

THE CONFEDERATE BATTLE FLAG IN HISTORY

NORTH & SOUTH

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY

VOLUME 4 • NUMBER 7

**WAS THERE A
COHERENT
CONFEDERATE
STRATEGY?**

**Why Did Abraham
Lincoln Choose War?**

“A Regular Slave Hunt”

**The Army of Northern Virginia and Black
Civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign**

\$4.99US \$5.99CAN




09>

0 71486 02860 4

“Mastery . . . elegance . . . lucidity.”

—James M. McPherson




Lee and His Army in Confederate History

GARY W. GALLAGHER

“Gallagher once again demonstrates the mastery . . . elegance . . . and lucidity . . . that have made him the foremost historian of the Army of Northern Virginia. The reasons for the morale and esprit that made this army such a feared fighting force are set forth more clearly here than anywhere else.”
—James M. McPherson, author of *For Cause and Comrades*

320 pp., 24 illus., 3 maps \$29.95 cloth
Civil War America



Pickett's Charge—The Last Attack at Gettysburg


EARL J. HESS

A definitive story of the charge, from both Union and Confederate perspectives.

“It is difficult to write something that is fresh and original on the battle. Earl Hess has succeeded. . . . This work will take its place as the new standard on Pickett's Charge.”

—D. Scott Hartwig, Historian, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

516 pp., 38 illus., 10 maps \$34.95 cloth
Civil War America



Gettysburg—The First Day

HARRY W. PFANZ

“An exhaustive and intimate description.”
—*Washington Post Book World*

“Completes a three-volume work that every serious student of the battle of Gettysburg must consult. Here is military history at its best.”—James I. Robertson Jr., author of *Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend*

496 pp., 54 illus., 16 maps \$34.95 cloth
Civil War America

— NOW IN PAPERBACK! —


In the Hands of Providence

Joshua L. Chamberlain and the American Civil War

ALICE RAINS TRULOCK

“Deserve[s] a place on every Civil War bookshelf.”
—*New York Times Book Review*


“History as it should be written.”—*Journal of Military History*
592 pp., 46 illus., 11 maps \$19.95 paper



THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

publishing excellence since 1922 | at bookstores or [800] 848-6224 | www.uncpress.unc.edu

JOHN H. EICHER AND DAVID J. EICHER



"Here is the reference work that Civil War historians have been waiting for."

—James M. McPherson, Professor of History, Princeton University, and Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*

"All students of the military side of the Civil War . . . should keep this volume near at hand." —Gary W. Gallagher, Nau Professor of History, University of Virginia

"Civil War High Commands is a bibliophile's tour de force and a Civil War aficionado's dream."

—Edwin C. Bearss, Historian Emeritus, National Park Service

Civil War High Commands

JOHN H. EICHER AND DAVID J. EICHER
Based on nearly five decades of research, this magisterial work is a biographical register and analysis of the 3,396 people who most directly influenced the course of the Civil War, its high commanders. 59.95 cloth


Stanford University Press

800-872-7423 | www.sup.org



Civil War Checks: Epic Design, Legendary Value

Honoring the struggle that shaped our nation, each check features a Civil War legend's striking portrait. Available only from Identity Check Printers, these Civil War checks are guaranteed to work with your bank. Matching address labels and embossed leather checkbook cover are available, too. You also get manufacturer-direct savings—including \$4 bonus on second box—plus the best in check fraud protection features. Make your checks something worth remembering—order today.



Civil War 9K33 (4 designs)



Matching Leather Cover L9K33



Matching Address Labels 9K133

ORDERING INSTRUCTIONS

Enclose all 4 of the following items in an envelope...

- A. Completed Order Form B. Voided Check (or reorder form) from current supply with any changes indicated C. Deposit Slip (also from current supply) D. Payment Check payable to IDENTITY CHECK PRINTERS

For Address Label Orders: On a separate sheet of paper, clearly print the information exactly as you wish it to appear on your order. Maximum 2 lines. Send this along with the other order items.

Name - 34 letters and/or spaces maximum.
Address - 50 letters and/or spaces maximum.

Customized Lettering: Standard lettering is shown on the products. Indicate your choice(s) for Customized Lettering on the Order Form.

- (C) Old (D) Script (E) Elegance (F) Contempo

Mail the completed order to:

IDENTITY
CHECK PRINTERS

15e Habla Español! P.O. Box 500 • Joppe, MD 21085-0500
1-800-874-5910 • www.identitychecks.com

100% Guarantee! If for any reason you are not completely satisfied, we will replace your order or refund your money. For your protection, orders will be shipped to the address on your checks unless we are otherwise instructed. All orders are shipped via bulk mail, (USA delivery only). Please allow 2-3 weeks for regular delivery.

A photocopy of this coupon is acceptable.

Offer expires 12/31/01

Name			
Daytime Phone ()			
E-mail Address:			
Check Design #	9K33		
Start checks with this number:	☐ 0000 ☐ 0001 ☐ 0002 ☐ 0003		
Save \$4 on 2nd Box	☐ Singles ☐ 200 - \$12.95 ☐ 400 - \$21.90 \$ ☐ Duplicates ☐ 150 - \$14.95 ☐ 300 - \$25.90 \$		
Customized Lettering Style #	add \$2.00 \$		
Individual Labels, Design #	9K133		
	☐ 144 Labels \$7.95 ☐ 288 Labels \$13.90 \$		
Customized Lettering Style #	add \$2.00 \$		
Leather Checkbook Cover Design #	L9K33 add \$19.95 \$		
SHIPPING & HANDLING add \$1.95 per box/item \$			
Express Mail Service, add \$7.00 (Includes In-Plant Rush & Priority Mail)	\$		
9KG226	SUBTOTAL \$		
Sales Tax only for delivery to Arkansas (6.125%) and Maryland (5%)	\$		
GRAND TOTAL \$			



Civil War Regiments (CWR) and North & South have joined forces! CWR offers balanced and in-depth military coverage (all theaters, North and South) in a lengthy, documented, and non-partisan format. How many times can you read about Pickett's Charge and Sherman's March in a 2,000 word cut-and-paste article? This new partnership will provide you with more photos, columns, and book reviews. Each

CWR offers meaty articles of real substance (5,000 to 18,000 words), with original maps, photos, columns, and book reviews. Each issue is laminated for durable use. Many of these collector's issues are in short supply, so order today! We guarantee your satisfaction!

CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA (Vol. 7, No. 1)
 "The Battles of Chattanooga Revisited," by Theodore P. Savas; "The
 Battle of Missionary Ridge," by Michael A. Hughes; "The Brigade of
 United States Regulars at Chickamauga," by Major Mark W. Johnson;
 "Cleburne and the Defense of Tunnel Hill," by Craig L. Symonds;
 "The 2nd Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters at Chickamauga and Chat-
 tanooga," by Lt. Col. Dana M. Mangham; "Chickamauga's Camp
 Thomas, 1898," by Richard A. Sauer. Book reviews, index, 192pp.
 Maps, photos, ISBN 1-882810-58-9. Paper \$12.00

THE WILDERNESS (Vol. 6, No. 4): "The Wilderness Revisited," by Theodore P. Savas; "The Battle of the Wilderness and Its Place in the Civil War," by Gordon C. Rhea; "Thomas Stevenson's Division on the Brock and Plank Roads," by Christopher L. Kolakowski; "Colonel Clark Moulton Avery and the 33rd North Carolina," by W. Keith Alexander; "The Death, Retrieval, and Remembrance of General James S. Wadsworth," by Eric Mink; "The Battles of Brigadier General John Marshall Jones," by Melissa Delcour; "Plashes and Ambushes: Irish Antecedents and the Fighting in the Wilderness," by Kelly O'Grady; "Preserving the Wilderness," by Mike Stevens; Book Reviews, and Index. 216pp. Original maps, photos. ISBN 1-882810-59-7. Paper, \$12.00.

GETTYSBURG: REGIMENTAL LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND (Vol. 6, No. 3): "The 35th Battalion Virginia Cavalry," by John Chapman; "Charles Reed and Bigelow's Battery," by Eric Campbell; "The 1st West Virginia Cavalry," by Steve Cunningham and Beth White; "Twice Lost: The 8th Louisiana's Battle Flag," by Terry Jones; "Major John Nevin and the 93rd Pennsylvania Infantry," by Dana Shoat; "The Reunion of the Philadelphia Brigade and Pickett's Division, July 1887," by D. Scott Hartwig; Book reviews, index, 208pp. Maps, photos, paper ISBN 1-882810-57-0 \$12.00

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN (Vol. 6, No. 2): "A German Volunteer in the Army of the Potomac," by Anders Hennrikson; "Layayette McLaws' Aide-de-Camp in Maryland," by Helen Tripp; "The 79th New York Highlanders," by Terry Johnston; "Battle for Burnside's Bridge," by Keith Toney; "The 118th PA Inf. at Shepherdstown," by Mark Snell; "The Civilians of Sharpsburg," by Ted Alexander; "The Lost Order and the Press," by Scott Sherlock. Book reviews, index, 208pp., maps, photos. Paper. ISBN 1-862810-56-2. \$12.00.

NORTH CAROLINA, THE FINAL BATTLES (Vol. 6, No. 1): "The 26th Wisconsin Infantry in the Carolinas," by Jim Pula; "The 1st USCT," by Roger Davidson; "The Battle of Town Creek," by Chris Fournelle; "Unpublished Confederates reports from Bentonville," by Mrk Bradley; "Stoneman's Carolinas Raid," by Chris Hattley, and an interview with Craig Symonds. Book reviews and index. 188pp. Maps. photos. ISBN 1-882101-54-6. Paper, \$12.00

CIVIL WAR, THE EARLY BATTLES (Vol. 5, No. 4): "The Fire Zouaves at First Bull Run," by Brian Pohanka; "The 1st Virginia Infantry (US) in Western Virginia," by Mark Bell; "Gulbor's Missouri Battery at Carthage & Wilson's Creek," by Jeff Patrick; "Ship Island and War in the Gulf," by Greg Bova; an interview with John Hennessey. Book reviews. 188pp. Maps, photos, index. ISBN 1-882810-55-4. Paper, \$12.00.

THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN (Vol. 5, No. 3): "Who Lost Lee's Foot?" by Wilbur Jones; "The Battle of South Mountain" by Robert Hartwig; "The 7th West Virginia Infantry and the Attack on the Bloody Lane," by Dave Mellott; "The 1st Texas Infantry in the Cornfield," by George Otolt; "A Brigade Commander's First Fight: The Antietam Letters of Colonel Phelps," Tom Clemens, ed. Book reviews, maps, photos, index. ISBN 1-882810-53-9. Paper. \$2.00

CHARLESTON: BATTLES AND SEACOAST OPERATIONS (Vol. 5, No. 2): "Amphibious Operations in the Department of the South," by Stephen R. Wise; "John Dahlgren's Marine Battalions," by Jeffrey Ryan; "Wild's African Brigade in the Siege of Charleston," by Steven D. Smith; and "First Blood on Sol Legare Island," by Patrick Brennan. Book Reviews. 168pp. Maps, photos, index. ISBN 1-882810-52-X. Paper \$12.00.

THE MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY COLLECTION (Vol. 5, No. 1) "The Sun Never Shined on a Braver and Truer Set of Soldiers: The 14th Tennessee Infantry Regiment," by Sgt. Robert T. Mockbee; "What I Know I Know, and I Dare Express It: The History of the 40th Georgia Infantry in the Vicksburg Campaign," by Maj. Raleigh S. Camp; "In the Field and on the Town with the Washington Artillery," edited by John Coski. Introduction, book reviews. 190pp. Maps, photos, index. ISBN 1-882810-51-1. Paper \$12.00.

FREDERICKSBURG (Vol. 4, No. 4): "The Death of General Cobb at the Stone Wall," by David Preston; "The Irish Brigade on Mayre's Heights," by Kevin O'Brien; "The Assault of the Pennsylvania Reserves," by Frank O'Reilly; "The 20th Massachusetts and the Street Fight in Fredericksburg," by Richard Miller; "Stonewall Jackson's Artillery and the Defense of Lee's Right Flank," by Greg Mertz. Book reviews; introduction by William Marvel. 174pp. Maps, photos, indexes. ISBN 1-882810-11-2. Paper, \$12.00.

CIVIL WAR BOOKS (Vol. 4, No. 3): A special issue with dozens of favorite authors discussing their favorite books! **LOW STOCK** Includes Wiley Sword, James I. Robertson, Chris E. Fonvielle, William Marvel, Patrick Brennan, Harry Planz, Gary Gallagher, and more. Many of these writers will surprise you with their selections. Also includes an article on Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner's lost Perryville battle report, an article on the CSS Hunley, book reviews, and index. **\$8.00. LOW STOCK**

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN (Vol. 4, No. 2): Intro. by Edwin C. Bearss; "Down the Louisiana Brigade at Mansfield," by Arthur D. Joiner and the Union Naval Expedition on the Red River," by Gary D. Joiner and Charles Vetter; "Colonel James H. Beard and the Consolidated Crescent Regiment," by Theodore P. Savas; "The Red River Campaign Letters of Lt. Charles W. Kennedy, 156th New York Infantry," edited by Edward Steers. Columns, book reviews, index. \$12.00.

THE MOUNTED ARM IN TENNESSEE (Vol. 4, No. 1): "Defending the Confederate Heartland: Henry Ashby's 2nd Tennessee Cavalry," by James Mohon; "The 5th Ohio Cavalry in the Shiloh Campaign," by Jay Jorgensen. Columns, book reviews, index. \$8.00

No. 1: "The 10th Louisiana Infantry Battalion," by Arthur Bergeron; "The 20th Maine," by Robert M. Russell; "The 2nd Maine Volunteer Infantry," by Anthony J. Milano; "The 1st Maine Volunteer Infantry," by Don Hillhouse. Columns, book reviews \$8.00 **LOW STOCK.**

SOLD OUT **No. 2: The Sumter Artillery: The 11th Battalion, Georgia Light**
as Speicher, "Wilderness to Petersburg: Unpublished Reports of the Sumter Artillery"; Midnight Engagement: John Geary's White Star Division at Wauhatchie," by Doug Cubbison. Columns, book reviews. \$8.00

SOLD OUT No 3: "The 6888 Central Postal Directory, Pennsylvania Infantry," by David A. Ward; "The 24th Central Postal Directory, John G. Walker's Division and the Relief of Fort Vicksburg," by Terrence J. Winschel; "Colonel Holden Putnam and the 93rd Illinois Infantry," by John W. Huelskamp. Columns, book reviews, \$8.00

No. 4: "All that Brave Men Could Do: Joseph Fingar's Florida Brigade at Cold Harbor," by Zack C. Waters; "The Battle of Belmont and the Citizen Soldiers of the 27th Illinois Infantry," by Peter Ellardson. Columns, book reviews, and Volume Three Index. \$8.00

No. 1: VICKSBURG. Intro. By Edwin C. Bearss. "The Confederate Loss of Vicksburg," by Jim Stanbery; The 1st Battalion, 1st Iowa at the Stockade Redan," by Terry Winschel; "The 22nd Iowa at the Railroad Redoubt," by Jerry Burden. Columns, book reviews. \$12.00.

No. 2: "The 1st GA Regulars at Sharpsburg," R. McMurry, ed.; "The 9th NY at the Crater," by Wm. Marvel; "The 148th Pennsylvania at Fort Crater," by Austin Brightman. Columns, book reviews. \$8.00

No. 3: *Dahlgren's Marine Battalions*, by Jeffrey T. Ryan; *Parson's*
SOLD OUT *the Red River Campaign*, by Anne J. Bailey; *The*
12th Virginia Infantry and the Retreat to Appomattox, by Chris
Calkins. Columns: book reviews.

No. 4: "The 11th Mississippi in the Army of Northern Virginia," by Steven Davis; "The 32nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry," by John M. Goski. Columns, book reviews, and Volume Two Index. \$8.00

No. 1: The Fredericksburg Artillery," by Robert K. Krick; "The Fredericksburg Artillery at Appomattox," by Sgt. C. B. Fleet, Chris Galkins, ed.; "The 37th Illinois Infantry at Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove," by Michael Mullins. Columns, book reviews, \$8.00

No. 2: "Duryee's Zouves," by Brian C. Pohanka; "Crawford's First Arkansas Cavalry," by Anthony C. Rushing; Columns, book reviews **LOW STOCK, \$8.00**

No. 3: "A Confederate Surgeon at Fort Donelson," Jim Stanbery, ed.; "The Pennsylvania Bucktails," by William Miller; "The 22nd Battalion VA Infantry," by Tom Brooks; "The Shoupade Redoubts: Joe Johnston's Chattahoochee River Line," by Greg Biggs. Columns, book reviews. **LOW STOCK \$8.00**

No. 4: "The 126th New York Infantry at Harpers Ferry," by Wayne Mahood; "The First Confederate Regiment Georgia Volunteers," by Pat Cates. Columns, book reviews, Volume One Index. \$8.00

PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING ISSUES OF *CIVIL WAR REGIMENTS*:

Vol. , # Vol. , # Vol. , # Vol. , # Vol. , # Vol. , #

☐ Payment Enclosed ☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard ☐ American Express ☐ Discover

#	Expires
---	---------

Send check or money order (US funds only) to:

North & South, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Telephone Orders: (559) 855-8637

US and Canada
shipping free,
Overseas shipping
charge \$1.00 per issue.

Civil War Society
Members: 10% discount.

NORTH & SOUTH

FEATURES

14 CONFEDERATE STRATEGY CONSIDERED

Was there a coherent Confederate strategy? Whose strategy was it? And what were its shortcomings?

—David Eicher, Joe Harsh, Richard McMurry, Robert Tanner, Russell Weigley, and Steve Woodworth.

24 A HOT TIME IN ASHLAND

Three and a half weeks into the Overland Campaign, a Union cavalry brigade found itself surrounded and in acute danger of being destroyed. —Gordon C. Rhea

38 WHY DID ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHOOSE WAR?

Slavery had little to do with Abraham Lincoln's determination to crush the secessionist states.

—Jeffrey R. Hummel

48 BATTLE FLAG

The Confederate battle flag in historical perspective.

—John M. Coski

64 THE OTHER HIGH WATER MARK

Four hundred and fifty miles southwest of Gettysburg, a stone wall runs along a ridge line. Lacking monuments, unmarked, and hardly visited, it nevertheless marks the high tide of the Confederacy in the west.

—Kenneth W. Noe

82 "A REGULAR SLAVE HUNT"


Perhaps as many as several hundred free blacks and contrabands—men, women, and children—were seized by the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, and taken into slavery. Was this the action of a few undisciplined units, or was it the settled policy of the army's high command? —Ted Alexander

DEPARTMENTS

- 2 Civil War Regiments
- 4 Editorial
- 5 Crossfire
- 8 Knapsack
- 46 Civil War Society
- 46 Cover Story

- 46 September Battlefield Tour
- 77 Do You Know?
- 78 North & South Back Issues
- 90 Briefings
- 97 Classified Ads


Map Graphics ©DLF Group, 2001



"Overland Campaign"


Battle of Hanover Court House
("A Hot Time in ashland," page 24)

Confederate Museum, University of Michigan



Battle-Scarred Banner
("Battle Flag," page 48)

Library of Congress



Emblem of the Abolitionist Cause
("A Regular Slave Hunt," page 82)

NORTH & SOUTH

EDITORIAL

PUBLISHER-EDITOR Keith Poulter
ASSISTANT EDITOR Terry A. Johnston, Jr.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Ted Alexander, Ed Bearss, Peter Bertram, Patrick Brennan,
Kent Masterson Brown, Joan Cashin, Richard DiNardo,
David Eicher, William B. Feis, Ed Frank, James R. Furquerson,
Gary Gallagher, Todd Groce, James O. Hall, Joseph L. Harsh,
James M. McPherson, Rob Markham, Wayne E. Motts,
Albert A. Nofi, William Garrett Piston, Gordon C. Rhea,
Richard Rollins, Richard Sauers, Theodore P. Savas,
Stephen W. Sears, William Shea, Jason H. Silverman,
John Y. Simon, Edward Steers, Jr., and Steven Woodworth

ART DEPARTMENT

ART DIRECTOR Joyce Gusner
MAP GRAPHICS DLF Group, David Fuller
PICTURE ARCHIVES Anne Hobart-Lang and Rolf Lang
CARTOONIST Joshua Weinberg

SUBSCRIPTIONS

NORTH & SOUTH, P.O. Box 1027, Escondido, CA 92033-1027

EDITORIAL

NORTH & SOUTH

33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667
PH (559) 855-8637 • FX (559) 855-8639 • Email: kpoulter@aol.com

MARKETING AND ADVERTISING

Rande Davis, Marketing and Advertising Director
19713 Beall Street, Poolesville, MD 20837
PH (301) 349-2219 • FX (301) 349-2758
Email: rsdmkt@prodigy.net

WEBSITE

Webmaster: D.H. Rule
www.northandsouthmagazine.com

DISTRIBUTION

Curtis Circulation Company
730 River Road, New Milford, NJ 07646-3048

NORTH & SOUTH is published monthly except for February, May, July, October, and December, by NORTH & SOUTH MAGAZINE, INC., 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. SUBSCRIPTIONS: US and Canada \$29.95 for seven issues (US funds), overseas \$39.95 (US funds). Application to Mail at Periodicals Postage Rates is pending at Tollhouse, CA and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: send address changes to NORTH & SOUTH, P.O. Box 1027, Escondido, CA 92033-1027. SUBSCRIPTION QUESTIONS: US & Canada call (800) 546-6707, foreign (559) 855-8637. Unless expressly stated, NORTH & SOUTH neither endorses nor is responsible for the contents of advertisements in its pages. Letters to the editor become the property of NORTH & SOUTH, and may be edited. NORTH & SOUTH accepts no responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts unaccompanied by return postage. Permission to reproduce the issue or parts thereof must be secured from the publisher.

PRINTED IN THE USA

ISSN 1522-9742

Copyright ©2001 by North & South, Inc.
All rights reserved. *North & South* is a registered trademark of
NORTH & SOUTH MAGAZINE, INC.

**For subscription information
see the feedback card and page 45.**

TELEPHONE ORDERS: (800) 546-6707

Editorial

EMBATTLED FLAG


IN THE ALMOST FOUR YEARS since *North & South* was launched, there has been a good deal of controversy over the Confederate battle flag—whether it should fly on the state capitol building in Columbia, whether it should constitute part of the state flags of Mississippi and Georgia, as well as questions relating to its more general use. I have made no kind of pronouncement on these issues, because I don't think it's my place to do so. I neither reside in any of the states in question, nor do I represent any group with a legitimate claim to involvement in the political controversy surrounding the flag—such as the NAACP or the SCV. Decisions have been taken by the citizens of the states in question, which seems to me—whatever the decisions—to be the proper course of action.

While I have not deemed it proper for *North & South* to get involved in the *politics* of the issue, it is appropriate that we cover the *history* of the matter. Accordingly this issue has an article, in my opinion an outstanding article, by John Coski of the Museum of the Confederacy, which traces the different ways in which the flag has been used, and viewed, from 1865 to the present day. I hope readers will find this historical perspective both interesting and enlightening. I do not imagine it will change a single person's political opinions about the current use of the flag (nor would I want it to do so), but just possibly it might help us all to appreciate why it is that different groups have such strong feelings about it—one way or another.

I will add one personal note. The battle flag figures—along with the Stars and Stripes—in the logo of the Civil War Society, of which *North & South* is the official magazine. The *historical* context of the logo is clear, and it seems altogether appropriate that the battle flag should be a part of it. And so it will remain.

* * * *

Finally, a word to new readers of the magazine, of whom there are many. Just because we have not become involved in the modern controversy over the battle flag, don't get the idea that we avoid controversy. In these pages you will find plenty of *historical* controversy. This issue's *Crossfire* contains what I intend to be the last shots fired in the "war" that has raged over Jim McPherson's article, "What Caused the Civil War?" (*North & South*, Vol. 4 #1). But I imagine Jeffrey Hummel's and Ted Alexander's articles in this issue will have low tech readers reaching for their pens, and their high tech counterparts jumping online. Just try to keep those letters to the editor to about 300-400 words. Please!





Crossfire

SIX ISSUES AGO, IN VOLUME 4, #1, we published an article by James M. McPherson entitled "What Caused the Civil War?" that triggered a mighty write-in by supporters and detractors of his argument. Whatever else this correspondence has demonstrated, it certainly confirms that *North & South* readers hold a wide variety of opinions! Out of curiosity I totaled up the pro- and anti-column inches in these last three issues of *Crossfire*: 106.5" pro, 101" anti. But all good things must come to an end, and entertaining though this correspondence has been, we do have many letters on other subjects waiting to be published. I therefore intend that with the publication of the following letters, coverage of this topic will cease, and we will move on to other things.

—Keith Poulter

"WHAT CAUSED THE CIVIL WAR?"

The cause of the War Between the States? It was not slavery, for four states that fought for the North kept their slaves, as did General Grant. It was not secession, for each state was sovereign, as recognized by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and the "Resumption of Powers" clauses of several states in their constitutional ratification ordinances, New York and Virginia for example, retained the explicit right to secede.

The South seceded because the North violated the covenant between the states, that covenant being known as the Constitution. Property rights in slaves was the specific clause, but whether the violation concerned property or any other right enshrined in the Constitution, the breach was caused by the North's refusal to honor the document itself.

Regardless of what we, now in 2001 think of the abomination that is slavery, the historical fact is that property rights are a foundation of the Constitution, and in 1861 slaves were property. When the North refused to respect the Constitutionally protected rights of Southern slave owners, they broke the Covenant.

WE WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS

Letters are often edited for length so we can include as many as possible. Write: *North & South* "Crossfire," 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667.

When parties are involved in such a contract, be it a business contract, a marriage covenant, or in our study, a Constitution for the states, the viability of, and continued existence of that agreement depends on fidelity to the terms of the instrument by all those involved. A breach of the terms of the covenant by one party absolves the other party of obligation to continue in the relationship.

The North demonstrated repeatedly that it would not respect the terms of the Constitution, so the South was legally and morally free to go its own way. Esotrine expositions on the 14th Amendment, fugitive slave laws, even the "3/5 Compromise," (which convinced the South to ratify the Constitution) only obfuscate the predominant issue: the North obrogated its responsibility to abide by the terms of the constitution, and the South was thereby relieved of the obligation to remain in the Union.



Library of Congress

Julia Grant

General Grant kept his (wife's) slaves during the war. General Lee inherited sixty-two slaves when his father-in-law died. General Lee freed his slave during the same war. Slavery is the greatest sin, but the South had every right to secede, and the North had no right to invade.

—Patrick McArthur
Fulshear, Texas

* * * *

I agree with Professor McPherson's comment that Abraham Lincoln has had more apocryphal statements attributed to him than any ten other Americans. Another pernicious arena for misinformation is the subject of General Grant's slaves. Allow me to elaborate a little more on this subject, as it is something I have read a little bit about.

Grant owned a single slave himself, a man named William Jones, who was acquired from

Frederick Dent, who could be either Grant's father-in-law or brother-in-law, more likely the former. Jones was manumitted by Grant on March 29, 1859, at a time when Grant needed the money that selling William would have brought. The details of this episode, along with much else about Grant and slavery, can be found in Brooks Simpson's recent biography of Grant, *Triumph Over Adversity*, or in Lloyd Lewis' somewhat older book, *Captain Sam Grant*. The deed of manumission, according to the footnotes in the Lewis book, is held by the Missouri Historical Society.

About Julia's four slaves we know both more and less. She mentions them a lot in her own memoirs, but their precise fate and even legal ownership is unclear. It is possible that legal title to them was held by her father. In her own memoirs, she says that they were freed "at the time of" the Emancipation Proclamation. Her use of the preposition "of" instead of "by" is significant here, because Missouri was of course exempt from the Emancipation Proclamation. One concludes then, albeit somewhat speculatively, that she or General Grant made the decision to free them regardless of the lack of legal requirement. The body of her memoirs supports this conclusion, because they more or less disappear from the narrative. The one exception is that of her nurse, who apparently stayed with Mrs. Grant but then ran off when Julia proposed to spend some time in Missouri. According to Mrs. Grant's memoirs, the nurse ran off because she feared being returned to slavery if she entered Missouri. This supports the notion that she was free at this time. This occurred in mid-January, 1864, when young Fred Grant was taken ill in St. Louis. In addition, Julia's memoirs contain an account of a visit to her father's home in the summer of 1864 (page 131 of the SIU Press edition) in which she speaks of all the family slaves being gone.

It thus appears that Julia Grant had rid herself of her slaves by early January 1863, and her father's slaves were all gone by the summer of 1864. The story that Grant kept slaves until after the war has no foundation in fact, no matter how many Internet sites say otherwise.

Perhaps the best comment on Grant's attitude toward slavery comes from Mary Robinson, one of the Dent family slaves, who said that Grant "wanted to give his wife's slaves their freedom as soon as possible."

—Jim Epperson, via email

* * * *

Previous correspondents in "Crossfire" have argued that Southerners would never have fought over such an illogical belief as the justice of slavery. If we take a look at the statements of many shapers of public opinion in

the antebellum south, however, we'll see that slavery was indeed the cause of secession and that secession caused the fighting. The few sources I cite here are pro-secession. There were also cooler heads in the South, but the pros outnumbered the cons. The South did not secede to gain relief from tariffs nor to expand their cotton fields into other territory. Secession was the only visible means of saving slavery. Did the North fight to abolish slavery? In most cases, no. Did the South fight to save slavery? Definitely.



Left to right: Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens (*Library of Congress*); Edmund Ruffin (*National Archives*); and Brigadier General Henry L. Benning (*Library of Congress*).

The only modern authority I will quote here, Kenneth Stampp (*America in 1857*), offers this: "Southern editors, politicians, and literary champions, in turn, frequently elected not to speak directly of the need to defend slavery but stressed instead the more abstract and elevated concepts of southern honor and constitutional rights...the terms were...almost invariably linked to slavery."

Fire-eaters North and South are a favorite scapegoat of revisionists. These evil-doers stirred the ignorant populace to action, we're told. Isn't it amazing that once secession was accomplished, these same people played minor roles in the actions of the Confederate government, if they had any input at all? A soldier made a very astute observation to his brother in 1862:

I do not agree with you entirely in attributing the war to ambitious politicians and corrupt editors and preachers. Such men are generally the scum which the *strong current of public sentiment throws to the surface as it sweeps along*. The[y] seem to guide the storm when in fact they are only driven before it, and they point you in the course only as a weather cock does, because they are the first to feel and yield to its earliest motion.

Let's look at one notorious fire-eater. Edmund Ruffin had a great deal to say about secession and he did a great deal to popularize the idea. His diary makes fascinating reading: October 22, 1860: "if Va. or N.C. were to [remain in the Union] it would be ruinous to such remaining slave holding states. Its then connection with the abolition states would com-

pel the speedy extinction of slavery.... The extinction of negro slavery, no matter how effected, would be a deadly blow to the prosperity of N.C. or Va." [Diary I:476] On October 29, 1860, Ruffin wrote to another extremist, William Lowndes Yancey, "I cannot doubt that you will view the result as I do—of the clear and unmistakable indication of future & fixed domination of the northern, section & its abolition policy over the southern states & people & their institutions, & the beginning of a sure & speedy program to the extermination of

negro slavery & the consequent utter ruin of the prosperity of the south. I cannot doubt that you will see but one passage for escape from the impeding and awful dangers & calamities—by secession of some, (if all are not then ready) of the southern states from the union with the northern...."

Then came the election of Abraham Lincoln, whom some readers seem to think the South had no reason to fear. Ruffin recorded, "the momentous election [of Lincoln] will serve to show whether...the institution of slavery, on which the social & political existence of the south rests, is to be secured by our resistance or is to be abolished in a short time." [Diary I:482] Governor Joe Brown, the Confederate government's thorn in the side, addressed the people of Georgia in a public letter on December 7, 1860: "Mr. Lincoln is a mere mote in the great political atmosphere of the country...the mere representative of a fanatical abolition sentiment...hostile to the institution of slavery.... The rights of the South and the institution of slavery are in imminent danger from the triumph of the powerful party which he represents.... What will be the result to the institution of slavery which will follow submission to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln...it will be the total abolition of slavery, and the utter raining of the South."

Henry L. Benning in November 1860 told the Georgia legislature, "We have data from which we may announce this position; that abolition, dire evil as it is, is inevitable, unless something is done to mollify this hostility to slavery on the part of the north, or to prevent the North from acquiring the power to abolish slavery. Whatever remedy is proposed,

[there must be] a capacity to change the will in the north [or] the capacity to prevent the North from acquiring the power to abolish it.... If you were to separate from the North, the power to abolish slavery by the North would be taken away.... The separation from the North would then be a perfect remedy for all diseases."

What about the abuse of the Constitution by the northern majority? Lately champions of the South have brought this old idea to the forefront again. Let's look at the southern idea of the Constitution at the time, as epitomized in The Resolution of Resistance offered in the Alabama Convention that declared the secession of the state: "Whereas, the only bond of union between the several States is the Constitution of the United States; and whereas that Constitution has been *violated* [by action of the North] *denying* to the people of the Southern States their Constitutional rights, [Lincoln was elected] upon the avowed *principle* that the Constitution of the United States *does not recognize property in slaves* and that the Government should *prevent its extension... slavery, in time, should be exterminated*;... absolves the people of Alabama from all obligation to continue to support a Government of the United States." A delegate to that same convention added, "I vote for the ordinance [of secession] by an overwhelming necessity. Years ago I was convinced that the Southern States would be compelled either to separate from the North, by dissolving the Federal Government, or they would be compelled to abolish the institution of African Slavery.... The day is now come, and Alabama must... secede from the Union...or she must submit to a policy on the part of the Federal Government that, in a short time, will compel her to abolish African Slavery." (Italics are in the original.)

The fiery South Carolinian L.W. Spratt, in his letter of complaint on the Confederate Constitution (Spratt wanted a renewal of the African Slave Trade) shows how providence stepped in to save the day for the South and southern honor:

I am bound to own that Giddings, and Greeley, and Seward, and Lincoln, parasites as they are, panderers to popular taste as they are, the instruments and the mere instruments of aggression, have done more to rouse us to the vindication of our rights than the bravest and the best among us.... Slavery was within [the government's] grasp, and forced to the option of extinction in the union or independence out, *it dares to strike, and assert its claim to nationality* and its right to recognition among the leading social systems of the world. Such, then being the nature of the contest, this union has been disrupted in the effort of slave society to emancipate itself. (Italics his.)

The clergy spent hours and hundreds of thousands of pages justifying secession to pro-

tect the divinely ordained institution of domestic slavery. Reverend Mr. Hall, chaplain of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, addressed the men: "We may rest assured that this war is not designed to abolish or injure slavery.... This war has set the seal of providence before the eyes of the world upon the stability of domestic slavery and of Southern Society: It has refuted the slanders of our enemies upon the character of the Southern people, it has torn off the silver veil from the face of Northern character and revealed to a disgusted world the hideous features of the false prophet.... we are permitted to vindicate the supremacy of Jehovah's word and the purity of his government. This explains why the Southern clergy... have shown such an active, sympathy with this political revolution."

Finally, the vice president of the Confederacy, a statesman who in the beginning did not believe immediate secession was necessary, looked back on March 21, 1861, and told his Savannah audience, "African slavery, as it exists among us [is] the proper *status* of the negro in our form of civilization. *This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution.* Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' [Jefferson wrongly thought] *that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature;... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition. This, our new Government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.*" (Italics his.)

These are only scattered statements of a few men. But If the student of the war reads the papers of the participants, he finds a consistency in thinking: Secession was the cause of the war; slavery was the cause of secession.

—Barry W. Bracken, Palm Coast, Florida

John B. Woodard's intemperate (to put it kindly) letter to the editor (Vol. 4, Number 5) reflects the sort of madness that sometimes gets in the way of any reasonable exchange as to the issues arising from studies of the "causes" of the Civil War and matters concerning its conduct. It's discouraging to encounter such deliberate blindness.

Mr. Woodard says that "your agenda is one of the liberal elite." I doubt that he has any real grasp of the meaning of those words. In any case, I am an admiring reader of N&S (and a direct descendant of a member of Company F of the 54th Virginia). If that makes me "liberal" and "elite" then I will gladly suffer Mr. Woodard's opprobrium.

Mr. Woodard needs to go back to school. His understanding of American history is warped.

—John A. Carnahan
Columbus, OH

Your "complexity" editorial [volume 4, #4] is exactly right and beautifully written.


—Colonel C.A. Jorgenson, USMC (ret)
Vienna, Virginia

I have read the letters from Ron Jones and G.D. Stalnaker ("Crossfire," vol. 4, #4). They rant against James McPherson but appear to forget the subject of his article—what caused the Civil War, not what happened *during* the Civil War. Their approach is similar to those who claim the Holocaust never happened or that slavery was a happy association between races. They attack to cover up their lack of defense. The recent article by Charles Dew ["Apostles of Secession," vol. 4, #4] is the crux of the discussion. We are not concerned about northern sins during the war, we are not concerned about how many slaves Grant owned, or whether child labor laws were just or unjust. These are a smoke screen to hide a darker issue: What led the south to fire at Fort Sumter? The words of the secessionists are there for anyone to read. If either of your correspondents cares to read them, they will realize that the main and only issue that concerned the entire nation was the issue of slavery and slavery alone. As for McPherson being a "revisionist," that is indeed ironic. He is stating the obvious, while these two writers are parroting the revisionist theories developed by the South after the war. But it is easy to see why these two men defend the "lost cause" so strongly. Men like Mr. Stalnaker don't wish to acknowledge that their forefathers, whom they take a great deal of pride in, fought for a cause so inglorious (to modern eyes) as slavery. Like Germans who created the concept of "good Germans" after World War II to separate themselves from the Nazis, many modern southerners like to emphasize a "noble cause" concept, to separate themselves from the ugly issue of slavery. Yet we cannot simply condemn the men who fought for the Confederacy, who fought for white supremacy and slavery, because to their way of thinking, that was proper. But now in the 21st century, it is time to face the sad fact that the Confederate cause really wasn't that noble. In fact, it was downright anti-American—in both deed and concept. Many of today's southerners like Jones and Stalnaker appear to be stuck in the past. They forget it was the northern states' rights that were being threatened by the southern states' desire to extend slavery to all areas. The Dred Scott case is a classic example of how northern states' rights to control and restrict slavery were directly challenged by the pro-southern Supreme Court....

—Gerald Tamura, Anchorage, Alaska

ED.: In criticizing the earlier letters, it seems to me Gerald goes too far in the other direction. Certainly slavery—or at any rate, race—was at the heart of the conflict. So much so that it seems safe to say that if slavery had not existed there would have been (continued on page 96)

CIVIL WAR 2002 CALENDAR



A Striking Collection of images by
Chris E. Heisey, America's most
published Civil War photographer.

"Chris Heisey's powerful photographs capture in eloquent fashion landscapes and monuments of the American Civil War. His splendid images underscore the need to protect our historic sites."


—Dr. Gary Gallagher, leading authority on Civil
War history of the University of Virginia

Available at bookstores nationwide or by
calling toll-free **1-888-461-4619**.

Published by Tidemark Press:
www.tidemarkpress.com

A portion of the proceeds will be donated to
battlefield preservation efforts

NOW AVAILABLE




The Confederate Regimental History Digital Library™

CD-ROM Version 1.0

is a searchable product that contains the complete text of over 100 rare and out of print regimental histories and personal narratives written by actual Confederate veterans between the late 1860s and early 1920s. Free product details, sample chapters, and purchase information available at:

WWW.CIVILWARANCESTOR.COM
P.O. Box 804421, Chicago, IL 60680-4421



Albert A. Nofi

Knapsack A CIVIL WAR DIGEST

SHORT ROUNDS

Close Order Drill

Passing through Georgia on some military business, a distinguished Confederate major general—apparently William Hardee, author of *Hardee's Tactics*—chanced to stop for a time in a small country village. The news of his presence soon reached the ears of the commander of the local home guard company. Since the captain was proud of the skill with which his little command executed the various evolutions in the drill book, he decided to put on a show for the general.

The captain had his company fall in outside the general's quarters and began to put the men through their paces. Within a few minutes the captain's shouted orders and his company's prompt and military response had attracted the general's attention, and he came outside to watch.

The guardsmen, mostly old men and young boys, plus the somewhat disabled and a few men exempt from regular service for occupational reasons, were doing quite nicely until their commander decided to attempt a complex countermarch maneuver at the double-quick. Within seconds the neat formation which the men had hitherto maintained disintegrated and the company was left in what one observer described as a "solid circle." In his most stentorian tone the frustrated captain cried out "Halt!" and, with some embarrassment, surveyed the mess into which he had gotten his men. The general looked on with renewed interest as the captain seemed to sink deep in thought.

Then, suddenly, the captain's face brightened, and he called out "Company, disentangle to the front, march!"

Within seconds the company was back in proper formation. The general

came over, and the officer, who had expected a withering blast of major general's proportions, received instead the general's compliments on having issued the best command he had ever heard given.

Old Hannah

Robert Collyer, a journalist, recounted the following tale in a letter to Frank Moore, a newspaperman and author, who incorporated it in his *Anecdotes, Poetry, and Incidents of the War*, published in New York in 1866.

When I was in Jefferson[, Missouri], in the fall of 1862, I found the hospitals in the most fearful condition you can imagine. I cannot stop to tell you all the scenes I saw; it is enough to say that one poor fellow had lain there sick on the boards, and seen five men carried away dead, one after another, from his side. He was worn to a skeleton, worn through, so that

great sores were all over his back, and filthy beyond description.

One day, a little before my visit, Old Hannah, a black woman, who had some washing to do for a doctor, went down the ward to hunt [the doctor] up. She saw this dying man, and had compassion on him, and said, "O, doctor, let me bring this man to my bed, to keep him off the floor."

The doctor said, "The man is dying; he will be dead tomorrow." Tomorrow came, and. Old Hannah could not rest. She went to see the man, and he was still alive. Then she got some help, took her bed, put the man on it, and carried him boldly to her shanty; then she washed him all over, as a woman washes a baby, and fed him with a spoon, and fought Death, hand to hand, day and night, and beat him back, and saved the soldier's life.

FROM THE GRAPEVINE

- > In the Union army colonels were five times more likely to be the subjects of courts martial proceedings than were privates.
- > In 1836 1st Lieutenant Robert Anderson's star pupil in artillery tactics at West Point was Cadet Pierre G.T. Beauregard, who considered Anderson his favorite instructor and who, twenty-five years later, directed the bombardment of Fort Sumter, which Anderson commanded.
- > During the Peninsular Campaign in mid-1862, the Confederate army acquired some 60,000 nearly new blue great coats, which had been discarded by retreating Union troops.
- > Surprised while preparing supper by a Union attack during the Battle of Spotsylvania on the night of May 9, 1864, the men of the 3rd Arkansas nevertheless rallied rapidly and went into action behind their commanding officer, Colonel Robert S. Taylor, who led their counterattack wielding a frying pan.
- > Mary Todd Lincoln's closest confidant during the war was Mrs. Elizabeth Keckley, a black seamstress who had once been employed by Varina Davis.
- > His exalted status as vice president-elect of the United States did not prevent Union quartermasters from confiscating horses belonging to Andrew Johnson during Confederate General John Bell Hood's Tennessee Campaign of 1864.
- > In 1869 former Confederate Brigadier General Thomas Jordan joined the Cuban Revolutionary Army, attaining the position of chief-of-staff and later that of commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces. By the time the uprising collapsed in 1878, he had a \$10,000 price on his head.
- > By mid-1863 the war was costing the federal government about \$2.5 million a day.
- > Not until August 1861 did Congress get around to providing for the retirement of senior officers, a provision that was immediately invoked by Colonel William Whistler of the 4th Artillery, who had been continuously on active duty since 1801.
- > Touring the trenches before Petersburg one day in late 1864, General Robert E. Lee found that Brigadier General Archibald Gracie, Jr., was continually obscuring his view as he observed points of interest in the Yankee lines. Said Lee, "General, you should not expose yourself so much," to

We make every effort to check the accuracy of anecdotes published in "Knapsack," but many were written down years after the event and in some cases are undoubtedly folk tales rather than genuine reminiscences.

"If we must die, let us die like men."

—Patrick R. Cleburne

The day before I went to Jefferson, the man had gone on a furlough to his home in Indiana. He besought Hannah to go with him, but she could not spare time; there was all that washing to do. She went with him to the steamboat, got him fixed just to her mind, and then kissed him, and the man lifted up his voice, as she left, and wept like a child.

I say we have grown noble in our suffering.

Comparative Artillery Ammunition Expenditure, 1854-1913

Although considered essentially an infantryman's war, the expenditure of artillery ammunition during the Civil War was rather impressive. Indeed, during the war Union army artillerymen fired approximately five million rounds of ammunition, the highest expenditure in any war between the fall of Napoleon and World War I.

WAR	DURATION IN MONTHS	ARMY	AMMUNITION EXPENDED	
			TOTAL	GUN PER DAY
Crimean (1854-1856)	17	Allied	?	5.0
Italian (1859)	2	Austrian	15.3	3.0
American Civil (1861-1865)	48	U.S.	5,000.0	4.0
Seven Weeks (1866)	2	Austrian	96.4	22.0
		Prussian	36.2	8.0
Franco-Prussian (1870-1871)	6	German	817.0	1.1
Russo-Japanese (1904-1905)	11	Russian	954.0	4.0
Balkan (1912-1913)	9	Bulgarian	700.0	7.0

DURATION is actual months of combat, which are usually shorter than periods of hostilities; ARMY indicates the side for which information is known; ALLIED is for the combined British and French forces; TOTAL is the approximate number of rounds expended during the war, in thousands; GUN PER DAY is the number of rounds fired per gun or howitzer per day during the war.

Note that the Austrian figure in the above table for the Seven Weeks War is anomalous, as a major portion of the Austrian army was in Italy, and Italian artillery expenditures are unknown. Nevertheless, even the overall Austrian rate of expenditure, 96,400 rounds in two months, was lower than the average monthly Union army expenditure

during the Civil War (c. 104,200), despite long periods of relative inactivity in 1861 and during four winters. Interestingly, armies went into World War I with artillery ammunition stockpiles that permitted a higher rate of expenditure than in most of the previous wars, including the Civil War. But shell expenditure exceeded even the most optimistic estimates: by September 1914 French artillerymen were already firing eight rounds per tube per day, which rose to thirty-four by the end of the war.

which Gracie—who was trying to shield Lee from Union marksmen—replied, "If I should not, General Lee, why should you?" Lee smiled and retired to a less exposed position.

JUNIOR OR SENIOR?



which Gracie—who was trying to shield Lee from Union marksmen—replied, "If I should not, General Lee, why should you?" Lee smiled and retired to a less exposed position.


The April 2001 issue [vol. 4, #4], p. 8, mentions Confederate Brigadier General Archibald Gracie, Sr. (senior). Gracie is listed as Jr. (Junior) in Warner's *Generals in Gray*, the *Official Records*, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, and Boatner's *Civil War Dictionary*.

If his son went by the name of Archibald Gracie, Jr., perhaps he did not know his father was a Jr. The inscription on Brig. Gracie's Gravestone in Woodlawn Cemetery, New York City, reads: "Archibald, son of Archibald and Elizabeth D. Gracie." Note that no "Jr." is on the Gravestone!

The date of death on the Gravestone is correct. Gracie was killed at Petersburg, Virginia, by enemy shell explosion, Dec. 1864.

—E. H. Rucker, Jr., M.D.
Newport News, Virginia

AL NOFI RESPONDS: It was not unusual in those days for people to abandon the "Jr." after a while. President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, was a Jr., but abandoned it on the death of his father. His son—who died shortly after earning a Medal of Honor on D-Day—was also a junior. Since then the family has adopted numbers, but the numbering is off, because the president's son was the first to keep "Junior" for his entire life.



Ambrotype portrait of Archibald Gracie, Jr.
Museum of the Confederacy

"Well, Captain, I Reckon . . ."

In May 1898, while preparing to take the field during the Spanish-American War, Troop A of the New York Volunteer Cavalry undertook a cross-country training march in Virginia one day. Toward evening, the troop commander, Captain Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., began looking for a place to camp. Spotting a field that had a good water supply and plenty of grass, Coudert asked an old farmer if he could bed the troop there for the night.

For a few moments the old gent seemed to mull the request over in his mind. After giving the captain the once over, he slowly took the corn cob pipe from between his lips and spoke.

"Well, captain, I reckon you're Federal soldiers, and the last time I seen that blue uniform I was a-shootin' at it a-back of that rock down the road a piece. But I suppose it's all over now, and you can have the field."

PROFILE

Uniform Expenses

At the start of the war both armies had elaborate uniform regulations, the Confederacy adopting virtually unchanged those of the prewar U.S. Army. A look at the cost of uniforming an infantry regiment of approximately a thousand enlisted men can give some notion of the cost of putting an army into the field. The dollar figures cited are for April 1861, when Union and Confederate currency was more or less trading at par.

A Union soldier's full uniform cost about \$30.00 in April 1861. A Confederate soldier's uniform ran much higher, well over \$50.00, due to the relative shortage of manufactured goods in the South. On this basis, uniform costs for an infantry regiment were about \$30,000 for the Union and well over \$50,000 for the Confederacy, assuming a thousand enlisted men in the regiment, as officers had to supply their own uniforms.

Initial Uniform Costs For One Infantryman, 1861

ITEM ISSUED	NUMBER	COST PER ITEM	
		U.S.	C.S.
Blouse	1	\$2.15	?
Cap Cover	1	.25	.38
Caps	2	.63	1.00
Coat	2	6.71	8.00
Drawers	3	.50	1.00
Great Coat	1	7.20	25.00
Hat	1	1.98	?
Rubber Blanket	1	1.00	?
Shirts	3	.88	1.00
Shoes, pair	2	1.94	3.00
Stock	1	.25	.25
Stockings, pair	2	.26	.50
Trousers	3	3.03	4.00
Woolen Blanket	1	3.50	7.50
TOTAL:		\$30.28	\$51.63 +

Uniform costs for mounted troops, artillerymen, and certain specialist troops were somewhat different. In addition, cavalrymen, artillery drivers, and wagoners were issued a stable frock (to protect their uniforms while cleaning up manure), while engineers and ordnance men received a set of fatigue overalls.

Of course at the beginning of the war there were many variations in the kit issued to newly mustered troops. In both

North and South many regiments were mustered into service with their own very elaborate uniforms; the Union's 7th New York and the Confederacy's Washington Artillery come readily to mind. In addition, many newly raised regiments found themselves only partially outfitted, or outfitted in a fashion other than that prescribed in regulations, due to shortages in the availability of uniforms and equipment. It was rare, for example, for volunteer troops ever to receive a hat, blouse, or stock (a choker), which were dress uniform items. More typical is the uniform issued the 7th Wisconsin, outfitted at state expense from locally available resources, which was mustered into federal service in August 1861.

Cost to Uniform One Infantryman: 7th Wisconsin Volunteers

ITEM ISSUED	NUMBER	EACH
Cap & Cover	1	\$1.00
Great Coat	1	7.50
Rubber Blanket	1	1.00
Shirt	2	1.38
Shoes, pair	1	1.87
Stockings, pair	2	.30
Summer Coat & Trousers	1	4.63
Winter Coat & Trousers	1	9.50
Woolen Blanket	1	3.50
TOTAL:		\$30.68

Although the Wisconsinites were uniformed to a less elaborate scale than that detailed in army regulations, the actual cost of outfitting them was slightly more than that prescribed in regulations, due to rising costs at a time of rapid mobilization. Eventually some of the differences between the items the state supplied—and what it paid for them—and what the federal government prescribed were made good, though there was an unpleasant exchange of notes between the two jurisdictions as to who owed what to whom. Overall, however, Union infantrymen were outfitted along the lines of the men of the 7th Wisconsin, rather than according to the more elaborate official regulations. Of course, the federal supply situation grew steadily better as the war went on. Moreover, as time went on the troops found that they could manage with a lot less than the prescribed allotments. For Confederate troops this was making a virtue of a necessity, since their quartermaster department was

never up to the task of outfitting them according to regulations. They frequently made do with captured Union uniforms, eked out by civilian clothing and occasional bits and pieces of their prescribed uniforms.

By the way, both sides had the same regulations governing the replacement of uniform items.

Uniform Issue Cycle: Union and Confederate Armies, 1861

ITEM ISSUED	YEAR OF SERVICE		
	1ST	2ND	3RD
Blouse	1	—	—
Cap Cover	1	1	1
Caps	2	1	1
Coat	2	1	1
Drawers	3	2	2
Fatigue Coveralls *	1	—	1
Great Coat	1	—	—
Hat	1	—	—
Rubber Blanket	1	—	—
Shirts	3	3	3
Shoes, pair	2	2	2
Stable Frock **	1	1	1
Stock	1	—	—
Stockings, pair	2	2	4
Trousers	3	2	2
Woolen Blanket	1	—	—

Theoretically each year's allotment of uniform items was divided into two batches, one for issue in the spring and one in the fall.

* Engineers and ordnance men, actually issued once every two years

** Cavalrymen, mounted artillerymen, and wagoners.

BIOFILE

Charles Brunner, Volunteer for the Union

Charles Brunner (1834-?) was one of numberless ordinary people caught up in the nation's greatest conflict. A native of Northampton County, Pennsylvania, his early life is obscure. Chancing to be in Wisconsin in August 1862, he enlisted in Company B, 23rd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, the only Pennsylvanian in the regiment. Nevertheless, he was either well known locally or an impressive figure, for he promptly became first sergeant of his company.

The 23rd had a busy career. After a short period of basic training it served for a time on occupation duty in Kentucky,

and was then assigned to Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's command. Brunner's regiment took part in the Chickasaw Bayou expedition, the investment and capture of Arkansas Post, and Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign.

Brunner first attracted attention at Port Gibson (May 1, 1863), the opening battle of Grant's final drive on Vicksburg. As his regiment attacked, the color sergeant went down. Seizing the colors, Brunner led the men forward, planting the flag on the enemy positions despite heavy fire. Two weeks later, at the Battle of Champion Hill (May 16), the 23rd Wisconsin wavered during the attack. Seizing the colors, Brunner cried out "Boys, follow! Don't flinch from your duty!" and led the men forward again, to take and hold the enemy position. On the very next day, Brunner's regiment was back in action, at the Battle of the Big Black River.

At the Big Black, a short but heated affair, Brunner's company was ordered to support the positioning of a cannon so that a troublesome Confederate battery could be brought under fire. The piece was emplaced and soon hotly engaged. Very quickly most of the artillerymen and their infantry supports were put out of action. Brunner rallied the men in time to beat off a determined enemy attack in

hand-to-hand combat, during which he was several times on the verge of capture.

Then followed the siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered on July 4, 1863, and a short expedition against Jackson, Mississippi, to beat off a Confederate relief column. By this time Brunner had received a commission as second lieutenant, and on July 29 he submitted his resignation from the army in order to take care of pressing personal business. He had fought in a series of major battles, personally capturing three enemy battle flags, and yet does not seem ever to have been wounded, despite the fact that dozens of his comrades had been killed or injured. With his discharge he disappears into the mists of history.

"Arms and the Man"

Thanks to Joseph G. Bilby, author of *Civil War Firearms* (Combined Books, 1996), who contributed this photograph and the following description. It was to appear in Louis A. Garavaglia's and Charles G. Worman's article, "Arms and the Man" (special infantry tactics issue, *N&S*, vol. 4, #6), but missed the deadline.

These are old and new Civil War guns photographed at a regional North-South Skirmish Association event. Left to right: well-made Belgian Minié rifle, basically a copy of the French carabine a tige, but



scaled down to .58 caliber (the so-called "beautiful Minié"); Navy Arms reproduction of an iron-frame Henry rifle, in .44-40; original Model 1854 Austrian Jaeger rifle, in .54 caliber; Pedersoli reproduction of a Sharps carbine. The European guns were imported in 1861-63 to remedy Union small arms shortages. □

Humiliating Punishments

MEN CONVICTED by court-martial were often not just punished, but intentionally humiliated, both as a reward for their misbehavior and as an example to others. This policy reached as far up the chain of command as the rank of major. For example James H. Lane, a major with the 31st USCT, was convicted of cowardice. He was cashiered, his sword broken, his buttons and shoulder straps cut off in front of his regiment, and he was sent to the Dry Tortugas for the rest of his enlistment. Major Alexander S. Hill of the 18th Corps d'Afrique was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and received the same punishment, minus the sword-breaking.

Seven Union captains were similarly humiliated. Frank H. Lane of the 11th Michigan went to the rear at the Battle of Resaca, remarking, "I've been at the front as long as I care to." He had his shoulder straps torn off in front of his regiment, and his

crime published in his hometown newspaper. Major General George H. Thomas, reviewing the case, suggested that Lane should have been shot. Captain Hooker DeLand, of the 1st Michigan Sharpshooters, quitted three different battlefields, and was heard to say, "I don't wish to be killed just now." He had his sword broken, his shoulder straps cut off, and was put to hard labor, along with the usual dismissal in disgrace and article in his hometown newspaper. The other five captains received similar punishments, including William Arnold, of whom it was said, "It shall be disgraceful for any man to associate with the prisoner."


Fifteen lieutenants suffered equal disgrace. Daniel S. Place of the 18th Indiana helped Confederate prisoners with their illegal correspondence. His sword was "broken by a non-commissioned officer," and his shoulder straps cut off. Charles Conzet of the 123rd Illinois was to have his shoulder straps cut off and then be shot, but after a series of appeals his sentence was commuted to a period in prison.

Noncommissioned officers were also the subject of public humiliation. Thirty-one sergeants and thirty corporals had their chevrons cut off in front of their regiments, including the drunken Corporal William Young of the 2nd U.S. Artillery, whose chevrons were "to be cut off by the bugler," as Young departed for his six months at Alcatraz.

The lowly privates had no badges of rank to lose, but forty-four had their coat buttons cut off, and several, such as Private Thomas Jackson of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who was arrested drunk, absent without leave, and in a house of prostitution, had their uniforms removed and were drummed out of the service in their underwear—usually a long way from home.

It is not known if these humiliations improved the behavior of others, but they must have been dramatic moments for the individuals involved.


—Contributed by Thomas P. Lowry
Woodbridge, Virginia

A detailed oil painting of President Jefferson Davis, showing him from the chest up. He has dark, wavy hair, a high forehead, and a serious expression. He is wearing a dark suit jacket over a white shirt and a dark bow tie. The background is a dark, mottled brown.

Confederate Strategy

David Eicher, Joe Harsh, Richard McMurry, Robert Tanner,
Russell Weigley, and Steve Woodworth

Above: President Jefferson Davis (*Museum of the Confederacy*).
Opposite: General Robert E. Lee (*Washington and Lee University, Lexington*).



Considered

Davis' instincts kept Lee from wagering all on the outcome of a single battle and thus may have prolonged the Confederacy's life—or prevented Lee from securing its continued existence by means of an overwhelming victory.

Questions abound concerning Confederate grand strategy.

Was there a consistent strategy? If so, what was it? Was there a potentially winning strategy? Why did Confederate strategy fail? Who was responsible for that failure? And so forth. We invited a panel of historians—all of whom have written on the subject—to engage in an initial exploration of these questions, as a foundation for future, more in-depth articles.

KEITH POULTER: Let's begin with a fundamental question. What strategic options did the Confederates have?


RUSSELL WEIGLEY: Only two military strategies offered a plausible chance of winning independence for the Confederacy: General Robert E. Lee's strategy of accepting the risks of the initiative and of aggressive war, and General Joseph E. Johnston's strategy of avoiding costly battles to trade space for time and for lives in order to exhaust the patience of the North and deny Abraham Lincoln reelection in 1864.

Lee's strategic thinking matured while he suffered two experiences which demonstrated that a relatively passive cordon defense would not work. In September 1861 he failed to drive the Federals from the future state of West Virginia because the overall defensive posture of the Confederacy, trying to guard its entire circumference, did not allow him enough resources to repossess an area where the enemy was already ensconced. And then, from November 1861 to March 1862, as commander of South Atlantic coastal defenses, he could not prevent Federal amphibious expeditions from making repeated inroads along the South Carolina, Georgia, and northern Florida coasts, because he could only react after the Federals had chosen where to strike. If the Federals were allowed to retain the initiative, Lee reasoned, they could repeat this process again and again, consistently multiplying their advantages in manpower and resources. Only if the Confederates seized the initiative could the South choose the points of collision and thereby have the chance at even odds, or with skill and luck even favorable odds, when the rival armies collided.

While he was military adviser to President Jefferson Davis after March 13, 1862, Lee began to put into effect his strategy of grasping the initiative, as co-

author of Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Valley Campaign. After he took command on June 1 of the Army of Northern Virginia, he consistently applied the strategy of the initiative as long as his resources in manpower allowed, usually attacking tactically even when he was obliged to be on the strategic defensive, but going over to the strategic offensive whenever possible.

longer enough territory to trade off for time and lives to afford a fair test. Still, it is doubtful whether the Confederate government and people would have accepted a Johnstonian strategy of yielding ground even from the beginning. George Washington had employed a similar strategy during the War of Independence, but then the rebel population more readily accepted losses of territory because no-



The Museum of the Confederacy

The crew of the Confederate commerce raider *Shenandoah*, not knowing the war had ended, burned nine US whalers in June 1865. Despite limited Confederate successes at sea, the US Navy's domination of the oceans and rivers was a major factor in the defeat of the Confederacy.

After the defeat at Gettysburg, however, Lee no longer had the men, nor the necessary support from President Davis, to advance north of the Potomac for a third time. This predicament reveals the great flaw in Lee's strategy of the initiative—the cumulative loss of the scarcest of all the Confederacy's limited resources, its men. Herein lies the attractiveness of Joe Johnston's alternative strategy of a flexible defense that yielded territory in order to buy time and save lives, so that by the 1864 Northern election the voters would not see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel and would replace Lincoln with a president willing to negotiate Confederate independence.

Another part of the appeal of Johnston's strategy to the historian is that it was not tested until too late, in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign. By then there was no

one entertained high expectations of the government of the Continental Congress anyway. But the citizens of the Confederacy had been accustomed for generations to the protection offered them by a strong United States, and they would not have taken kindly to substituting for such protection a Confederate government that did not vigorously defend its ground against its military enemies. Besides that, much of the Confederacy's territory along its border with the North was too valuable economically and politically to be abandoned deliberately.

So a Joe Johnston strategy, though tempting because of its conservation of lives and the George Washington analogy, was never politically acceptable. That left the R. E. Lee strategy, which at least carried a plausible promise of demoralizing the North enough, especially if vic-

tories could have been won on Northern soil at Antietam and Gettysburg, to make peace negotiations possible on Confederate terms. Lee's strategy also took account the desirability of a short war. If Lee's strategy proved too expensive in Confederate lives, it was still the only possible Confederate strategy carrying any semblance of a rationally acceptable promise of success.

To say that, of course, is to concede that probably no available strategy could have saved the Confederacy.

RICHARD MCMURRAY: To be "good" or "appropriate" a nation's military strategy must further its geopolitical goals. The great geopolitical objective of the Confederacy was to win national independence. In theory the Rebels could have achieved this goal in any one of three ways—the two mentioned by Russell or through massive foreign (which for all practical purposes meant British) intervention. Foreign intervention, however, was a chimera, as far-sighted Confederates quickly realized. Only a stupendous blunder by the United States—such as the imprisonment of Confederate diplomats

illegally seized from the British mail steamer *Trent*—could have altered this fact.

Battlefield victories offered the Rebels only a slightly more realistic hope. It was most unlikely that any Southern victory, however complete, won in the Confederacy itself would have enabled the Secessionists to dictate their independence to the Lincoln administration. Most likely, such an outcome could only have been produced by a great military success won on Northern soil. Unfortunately for the Southerners, logistics alone made it impossible for the Confederate armies to conduct prolonged military operations beyond the Potomac, the Ohio, or the Missouri. Certainly after the great disasters of 1863 (Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Gettysburg) there was no possibility of the Secessionists "winning" their independence through battlefield triumphs.

After 1863 the Confederates were left with only the hope that they could so prolong the war and punish the Union armies that the majority of Northerners would agree to let the seceding states go.

This possibility, in fact, may have been the Southerners' only realistic hope from the beginning of the war.

Such a course required—above all else—that the Rebels not lose the war while they were waiting for the Unionists to give up. Later, historians would quip that this was a strategy of "winning by not losing." The Secessionists also had to inflict great punishment—high casualties—on the Yankee armies in order to demoralize the Northern public.

As it turned out, the Confederates were not able to avoid defeat in 1864. Their armies did win convincing victories in the Red River, New Market, Bermuda Hundred, and Overland Campaigns, inflicting some 80,000 casualties on the invading Federal armies and denying them any major military successes. However, when the Rebels lost Atlanta early in September and Abraham Lincoln won reelection in November, all rational hope for Southern independence vanished.

DAVID EICHER: It is important to remember that Confederate casualties were also very high, and that the Army of



William Gladstone

In this cartoon, U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward returns the hijacked Confederate commissioners, thus appeasing British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell. Jeff Davis' hopes of British intervention are dashed.

Northern Virginia lost a higher percentage of combat soldiers than Grant and Meade—and that the North was gaining a strategic advantage throughout the Overland Campaign by moving closer to the James River, and eventually causing the defeat of Lee's army.

ROBERT TANNER: Given its political goals, the Confederacy fought the only war it could. Those goals were the need to preserve a functioning slave society and the attainment of independence. Those policies could not be achieved by avoiding combat along the frontiers in favor of luring Yankee armies deep into the South in the hopes of destroying them piecemeal, and so great battles were fought in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee rather than in Alabama or South Carolina.

KEITH POULTER: There is some disagreement as to whether there was a coherent Confederate strategy. Was there, and if so what was it?

RICHARD MCMURRAY: At one time or another during the war the Confederates tried (or considered) five distinct military strategies. For simplicity's sake and for purposes of analysis we can la-

bel them the Davis strategy I, the Davis strategy II, the Davis strategy III, the Robert E. Lee strategy, and the Joseph E. Johnston strategy. (The Davis strategy III was a proposal by the Confederate president at the very end of the conflict for the Rebels to resort to protracted guerrilla warfare. Fortunately wiser men prevailed and the Southerners never tried to implement it.)


DAVIS STRATEGY I: For most of the first year of the war the Rebel government scattered troops all around the periphery of the Confederacy in a vain effort to defend all of its territory. Politically the scheme made sense; militarily it led to disaster early in 1862 when Union forces had little trouble punching through the thin line of defense along the border. In the aftermath of a series of great disasters (Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, New Orleans, and so on), Secessionist authorities abandoned the effort to hold every bit of their territory.

DAVIS STRATEGY II: In the wake of the early 1862 disasters the Confederate government decided to abandon less important regions and concentrate its resources to defend key points. By using

their "interior" lines (especially the railroads) the Rebels could shift troops about to protect whatever point the Yankees chose to attack. The secessionists could also use this system to assemble a force for an offensive of their own. This strategy was also called the "offensive-defensive"—stand on the defensive, but strike out at the enemy whenever a favorable opportunity to do so presented itself.

ROBERT E. LEE STRATEGY: In the winter of 1862-1863 General Robert E. Lee began to advocate that the Rebels seize the initiative (or take "the aggressive"), seek to throw the Federals off balance, and try to win a victory that would persuade the North to abandon the effort to preserve the Union. (Some students of the war have argued that Lee merely wished to emphasize the "offensive" part of the "offensive-defensive" and that his strategy was therefore only a variant of Davis strategy II.) Lee seems to have come to this position because he realized two crucial truths that have largely escaped the attention of others (both then and now): first, the Confederacy simply did not have the human, material, or financial resources to wage a long war; and second, the Confederacy

WESTERN DEFEATS (below): Confederate strategies which relied upon "winning by not losing" ignored the crucial fact that right from the start the war had seen one Union victory after another. Unless the tide of defeat in the West could be halted, the Confederacy was doomed.



was already well on the way to losing the war because of its defeats in the West and the problems that had developed among its generals there. Thus the Confederacy could not hope to win by not losing, because it was already, in fact, losing. Only a "pro-active" strategy offered much hope of reversing that trend and winning a great victory that would bring independence either by demoralizing the Northern people or by enabling the Rebel armies to dictate peace terms.

**Was General Joe Johnston's
1864 Georgia campaign a
clever delaying action or
"another great disaster" for
the rebels?**

*"Joseph E. Johnston at the
Battle of Bull Run" by L.M.D. Guillaume.
Courtesy The R.W. Norton Art Gallery,
Shreveport Louisiana*

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON STRATEGY: By 1864, if not earlier, General Joseph E. Johnston rejected a "pro-active" approach to the war. Instead, in the Atlanta Campaign (May-July 1864) he adopted an almost passive approach to military operations. He would place his army in a naturally strong position, enhance its strength with fortifications, and wait in hopes that his enemy would attack. When the enemy refused to do so, but instead marched around his flank, Johnston would retreat fifteen or twenty



DEC 7 1862	DEC 31 1862- JAN 2 1863	JAN 10-11 1863	MAY 1 1863	MAY 12 1863	MAY 14 1863	MAY 16 1863	MAY 17 1863	MAY 18- JULY 4 1863	NOV 25 1863	NOV- DEC 1863
<i>Prairie Grove</i>	<i>Stones River</i>	<i>Arkansas Post</i>	<i>Port Gibson</i>	<i>Raymond</i>	<i>Jackson</i>	<i>Champion Hill</i>	<i>Big Black River</i>	<i>Vicksburg</i>	<i>Missionary Ridge</i>	<i>Knoxville</i>

miles and the whole ballet would begin anew. In so doing, Johnston and his adherents *later* asserted, he would preserve his army and eventually "win by not losing." (Some have maintained that Johnston only emphasized the "defensive" part of the "offensive-defensive" and that eventually he would have struck back at his opponent. Thus, they claim, his approach to the war was but a variant of the Davis II strategy.)

DAVID EICHER: The initial defensive strategies adopted by the Confederacy were uncoordinated (except perhaps in Jefferson Davis' head) and poorly implemented. The obvious shortcomings of a purely defensive strategy gave rise to more aggressive policies, threatening cities such as Washington and Baltimore in the east and St. Louis and Cincinnati in the west; parrying these thrusts required enormous defensive efforts on the part of the Union. Cavalry raids were also used to disrupt Union supply lines.

JOE HARSH: Few subjects have been more appealing to Civil War buffs than assessing and reassessing Confederate strategy. In light of its final and total failure, numerous mistakes in execution made during the war, and a generous infusion of quirky personalities responsible for carrying it out, Confederate plans for gaining victory have yielded an easy and tempting target. Seldom, however, is the effort made to define the boundaries of the subject, its constituent parts, or the influencing outside forces. Frequently, therefore, discussions are confused, incomplete, and out of context.

Strategy, when used too loosely, is ambiguous at best and meaningless at worst. There are five levels (or phases) of a nation's conduct of a war that must be distinguished and separated for both description and evaluation. *War aims* are the great objects that carried the nation into the war and that must be obtained to achieve victory. *War policy* is the guidelines adopted for the use of the nation's resources, human and physical. *Strategy* is the military and naval plans adopted within the policy guidelines for obtaining victory. *Tactics* is the method adopted for applying force in battle. And *logistics* is the program for moving and supplying forces between battles.

The nearer these levels come to harmonizing, the better the nation's chance

for success. For example, any nation at war that is short on resources must maximize mobilization at the policy level and minimize risk at the strategy level. It would be counterproductive within that context for a commander to adopt tactics that squander men and material. Aims and policy provide the context for strategy. Aims and policy must be determined by the political sphere (president, war secretary, and congress for the Confederacy); and strategy ought to be devised by the military (theater commanders in consultation with the executive, in this case).

There are, however, other realities that influence and shape strategy. Although these realities ought to be incorporated into aims and policy, sometimes they are not fully confronted. To what extent a military commander is responsible for accounting for realities beyond those in aims and policy is not clear. It is certain that they will sooner or later impact on the execution of his policy, possibly predetermining its failure.

Among these outside realities, none is more important than the resources of the nation. No matter what aims a commander pursues or policies he is given, he cannot employ more resources than are at his disposal. Any strategy he devises that does not take his resources into account is *ipso facto* unrealistic and, worse, is bound to result in waste, loss, and failure. Resources, in their broadest sense, include population, geographic and topographical features, agriculture, industry, transportation, communications, and wealth and finance.

Confederate deficiencies in resources are well known and have been frequently mentioned, and yet the implications of these physical disadvantages for Confederate strategy have not been fully plumbed. The extensive Southern seacoast and large number of rivers that invited use as avenues of invasion not only opened the Confederacy to attack from a variety of points, but also made it impossible to know in advance where best to concentrate forces for defense. In agriculture—the one area in which the South approached sufficiency—an abundance of foodstuffs and raw materials for clothing and equipment was frequently stymied by a primitive transportation system that could not deliver goods where and when they were needed. Fac-

tors such as these sometimes give the false impression of the infamous "perimeter" defense.

Another outside reality that critically impacts on strategy is (what may be called for want of a better term) the temperament of a nation. Under this heading may be included the political, social, and cultural systems and what they demand, will permit, and will not tolerate. Southern *ethos* demanded a war fought on more or less traditional lines, eschewed guerrilla warfare, and even all but disowned if not quite extinguished partisan fighting where it sprang up unbidden. Southern conservative attachment to local rights made it difficult to concentrate units outside of the state of origin. And the staunch Southern commitment to slavery complicated strategy in a number of ways, not the least of which was the full mobilization of manpower, on the one hand, and the concentration of forces at a distance, on the other.

As organized Confederate resistance collapsed, Jeff Davis advocated widespread guerrilla warfare.

Opposite: Painting by W.D. Washington, courtesy The Museum of the Confederacy.

Closely connected to national temperament is the will (or morale) of the people. How many sacrifices are they willing to bear? How many defeats are they able to suffer? And how great is their perseverance in supporting a long war? Only recently has a debate on Confederate national will opened, and the two sides of the argument have generated much heat and little light. While one trumpets the Southern effort as excelling all possible expectations, the other insists the Confederacy could have won the war—and lost only because of the atrophy of national will.

And finally—although this short list of outside realities must not be considered exhaustive—are the attributes of the enemy opposed in the war. Every one of the categories so far mentioned (aims, policy, strategy, and outside realities) must be considered from the point of view of the opponent. No strategy exists in the vacuum of its own universe. It is good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, successful or unsuccessful, not only to the degree it reflects the strengths and

weaknesses of its own side, but also in the manner in which it interacts with the strategy of the enemy. For example, admittedly the long coastline of the Confederacy was an inherent weakness, but in the Civil War it was only a weakness to the extent that the Federals chose to exploit it. Or, similarly, any abatement of Southern national will was bound to lessen Southern effort, but in the Civil War it mattered only if it were overmatched by the North's perseverance.

STEVE WOODWORTH: Confederate strategy was fundamentally the work of Jefferson Davis, and since it failed in its purpose, we are bound to criticize it. In doing so, however, we should remember that there were myriad ways in which Davis could have lost the war in a month or two but did not. In him we see no blunderer, but a competent leader who did not quite succeed in a difficult task. That said, it is nevertheless true that the Confederacy suffered from a lack of a

strategy was instinctively defensive. Those instincts conflicted with two other factors. First, the proximity of the Confederacy's strategic assets—especially Richmond—to its frontier meant that a successful defense must be aggressive and that some large risks must be taken. Second, Robert E. Lee, a God-send to any war president, looked at the same factors Davis did—especially the South's inferiority in numbers—and drew an opposite conclusion. Whereas Davis believed the South could win by not losing, Lee believed the South could lose by not winning. Only quick victory could, in Lee's calculation, overcome the North's numerical superiority, and therefore any risk was justified—nay, required—for that purpose. Lee used his considerable influence with Davis to persuade the president to take more risks than he otherwise would have done, and used those risks to win victories that some think the Confederacy could ill-afford. Davis' instincts kept Lee from wagering all on the outcome of a single battle and thus may have prolonged the Confederacy's life—or prevented Lee from securing its continued existence by means of an overwhelming victory. One may argue that the resulting strategy of tempered risk-taking was best, but since it did not succeed, I would argue that the Confederacy would have been better served by a thorough adherence either to Lee's or Davis' strategic ideas.

KEITH POULTER: David mentioned earlier that Confederate defensive strategies were uncoordinated, except perhaps in Jefferson Davis' head. Anyone care to comment on that?

ROBERT TANNER: This was the fundamental flaw: there was no consensus between Jefferson Davis and his senior commanders as to how they were going to use the military force they had created to achieve their political goals. There was a lack of an overall guiding intelligence—which should have been provided by Davis, who (and it meant more in the nineteenth century) was after all the commander-in-chief.

For example, in spring 1862 the Confederacy was conducting a broad front withdrawal, and at the same time the army's ranks were filling up rapidly as conscription was implemented. Then, if ever, was the time for the formulation



Overall, then, strategy, especially the judgment of strategy, is a complicated and not a simple matter. The bad news is—because so many questions remain unanswered—it is not yet fully known what Confederate strategy was. And it is impossible to judge that strategy until it is better understood. The good news is—especially for those of who earn a living as historians—there is so much yet to do. It is a wide open field.

KEITH POULTER: Who formulated Confederate grand strategy?

clearly conceived and applied grand strategy. Like his fellow Southerners, Davis prized the offensive and preferred striking blows to receiving them. However, he also knew the Confederacy could win the war by merely enduring. He assumed other Southerners shared his own determination to resist as long as physically possible. Defeat could only come from a catastrophe that robbed Southerners of the power to resist. As a result Davis was eager to attack but only if it could be done without risking that catastrophe. His



Jubilant soldiers cheer as Old Glory is raised on the heights of Lookout Mountain, signaling yet another Union victory in the West.

of an overall plan. Yet all that eventuated were three uncoordinated offensives in Maryland and East and West Tennessee.

KEITH POULTER: Anyone else care to comment on the notion of a central flaw in Confederate strategy?

JOE HARSH: I would not so much pick out a flaw as say, with George Pickett, "The Yankees had something to do with it." The plain fact was that the North exhibited a grim determination not to see the Union sundered.

RICHARD MCMURRY: In theory any of the strategies available to the Confederates could have worked. In fact, however, what I earlier called the Davis I, Davis II, and Joe Johnston approaches to the struggle ignored the crucial fact that the war had seen one Union victory after another (Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island Number 10, Fort Jackson, Fort Philip, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Iuka, Corinth, Perryville, Prairie Grove, Stones River, Arkansas Post, Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, Big Black river, Vicksburg, Milliken's Bend,

Port Hudson, Tullahoma, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, etc., etc.).

The great strategic truth of the Civil War (obscured by Lee's success in Virginia) was that the Confederacy began losing the war soon after it began. Unless the tide of defeat in the West could be reversed, or at least halted, the Confederacy was doomed. In 1864 no passive policy could undo the damage that the Rebels suffered in 1861, 1862, and 1863. Nor could an effort to win by not losing succeed if the Rebels continued to lose. For these reasons Johnston's campaign in north Georgia quickly turned into another great disaster for the Rebels.

RUSSELL WEIGLEY: To my mind the central flaw was that there was no consistent strategy—emphasis continually switched from offense to defense, and from one theater to another. I do think the Confederacy was right to employ its ablest general—Lee—in the East, for it was only there that the war could be won or lost quickly. It is true that the series of Union victories in the West came close to being fatal; but it was only with the

surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia that the bottom finally fell out of the Confederacy.

DAVID EICHER: Not so much a flaw, but a central *problem* for Confederate strategy was the commitment to state rights, with individual states holding back materiel and manpower from the central government. The division of the Confederacy into military departments had somewhat the same effect—a problem which plagued the North too, but with less serious consequences because of its more abundant resources.

KEITH POULTER: It seems to me that the Confederate high command—Jefferson Davis—made a fundamental error in the spring of 1864. Outnumbered about 3:2 in immediately available front-line troops, he opted to allocate troops to the two major theaters in such a way that they were outnumbered in both. Classical military doctrine would have been to allocate troops so that the Confederacy had a numerical superiority in one theater and would seek a victory there before switching troops to the



Robert E. Lee and his army retreat after the failure of the last of his strategic offensives.

other. The Rebels would thus defeat a numerically superior enemy in detail, using its interior lines to switch troops from one front to another. If this line of reasoning is valid, Lee should have been given 100,000+ troops, and Johnston perhaps 40,000. The nature of the two commanders was also ideally suited to such a division of tasks: Lee to attack, Johnston to fall back slowly.

STEVE WOODWORTH: From a purely military point of view this strategy has, at first glance, much to recommend it. Lee was by far the more aggressive (and skillful) of the two major Confederate army commanders and possessed the confidence of the Richmond government. Surely if anyone could save the South from its increasingly serious plight, it would be Lee. Why not, therefore, give him the greatest possible means? An additional appeal to this program would have been the nature of Lee's likely opponent, Ulysses S. Grant. The North's greatest general and perhaps the greatest general of the war, Grant nevertheless was at his weakest when an opponent sur-

prised him and seized the initiative. Early in the war Grant had suffered his worst moments when the wretched John B. Floyd and the hapless Albert Sidney Johnston had done just that to him. Conversely, when allowed to dictate the pace of operations, Grant looked to be all but invincible.

Thus the idea of a massive eastern offensive in 1864 is an attractive one. On further reflection, however, other questions arise. Suppose Lee had been reinforced to a level of parity with Grant. Could he then have won a decisive result? That is, could he have destroyed Grant's army or handed it massively demoralizing defeats? When Lee was near parity with McClellan on the Peninsula decisive victory eluded him. With only a small numerical disadvantage at Gettysburg, Lee suffered defeat. Would he have fared better against Grant? And could Lee have accomplished all this while he was suffering from the increasingly severe physical disabilities that repeatedly prostrated him during the 1864 campaign? Indeed, could the Confederate logistical system

in Virginia have supported an army of 100,000 or 120,000?

And what of Johnston in Georgia? Would he not have retreated even more rapidly than he did? Even if he did not, it is hard to see how he could have delayed the fall of Atlanta much beyond early July. More likely it would have fallen a month earlier. What magnitude of victory would Lee have had to win in Virginia to offset that dramatic event?

Also, we should bear in mind what the Confederacy needed in 1864. As Richard wisely points out, foreign intervention had never been a realistic prospect, and a victory that would prostrate the North and allow Lee to dictate a peace in the White House (or some such place) was by 1864 extremely unlikely (to say the least). Rather the Confederacy's remaining hope of winning the war lay in convincing the North to abandon the struggle. This could be accomplished by running up northern casualty lists and denying the North the kind of morale-boosting victories that would convince its citizens and soldiers that the war was

in fact being won. True, it might also have been accomplished by a massive Confederate victory in the East—a Bull Run-style victory on Pennsylvania soil—but that would be more difficult. In short, the South's easiest way to independence in 1864 would seem to have been to hold Atlanta and Richmond and bleed the blue-clad armies white. For the accomplishment of those goals, the Confederacy's actual distribution of troops may have been appropriate.

Our judgment is inevitably tainted by the world we live in, with its instantaneous communications.

Aside from such purely strategic considerations, politics would also have influenced the Davis government not to adopt such a strategy. All politics, it has been said, is local, and political pressure in the Civil War often demanded the defense of each locality. So it would no doubt have been in this case. Could any government in Richmond have faced the political consequences of virtually abandoning Georgia? Could morale have been maintained among the Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi troops of Johnston's army who would have found themselves transferred to Virginia? Would they, as well as the Army of Virginia's large component of Georgia troops, have maintained high morale as more and more of Georgia fell to Sherman's advance? In fact, Sherman's advance through Georgia triggered increasing desertion among all of the Confederacy's Georgia troops.

A massive Confederate reinforcement of Lee in the spring of 1864 would have been daring and imaginative. It was perhaps exactly the kind of desperate initiative that might have reversed the Confederacy's declining fortunes. Yet it would have required feats of logistics, politics, and motivation on the part of a Confederate government whose record in those areas had previously been indifferent; brilliantly aggressive campaigning by the ailing Lee; and prodigies of hard marching and fighting from thousands of Confederate soldiers whose far-away homes were being overrun by an all-but-unopposed enemy. It would indeed have been a desperate endeavor, and until the fall of Atlanta that September, the

Confederacy's prospects probably did not appear nearly that desperate to any but the most prescient Southerners like Lee and Patrick R. Cleburne.

RICHARD MCMURRY: In any case the problem was not with Davis' grand strategy but with the inability of his army commanders—other than Lee—to win battles and campaigns. This, by the way, was not because they were outnumbered. The Rebels enjoyed numerical superiority in several battles and were virtually equal in strength to the Federals in others (early stages at Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, first day at Shiloh, early stages at Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Peachtree Creek, Spring Hill, Franklin, and others).

The Confederacy simply could not win a war in which a very large percentage of its people (very close to, if not a majority) opposed its existence—many of them actively—and in which it constantly lost battles, troops, territory, rivers, cities, economic resources (especially the slaves who fled to the Union lines at every opportunity), etc. I think it was clear to some (notably Lee) by the winter of 1862-1863 that the Rebels would lose the war (in the West) unless he could win it by a great victory in the East.

In other words, the basic Rebel problem was not strategy but the battlefield defeats the South suffered from almost the beginning of the war.

KEITH POULTER: Nevertheless, a less-than-adequate central administration was hardly a plus for the war effort. Several of you have alluded to something that was militarily necessary but politically impossible. And I can't help thinking of a favorite quote of mine from Cardinal Richelieu—"politics is the art of making possible that which is necessary." This is a harsh standard by which to judge any statesman, but I think there is little doubt that in this sense Jefferson Davis failed to measure up.

RUSSELL WEIGLEY: I think that is fair.

JOE HARSH: But we have to be awfully careful when making such judgments. We should always bare in mind what an individual knew and when he knew it, and be mindful of mid-nineteenth century problems of distance and communication. Our judgment is inevitably tainted by the world we live in, with its instantaneous communications.

KEITH POULTER: Joe, what is your view of the significance of the West for the outcome of the war?

JOE HARSH: The western theater was too big for the Confederates to handle; they needed to field two large armies there, and were never really able to field more than one. The most they could therefore hope to do was to delay disaster in the West while winning victory in the East.

KEITH POULTER: On that note I must draw this discussion to a close. I said at the outset that questions abound concerning Confederate grand strategy; I'm aware of a few more now! It's a complex subject, and one we will return to in future articles. Certainly Jefferson Davis' leadership will be explored in next year's special issue, which will compare the performance of the two wartime administrations. Meanwhile I hope we've given readers something to get their teeth into when they think about that fundamental question: Could the Confederacy have won, and if so, how? □

DAVID EICHER is managing editor of *Astronomy* magazine, and author of *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War* (Simon & Schuster, 2001).

JOSEPH L. HARSH is professor of history at George Mason University, and author of the award-winning *Confederate Tide Rising* (Kent State University Press, 1998) and *Taken at the Flood* (Kent State University Press, 1999).

RICHARD MCMURRY is author of *Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy* (University of Nebraska Press, 2000).

ROBERT G. TANNER is a lawyer living in Atlanta and author of *Retreat to Victory* (Scholarly Resources, 2001).

RUSSELL WEIGLEY is Distinguished University Professor Emeritus at Temple University. His latest book is *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865* (Indiana University Press, 2000).

STEVEN E. WOODWORTH is an associate professor of history at Texas Christian University. His most recent book is *While God Is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers* (University Press of Kansas, 2001).

Here's My Old War Horse: Longstreet at Sharpsburg



**October 13-14, 2001
Hagerstown, MD
Antietam Battlefield**

Battlefield Tours/Presentations:

- Perry Jamieson
- William G. Piston

**Round Table Discussion - Silent Auction
Evening Social - Meals Included
Battlefield Maintenance Project**

**\$110. LS members
\$135. non-members (includes 1yr. m'ship)**

For information or to register:

mlagonia@aol.com - 914-381-2147

118 Florence Street., Mamaroneck NY 10543

**The Longstreet Society, Gainesville GA
www.longstreet.org**

Civil War Society Polos, Hats, and Tees

THE POLO SHIRT: Our classic style 50/50 polo has the Civil War Society logo on the left chest. Color: Ash Gray LG-XL-XXL \$25.00

HATS WITH CIVIL WAR SOCIETY LOGO: 100% cotton twill with an adjustable back. Color: Ash Gray or Soldier Blue \$9.00

T-SHIRTS: The tees have Civil War Society's logo on left front chest, and a quote from either Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee, or Ulysses S. Grant on the back. When ordering, choose the Jackson quote: "always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy..."; the R.E. Lee quote: "I wish these people would go away and let us alone"; or the Grant quote: "My only terms are unconditional surrender." 50/50 Cotton/polyester in Ash Gray. LG-XL \$15.00
XXL \$18.00.

Shipping & handling, \$2.00 per item
(FREE for Society members).



To order call

559-855-8636

or write

Civil War Society

33756 Black Mountain Road

Tollhouse, CA 93667



PERRYVILLE

This Grand Havoc of Battle

Kenneth W. Noe

"Noe's well researched, well written *Perryville* is the best volume on arguably the least understood important battle during the Civil War. No Civil War buff will want to miss it."
—William W. Freehling

"Noe explores a topic in need of a modern, deeply researched, detailed analytical narrative. His engagingly written book, which places Perryville in the war's broader social and political context, should be the standard on this important military campaign for many years."—Gary W. Gallagher

\$35.00 cloth

Back in Print!

YANKEE BLITZKRIEG

Wilson's Raid through Alabama and Georgia


James Pickett Jones

"Jones handles the narrative details of the campaign in good fashion. He sets the context of events, with full appreciation of the command question involved, and includes the reactions of individual officers and enlisted men. . . . Excellent."
—*American Historical Review*

"The definitive study of one of the Civil War's most important campaigns."—*Georgia Historical Quarterly*

"One of the best studies ever on the often-neglected central region of the Confederacy."—*Florida Historical Quarterly*

\$18.00 paper



Back in Print!

ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON

Soldier of Three Republics

Revised Edition

Charles P. Roland

Foreword by Gary W. Gallagher

"A masterly biography of a man cast in the heroic mold."
—*Journal of American History*

"The classic treatment of Johnston."

—*American Historical Review*

Selected as one of the best one hundred books ever written on the Civil War by *Civil War Times Illustrated* in 1981 and by *Civil War: The Magazine of the Civil War Society* in 1995.

\$19.00 paper

— THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF —
KENTUCKY

At bookstores • 800/839-6855 • www.kentuckypress.com

"A HOT TIME

The Battles of Hanover Court House and Ashland

May 31 - June 1, 1864

Sounds of combat rattled through the streets of Ashland. Both sides fought dismounted, often at close quarters. "It was strange but true to see rebel and Union soldiers firing from opposite sides of the same tree," an Ohioan wrote. "The rebels were so thick that we could scarcely miss them if we fired at random," he claimed, "and but few shots went astray."



IN THE SPRING OF 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant initiated a major offensive to defeat General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant hammered at Lee in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania Court House, and on the North Anna River, advancing ever closer to the Confederate capital. During the last week of May, the Union commander swung southeast of the Confederates to bring the Army of the Potomac across the Pamunkey River near Hanover town, seventeen miles from Richmond. Lee responded by evacuating his North Anna

defenses and marching southeast along a route parallel to Grant's.

Grant and the Potomac army's titular head, Major General George G. Meade, considered the campaign largely an infantry affair and relegated the Union army's cavalry, commanded by Major General Philip H. Sheridan, to a supporting role. On May 28, as the armies jockeyed for position, Sheridan sent a large body of horsemen to scout out Lee's location. Lee, it developed, also dispatched much of his cavalry—commanded by Major General Wade Hampton, the senior division head—to feel out Grant's

deployments. Colliding near Haw's Shop, the two mounted forces fought a day-long engagement that ended with Hampton's withdrawal. By May 30, both armies had settled into strong positions on opposite sides of Totopotomoy Creek, a marshy Virginia stream meandering west to east a few miles south of the Pamunkey. Ensnared in formidable earthworks along Totopotomoy Creek's south bank, Lee's army again barred Grant's direct route to Richmond.

As combat heated along Totopotomoy Creek, Federal commanders became concerned about the safety of their

AT ASHLAND"

GORDON C. RHEA



rear. Five miles of open countryside extended north from the Union line's western terminus at MacKenzie Corner to the Pamunkey. By sending a force into this unprotected interval, Lee could play havoc with Union supplies and attack Grant's Totopotomoy Creek defenses from behind. Heightening Grant's concern was the presence of Confederate cavalry at Hanover Court House, a village some five miles north of MacKenzie Corner and a short distance below the Pamunkey. From there, rebels could strike south along the Mechanicsville Pike or proceed southeast along Hanover

River Road, following the Pamunkey's southern bank across the army's rear and attacking Grant's main supply depot at White House. In short, leaving the gap between the Union army and the Pamunkey unprotected invited all manner of mischief, and Grant resolved to close it with cavalry.

Two of Sheridan's three divisions—those of Brigadier General Alfred T. A. Tobert and Brigadier General David McM. Gregg—were encamped downriver, guarding the approaches to White House and waiting to escort reinforcements. That left Sheridan's third division,

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA"
by Edward Lamson Henry (1841-1919). City Point did not become Grant's headquarters and primary supply depot until after the Battle of Ashland, when the White House base was abandoned. The painting nevertheless conveys an idea of the tempting target such a base made, and underlines why the Union high command was sensitive to the possibility of an enemy raid.

Courtesy Addison Gallery of American Art

a force of some 2,500 troopers under Brigadier General James H. Wilson, available to plug the bothersome interval between the army and the Pamunkey. Wilson was handily positioned north of the river rounding up stragglers, guarding crossings, and accompanying supply trains. Around noon on May 30, Meade directed Wilson to prepare to shift to the south bank.


former friend and classmate, Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser, had stampered Wilson's division with a brigade. Troubled by Wilson's poor showing in the Wilderness, Sheridan had relegated the young brigadier general to supporting roles. He had played only minor parts in Sheridan's victories at Yellow Tavern and Meadow Bridge and had missed Haw's Shop entirely. Sheridan seems not to have

men. For artillery support Wilson had Lieutenant Alexander C.M. Pennington, Jr.'s 2nd United States, Battery M, and Lieutenant Charles L. Fitzhugh's 4th United States, Batteries C and E.

As Wilson prepared to wind up his wagon-guarding assignment and head across the river, headquarters decided to expand his mission. The Virginia Central Railroad passed through Hanover Court House on its way from the Shenandoah Valley to Richmond. A short distance west of the Virginia Central and running parallel to it was the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, also a major Confederate supply line. Union cavalry raids had cut the railroads several times, but rebels had repaired the damage in short order. Not so easily repaired, however, were the spans across the South Anna River, both easily accessible from Hanover Court House. Two miles northwest of town, Hanover River Road crossed the Virginia Central Railroad at Wickham's Crossing, near the plantation owned by Major General Williams C. Wickham of Lee's army. Three miles farther west, the river road intersected the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad at Ellett's Crossing. From the two crossings, it was but a short distance to the river and the bridges.

Under Meade's final formulation, Wilson was to protect the interval between the army and the Pamunkey and to destroy the two rail bridges over the South Anna River. Wilson received Meade's orders to patrol the country "between the right of the army and the river." He did not, however, get word of the additional charge to tear up railroad bridges.

Around noon on May 30, Wilson relieved Chapman and sent him across the Pamunkey to Crump's Creek, a small stream that flowed north into the Pamunkey four miles southeast of Hanover Court House. Chapman dispatched Major William Patton's 3rd Indiana Cavalry west along Hanover River Road to scout for rebels, and Patton encountered pickets from Colonel Gilbert J. Wright's brigade of Confederate cavalry. Wright's brigade, commanded until recently by Brigadier General Pierce M.B. Young, consisted of the 7th Georgia, Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, Phillips' (Georgia) Legion, and the Jeff Davis (Mississippi) Legion. Wright cut an imposing figure—he stood six feet four and had reputedly



Left: James Harrison Wilson—able, ambitious, and abrasive—and his brigade commanders John Baillie McIntosh (top right), and George Henry Chapman.


Sporting a dashing mustache and goatee, Wilson was only twenty-six-years-old when the campaign began, and his appointment to head a division had come as a surprise. He had no combat experience, having served in the West as an aide to Grant, and his only experience with cavalry was a ten-week stint running the Cavalry Bureau in Washington, a desk job that had nothing to do with leading men in battle. Wilson was smart and adept at bureaucratic maneuvers, but whether his desk savvy would translate to the battlefield remained an open question. The Illinois native had got off to an embarrassing start in the Wilderness by failing to picket roads toward the rebel army, permitting Lee to catch Grant in the dense thickets by surprise. Then his

liked Wilson. The young general, a biographer observed, "was often imperious and outspoken, to the extent that he fully alienated as many people as he attracted." His performance thus far in the campaign had been lackluster, and he welcomed the opportunity to prove himself.¹

Wilson commanded two brigades. The larger, under Colonel John B. McIntosh, contained the 1st Connecticut, 3rd New Jersey, 2nd and 5th New York, 2nd Ohio, and 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry. His smaller brigade under Colonel George H. Chapman consisted of the 3rd Indiana, 8th New York, and 1st Vermont Cavalry. McIntosh and Chapman, both in their mid-thirties, were capable commanders and shared the unusual distinction of having served before the war as midship-

Library of Congress

Both Generals in Blue



killed a friend in a drunken brawl before the war—and his troopers skirmished vigorously with their Indiana counterparts all afternoon. Unable to reach Hanover Court House, Patton returned to Crump's Creek at dark and rejoined Chapman's other two regiments. They remained on picket duty all night, "saddled and bridled and sleeping in overcoat and boots," a Hoosier recollected.²

Sometime after midnight, Wilson set off with McIntosh's brigade to join Chapman. Crossing the river at Dabney Ferry, they reached Crump's Creek at 5:00 a.m. on May 31. Wilson now had his division united. Anxious to get underway, he started west on Hanover River Road with McIntosh's brigade, leaving Chapman in reserve at Crump's Creek.³


HANOVER RIVER ROAD forked two miles west of Crump's Creek. The main route continued northwest to Hanover Court House; the left branch ran southeast to Cash Corner and on to the Union army's rear at Totopotomoy

Creek. Dr. Lucien Price's fine home—"a large and magnificent mansion house of brick, painted brown, embowered in a forest of oak trees," according to a Federal—stood on a knoll near the fork. Named Dundee, the Price home had numbered among Jeb Stuart's favorite haunts in the war's earlier years and was familiar to veterans of both armies who had passed there during Major General George B. McClellan's campaign in 1862. Wright had posted the Cobb Legion near the house to hold the road fork. Soon those Georgians and McIntosh's lead elements—Colonel George A. Purington's 2nd Ohio Cavalry, and the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel William P. Brinton—became embroiled in a fierce little fight. Discovering the strength of McIntosh's force, Wright sent the Jeff Davis Legion into the fray, waging a stubborn delaying action in thick woods and underbrush along the roadside.⁴

Backed by Fitzhugh's artillery, McIntosh drove Wright's Confederates some

two miles to an overgrown field, where the rebels took cover in tall grass. "A Johnnie dropped down just ahead of me, and calling to the lieutenant to know if I should go after him, and receiving no answer, I concluded to make an effort anyway," Isaac Gause of the 2nd Ohio reminisced. "On rising to my knees I discovered it was too much like attracting a nest of hornets. With the shower of lead falling about, I experienced a sudden change of mind, and concluded that we did not want any Johnnies."⁵

Hanover Court House was plainly visible a short distance west, across little Mechump Creek. The slow-moving tributary to the Pamunkey cut a wide, marshy floodplain that served as a moat barring the way to the courthouse town. Confederates could be seen deploying on the broad plain west of the creek, around the courthouse buildings. Captain William M. McGregor's Confederate Horse Artillery rolled up in support of Wright's brigade and began trading shots with Fitzhugh's artillery. The range was short,



and artillerymen on both sides had clear targets. "I have been in a heap of fights but that was the closest place I ever was in," a Georgian wrote home. "The balls just plowed up the ground [and] skinned the trees." Buffeted by musketry and artillery fire, McIntosh decided against trying to cross Mechump Creek and pulled most of his men back to the Price farm, where they began cooking supper. A Union contingent remained near the creek's swampy ravine, "watching the movements of the enemy cavalry, dismounted and ready to receive us, on the hill on the opposite side," a trooper in the 1st Connecticut Cavalry remembered.⁶

Dr. Price's place served as Wilson's headquarters, McIntosh's campground, and as a field hospital for wounded cavalrymen. Bickerton L. Winston's grounds, spreading across nearby Signal Hill, also hosted some of McIntosh's men. The Winston place was familiar to Union veterans, as part of McClellan's army had camped there during a reconnaissance toward Hanover Court House in 1862.

Wilson sent troopers south to Cash Corner and on to Phillip's Mill, where they communicated with infantrymen guarding the VI Corps' rear. Chapman's brigade remained at Crump's Creek, ready to pitch in if Wilson needed it. So far as Wilson was concerned, he had completed his assignment to plug the interval between the army and the river.⁷

* * *

SETTLING INTO CAMP at Dr. Price's house around 1:30 p.m., Wilson received a message from Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff. The note was ten hours old. "The order for the destruction of the bridges has not been countermanded," Humphreys wrote, reminding Wilson that he was not only to cover the army's right flank but also to wreck the railroad bridges across the South Anna River. Wilson was taken aback, as this was the first that he had heard about destroying bridges. "I have now one brigade holding the forks of the roads near Winston's house, and occupying the Richmond Road in force

to [Cash Corner], covering its junction with the Mechanicsville Road, with orders to patrol to the right of the army," he wrote in reply to Humphreys. "The other brigade is at the crossing of Crump's Creek, but, if you think necessary, it might be moved to the vicinity of Enon Church," a point farther south. He asked Humphreys to "inform me of your wishes by return courier."⁸

Humphreys's response did not reach Wilson until 7:00 p.m. The cavalryman, the note read, was to continue to Hanover Court House, dispatch parties to destroy the railroad bridges across the South Anna River, and then move "in the direction of Richmond till [he] should encounter the enemy in such strength that [he] could no longer contend with them successfully." Wilson had reservations about the assignment, believing the far-flung expedition proposed by Humphreys better suited the entire cavalry corps than his lone division, which would become increasingly vulnerable as it moved away from the Federal army.

Despite misgivings, Wilson directed McIntosh to "get ready to advance at once."⁹

Wilson's first step was to capture Hanover Court House, a formidable task in itself. Confederate cavalry and artillery now occupied the village in force and lined Mechump Creek's western bank. "Before us was a narrow belt of timber on the extreme verge of a steep bluff," one of Colonel Purington's Ohioans recorded, "and at the foot of the bluff a narrow meadow, cut up with deep ditches full of running water, and girdled by a thick, matted growth of brush, briars, and blackberry bushes—and on the opposite side of the meadow the bluffs of Hanover, on which were stationed two brigades of rebels with four pieces of artillery." Wilson's only practicable avenues over the marshy floodplain were two bridges. One carried Hanover River Road, and Virginia Central Railroad crossed about a mile south on the other. The spans would be difficult to take, as the rebels had them well posted.¹⁰

A close examination of the terrain persuaded Wilson that McIntosh should launch his main assault west along the river road and attempt to seize the road bridge by storm. McIntosh dismounted his brigade and formed it in line east of Mechump Creek, perpendicular to the river road. Purington's 2nd Ohio Cavalry lined up across the roadway, with Major Dudley Seward's 1st Battalion north of the road and Major A. Bayard Nettleton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions extending south. Brinton's 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry formed on Purington's right, pushing the line north across the field, and Lieutenant Colonel Erastus Blakeslee's 1st Connecticut deployed on Purington's left, reaching south to the railroad. The 2nd New York Cavalry under Colonel Otto Harhaus remained mounted in reserve behind the Ohio troopers, ready to follow up the dismounted attack with a saber charge across the road bridge.¹¹

While Wilson laid his plans and deployed McIntosh's troopers, Confederate reinforcements poured into Hanover Court House. Major General William H. F. "Rooney" Lee, one of General Lee's sons, came from camps nearby with two veteran brigades. One was a North Carolina outfit of four regiments. Its former commander, Brigadier General James B. Gordon, had been mortally wounded on May 12, and the brigade was now tem-

porarily under Pierce Young, a dashing Georgian of considerable military talent. Lee's other brigade contained three regiments drawn from this part of Virginia and commanded by Brigadier General John R. Chambliss, Jr., a planter who had trained at West Point.

As Rooney Lee's two brigades rode into Hanover Court House, Wright's troopers, exhausted from their day's sparring with McIntosh, relinquished the field and retired several miles west. Lee directed Pierce Young to dismount his men and array them along high ground lining Mechump Creek's western bank. The 2nd North Carolina Cavalry anchored the left of Young's line, near the court house buildings, the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry extended south, and the 5th North Carolina Cavalry held the Confederate right at the Virginia Central Railway depot. The 1st North Carolina Cavalry remained mounted and spread along the front as skirmishers. Chambliss' Brigade—the 9th, 10th, and 13th Virginia Cavalry—served as a reserve and covered the field north of the court buildings.¹²

Wilson instructed McIntosh to attack at dusk. "The sun was almost down, and we could distinctly see our foes upon the opposite plain, loading and firing upon us," an Ohio man remembered. "Their artillery was in position and every movement made was plainly visible.

The clear, unclouded sky placed them in such position that they resembled monuments moving about and changing places before us."¹³

At Wilson's command, McIntosh's troopers descended the steep bluff to Mechump Creek and began sloshing across. Ditches laced the floodplain, and rebels had cleared the area of trees, eliminating any cover. North Carolinians on the ravine's western lip fired into McIntosh's men as soon as they realized that the attack was underway. "By the aid of grape vines, brush and rocks, we gained the valley below and charged over the meadow, but the ditches and briars checked our progress, and after crossing each ditch we were obliged to halt and reform under a heavy fire," a Federal recalled. McIntosh had instructed his men to hold their fire to get across more quickly, and many of them were well over before the Confederates fully comprehended what had happened. "We charged right across this valley," a Connecticut soldier remembered, "in the face of grape and canister, waded the creek, [and] went steadily through the bushes that lined its side."¹⁴

The 2nd Ohio, advancing along the roadway, faced Tar Heels shooting from behind fence-rail breastworks on the western bank. "At short range infantry were pouring small shot on us, while the


Confederate Pierce Manning Butler Young (right) rose from 2nd lieutenant to major general during the war, and was cited for "remarkable gallantry."

This photograph of a demolished railroad bridge over the North Anna illustrates the kind of damage inflicted by Wilson's raiders on the bridges over the South Anna. *Both Library of Congress*




BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON
3RD CAVALRY

Union Order-of-Battle



Charles L. Fitzhugh (left) and Alexander C.M. Pennington. Both commanders of Wilson's artillery were graduates of West Point, both went on to command cavalry regiments, and both were breveted brigadier general at the close of the war.



Both Roger D. Hunt Collection

artillery commenced using up their surplus grape and canister and threw it toward us," a Buckeye recollected. After pressing across the creek north and south of the Hanover River Road bridge, the Ohio men dodged behind the protective roll of the creek's western bank and huddled tightly against the ground. Mistakenly assuming that Young's rebels had broken his charge, McIntosh ordered his bugler to call the men back. "Many of the officers in the other regiments thought it applied to the whole line and ordered a retreat," an Ohioan related, "which left the line with gaps in it, some going back and some advancing." Major Nettleton, commanding the portion of the 2nd Ohio south of the road, decided that advancing was safer than falling back and ordered everyone with five or more rounds to charge. "About one hundred were found 'not wanting,'" an Ohioan reported, "and we moved off on the double quick." When Nettleton's troopers reached the far crest, the 2nd New York thundered across the bridge in support. Ohio men screamed at the top of their lungs and charged the Tar Heels behind their fence. "Our ammunition failed,"

Purington reported, "and in some parts of the line the enemy were actually driven from their position with stones and clubs."¹⁵

The going was tough for Purington's men north of the road bridge. "When we came to the top of the bank, we were met with a fresh volley reserved for our reception, but fired too soon to do any damage," the Ohioan Gause recollected. "We dropped flat between the rows of dead corn stalks, and they had a woeful sound when struck by bullets." Gause and his companions hugged the ground as dirt kicked up by rebel bullets spattered against them. "It appeared to me as if every cornstalk in that field was hit," Gause reminisced.¹⁶

The 1st Connecticut, on the left wing of McIntosh's line, charged into the creek bed under heavy fire and drove Young's Tar Heels back along the railway. Major McNeill of the 5th North Carolina took cover in the railroad depot and waged a tenacious defense. Young's line became untenable, however, as the 18th Pennsylvania, on McIntosh's right, left the protection of a fence east of the creek, braved Mechump Creek's lowlands, and clam-

bered onto the tableland north of the court house buildings, turning the Tar Heels' northern flank. "Our line never wavered," a Pennsylvanian claimed, "and in fifteen minutes from the time we left the fence the enemy were leaving the village in confusion." Major John W. Phillips, who led the Pennsylvanians in the charge, fell wounded.¹⁷

As Young's line of dismounted cavalry collapsed under the pressure of McIntosh's attack, Chambliss sent his mounted Virginians into the melee, sabers swinging overhead, attempting to cover the retreat. "In passing over open country to our position on the line of battle, the shells screamed and the minnie balls whistled, but passed harmlessly over our heads," Richard L. T. Beale of the 9th Virginia Cavalry recollected. "Give 'em hell, boys!" the Confederate artillerist McGregor admonished his gunners. "Pour it in, boys!" But McIntosh's Federals were now streaming across the plain into Hanover Court House and could not be stopped. "They finally gave way before the galling fire from the Spencer carbines and the battery," the Ohioan Gause recollected of the rebels, "which had a fine

range on them.” A Connecticut man noted simply, “They were routed completely.” Mounted troopers from the 2nd New York almost captured McGregor’s pieces, but quick-thinking Confederates spirited off the guns in the nick of time.¹⁸

It was too dark to pursue, so McIntosh occupied the courthouse grounds, posted pickets, and rested his soldiers. Chapman’s brigade moved up from Crump’s Creek to join them. “It was after 9:00 when the action ceased,” Wilson informed Humphreys. “My men were fatigued from their fighting today, and ammunition exhausted. I have therefore concluded to halt for the night, recruit men and horses, get ammunition and provisions, so as to push out at the first dawn of day.” His objective would be the railway bridges spanning the South Anna River. “It was so dark when we were through the days work,” an Ohioan recollected, “that we could not distinguish between our uniform and that of the rebels, so when we awoke at daylight we were surprised to find we had been sleeping by the side of a dead rebel.” Wilson considered the fight a “very handsome affair,” and jotted in his diary: “whipped rebels easily.”¹⁹

* * *

WILSON DECIDED TO SPLIT HIS DIVISION

the next morning for the bridge-wrecking operation. Chapman was to take the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 2nd New York Cavalry northwest along Hanover River Road and destroy the two bridges north of Wickham’s and Ellett’s crossings. Chapman’s route would leave him vulnerable to attack, since large numbers of Confederate cavalrymen—both of Rooney Lee’s brigades, and Wright’s as well—had evacuated Hanover Court House in the direction of Ashland, a small town seven miles to the west. As soon as the Confederates learned that Chapman was burning railroad trestles, they would inevitably rush north to stop him. Wilson’s solution was to dispatch a second force under McIntosh west along the Ashland Road to screen Chapman’s left flank, fending off Rooney Lee and any other rebel cavalry units lurking in the vicinity. For his screening operation, McIntosh was to take the 5th New York Cavalry, the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, and the 1st Connecticut Cavalry. The rest of the division—the 1st Vermont, 3rd Indiana, 3rd New Jersey, and 8th New York Cav-

alry—would remain with Wilson at Hanover Court House, ready to join either of the two expeditions as needed.²⁰



Both of Wilson’s expeditions started off at about the same time, Chapman’s two regiments riding northwest along Hanover River Road, and McIntosh’s three heading west along the Ashland Road. Chapman had fairly easy going. Camped along Hanover River Road in Chapman’s path was Lieutenant Colonel Ridgely Brown’s 1st Maryland Cavalry and the Baltimore Light Artillery, both commanded by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson and numbering no more than 150 men. Johnson put up a brave front, falling back slowly as Chapman advanced. Severely outnumbered, Johnson petitioned Rooney Lee for help. At this juncture, Lee’s two brigades were on the Ashland Road, confronting McIntosh, and Lee did not see how he could spare troops to assist Johnson. He sent a courier to Johnson alerting him that his hands were full and that he was being driven back as well, promising to watch the Marylanders’ southern flank and urging Johnson to make at least a “little fight for the bridges.” Miffed, Johnson replied that his 150 men “couldn’t do [what Lee’s] division of cavalry couldn’t and [that he] was going back, too.”²¹

Concerned that Chapman might become isolated, Wilson sent him the 1st Vermont and 3rd Indiana Cavalry. A squadron under Captain Oliver T. Cushman of the 1st Vermont turned north at Wickham’s Crossing and destroyed the Virginia Central bridge over the South Anna River while Chapman’s main body pushed Johnson’s Marylanders back to Ellett’s Crossing and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. “We fought the enemy from point to point,” a Marylander recollected, “in hopes that reinforcements would be sent us, and thus save the bridges.” Reinforcements, however, were not forthcoming. Hoping to redeem what was fast becoming an impossible situation, Johnson deployed his small force at Ellett’s Crossing, fully aware that the stand had little chance of success. Leaving Colonel Brown in charge, Johnson rode west to locate a place for the troops to fall back on.²²

Chapman’s column reached Ellett’s Crossing around 2:00 p.m. Confronted by an overwhelming force, Brown decided to do the unexpected and attack. Ordering a mounted charge, he rode to the front


of his small band and led them in a forlorn attack against Chapman’s four regiments. Brown made an irresistible target at the head of his men, and a Union trooper shot him through the right eye, the bullet passing out the back of his head. Brown tumbled from his mount, mortally wounded. Demoralized, the Marylanders retreated, bringing Brown’s body with them.²³

Johnson heard the ruckus and galloped back to Ellett’s Crossing. By the time he arrived, Chapman was preparing to launch a charge of his own. As Johnson pondered the situation—Chapman was “making disposition for an advance which it was apparent we could not withstand with our small command,” Brown’s adjutant George W. Booth remembered of those tense moments—help in the form of the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry arrived from Rooney Lee.



Both US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA

After the war Erastus Blakeslee (top) became a Congregational clergyman; Alvred Bayard Nettleton (below) served as assistant U.S. secretary of the treasury, 1890-1893.



Valentine Museum

MAJOR GENERAL
WADE HAMPTON



Confederate Order-of-Battle



BRIGADIER GENERAL
THOMAS L. ROSSER



COLONEL
GILBERT J. WRIGHT



7TH VA



11TH VA



12TH VA



35TH VA
BATTALION



7TH GA



COBB'S
(GA) LEGION



PHILLIP'S
(GA) LEGION



JEFF DAVIS
(MS) LEGION



MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM H. F. "ROONEY" LEE



BRIGADIER GENERAL
PIERCE YOUNG



BRIGADIER GENERAL
JOHN R. CHAMBLISS, JR.



CAPTAIN
WILLIAM M.
MCGREGOR



1ST NC



2ND NC



3RD NC



5TH NC



9TH VA



10TH VA



13TH VA

COLONEL BRADLEY T. JOHNSON



1ST MD



BALTIMORE LIGHT
ARTILLERY

Wade Hampton (left) and Thomas Lafayette Rosser. A highly talented cavalryman, Hampton served both as governor of South Carolina and U.S. Senator after the war, while Rosser became chief engineer of the Northern Pacific and Canadian Railroads, a gentleman farmer, and a brigadier general of U.S. volunteers at the time of the Spanish-American War.

 = cavalry  = horse artillery; XX = division; X = brigade; III = regiment; II = battalion; I = battery

Johnson was distraught over Brown's loss and refused the reinforcements. "I don't want your squadron," he told Lee's aide Captain Theodore S. Garnett, leading the regiment. "Colonel Brown has just been killed. I cannot stop the enemy here." Calling in his men, Johnson retreated south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, toward Ashland. His way now clear, Chapman seized Ellett's Crossing and dispatched Captain Cushman to the nearby railway bridge, which he wrecked as thoroughly as he had the first span. "Both of these bridges were most effectually destroyed by fire, including trestle work as well as superstructure," Chapman later reported, "as also the water tanks, and the road was further damaged by the destruction of small bridges and cattle guards at different points."²⁴

* * *

ASHLAND WAS A QUIANT VIRGINIA TOWN fifteen miles north of Richmond. It owed its existence to the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. Initially named "Slash Cottage" after the nearby "Slashes of Hanover," birthplace of Henry Clay, the town hosted an elaborate resort replete with a spa, hotel, and guest cottages. By 1860, horse

racetracks and casinos had attracted visitors from Richmond, many of whom built summer homes and commuted by train. "In one short decade," a local historian noted, "Ashland had come a long way from a large stand of trees in the middle of a slash where pigeons came to roost, to a thriving mineral springs resort that attracted picnickers for the day or families for the week."²⁵

War was not new to Ashland. The place was close to Richmond, it lay on the rail line, and Telegraph Road, the major north-south wagon route from Richmond to Washington, passed less than half a mile east of town. Ashland had been a popular target for Union raiders, and its location drew the war to it again. Two and a half miles north was Ellett's Crossing, where Johnson's Marylanders were vainly trying to fend off Chapman's Federals. And a few miles east, on the road to Hanover Court House, were McIntosh's three regiments, driving Rooney Lee west toward the town.

Lee was hard pressed. Nearing Ashland, he left a token force on Ashland Road to retard McIntosh's progress, led the rest of his division south along farm roads, and turned west to Telegraph Road. This placed him southeast of town,

where he began setting up a defensive line to bar McIntosh's direct route to Richmond. Colonel John Hammond's 5th New York Cavalry, in the fore of McIntosh's column, easily pushed aside the small force of Confederates remaining on Ashland Road, crossed Telegraph Road, and rode victoriously to the railway station in the center of town. Colonel Purington's Ohio troopers came close behind and joined Hammond's men tearing up tracks and destroying the train station.

Hammond's and Purington's rapid advance had left McIntosh's rear-most regiment—the 1st Connecticut—several miles back on the Ashland Road. Around noon, Wade Hampton, who was camped a few miles away at Atlee Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, received alarms from Rooney Lee alerting him to McIntosh's progress. Hampton immediately started north with his brigade commander Thomas Rosser and three Virginia regiments, intending to enter the Ashland Road behind McIntosh and attack him from behind.²⁶

Hampton and Rosser reached the Ashland Road shortly after the tail of McIntosh's force had passed by. "The road was narrow and obstructed by a thick, bushy forest," Rosser recounted, "and

while the enemy was not in sight, so recently had the rear of his column passed that the water from a branch was still running into the tracks made by his horses in the mud on its bank, not having had time to fill." Leaving Rosser to harass McIntosh's rear, Hampton galloped off to coordinate with Rooney Lee. Rosser and his three regiments rode west along the Ashland Road and discovered to their delight that elements from the 1st Connecticut Cavalry had strayed onto a side road, leaving McIntosh's supply wagons unprotected. "Our regiment was marching quietly in the rear with our pack train and headquarters dog Cash," a man in the 1st Connecticut recollected. The New Englanders had no inkling that rebels were about to attack.²⁷

At Rosser's signal, Colonel Thomas Massie's 12th Virginia Cavalry pitched into the 1st Connecticut—"came down upon them like lice in Egypt," a Federal said of the unexpected assault. "The servants, who were riding and leading the pack animals, of course were terribly scared and dashed right down the road through the center of our regiment, throwing it, for the time being, into some confusion," another Connecticut man remembered. While New Englanders scattered, Rosser's Virginians loaded up on delicacies from the Union wagons and captured McIntosh's spare mounts accompanying the rearguard. A trail of beans proved especially intriguing and led to an overturned mule cart. "Don't kill me," bawled the driver, who was relieved to discover the Confederates more interested in his cargo than in him. "The effect of this rear attack was to scatter the enemy in every direction through the woods, breaking up his organization," Rosser reported, "but in doing so I encumbered my men with prisoners, horses, and wagons." Colonel Blakeslee, commanding the 1st Connecticut, ordered his soldiers to open ranks and let the panicked packhorses run through. While Rosser's troopers collected booty, Blakeslee rallied his men along both sides of the Ashland Road in hopes of making a stand.²⁸



Rosser's lead squadron under Lieutenant George Baylor drove Blakeslee back in vicious, hand-to-hand-fighting. "The woods were very thick, so that I could get but few men in action at a time," Blakeslee related, "and the woods were filled with rebels, so that a saber charge

in the road was impracticable." Blakeslee estimated that he reformed seven times during his heated rearguard fight. Disabled by a severe hand wound, he relinquished command to Major George O. Marcy. Colonel Purington, whose Ohio troopers were ripping up track at Ashland, heard the firing and sent Squadron D under Lieutenant Melancthon C. Cowdery to help Blakeslee. The additional Federals caught Rosser by surprise. "I had kept only two squadrons in the saddle unencumbered," Rosser wrote. The balance of the command was guarding the prisoners and captured property, and was scattered along the road for over a mile. Cowdery's squadron charged into Baylor's troopers, and men fought at close quarters, firing pistols and slashing with sabers. "Everything was about to break," Rosser recounted, "when Private [Holmes] Conrad, who was at my side, rushed to [the 11th Virginia] and seized its colors and called to his old comrades to save their flag that had waved triumphantly upon so many glorious fields, and rushed with it into the ranks of the enemy." The Virginians piled into the Federals. "Following up his success," Hampton later put it, "Rosser pressed the enemy vigorously and in a series of brilliant charges—some of which were over dismounted men—he drove [the last of McIntosh's troopers] into Ashland." Federals posted in houses finally stopped Rosser's progress with a "galling fire," a Virginian reported.²⁹

While Rosser mauled the tail of McIntosh's column, Rooney Lee arrayed his two brigades—Pierce Young's North Carolinians and John Chambliss' Virginians—into line across Telegraph Road and the railroad, blocking the routes south of Ashland. Hampton, now actively coordinating the Confederate defense, saw an excellent opportunity to capture McIntosh's entire force. He had three brigades—Rosser's, Young's, and Chambliss'—concentrated against McIntosh's three regiments. Rosser held the Ashland Road, blocking McIntosh's way back to Hanover Court House. Young and Chambliss, south of town, closed off McIntosh's route toward Richmond. Telegraph Road and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad led north from town, toward Ellett's crossing, but Johnson's Maryland troopers, reinforced by elements from Gilbert Wright's brigade, stood across those

routes. The closest Union reinforcements to Ashland—Chapman's troopers—were still at Ellett's Crossing, pulling up tracks and oblivious to McIntosh's predicament. With rebels hemming him in on three sides, McIntosh's only way out was to flee west. This, Hampton reasoned, would take him away from the Union army and only temporarily postpone his inevitable capture.

While Hampton completed his preparations to snag McIntosh, a battery of Confederate horse artillery under Captain Patrick Hart rolled up. McIntosh was now bottled up in Ashland, surrounded by a Confederate force that outnumbered him better than three to one. "Attack at once," Hampton ordered, determined to



Both Museum of the Confederacy

"Rooney" Lee (top) owned the "White House" plantation on the Pamunkey, which at the time of the Ashland battle was the principal logistical base for the Army of the Potomac. John R. Chambliss, Jr. (bottom) was killed in August 1864 in a clash with David Gregg's Federal cavalry.

exploit his advantage and capture the isolated Union brigade.³⁰

McIntosh girded to repulse the impending onslaught. He stationed his horse artillery in town and posted his men in houses along the rail embankment and behind breastworks hastily erected across neighboring woods and fields. McIntosh's line formed a semi-circle, the arc's center facing east, on the Ashland Road, and its ends resting on the railroad north and south of Ashland. The 2nd Ohio, under Purington, faced north, controlling the railroad and Telegraph Road in the direction of Johnson's Marylanders. The 1st Connecticut, now under Major Marcy, faced east across the Ashland Road, confronting Rosser. And Colonel Hammond's 5th New York looked south, toward Rooney Lee's two brigades under Young and Chambliss.

Hampton began his attack by sending Young's Tar Heels in a headlong charge to break McIntosh's line between Telegraph Road and the Ashland Road. Elements from Hammond's and Marcy's regiments deadlocked Young in bitter fighting. Young—"an exceedingly handsome, gallant, and enterprising officer," Wilson later described him—fell wounded, and command of his brigade devolved on Colonel John A. Baker of the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry. When the North Carolinians ran low on ammuni-

tion, they "fought the enemy with stones and brick-bats," a Confederate recalled. Hammond's Federals, armed with seven-shot carbines, held firm, killing and wounding more than seventy of Baker's men. "Several times our boys were partially surrounded," a New Yorker related, "but the ceaseless fire of their carbines and the grape and canister of the artillery mowed fearful gaps in the enemy's lines, and strewed the ground with slain." Hammond almost joined the slain when a rebel bullet hit his scabbard, cracking the bone above his ankle.³¹

McIntosh sent a courier to Ellett's Crossing to inform Chapman of his predicament. The courier slipped past the Marylanders guarding the road and pounded into Chapman's camp. Wilson, it developed, was visiting Ellett's Crossing to see how Chapman was doing. Learning from the courier of McIntosh's situation, he immediately rushed Major William Wells' battalion of the 1st Vermont Cavalry south along Telegraph Road. The battle-hardened Vermonters numbered among the best of Sheridan's troopers. Punching through the Marylanders, they stormed into Ashland, where McIntosh directed them east to assist the 1st Connecticut against Rosser, near the intersection of the Ashland Road and Telegraph Road. North of town on Telegraph Road, a portion of Purington's

2nd Ohio—eight dismounted companies under Major Nettleton—deployed behind a ditch and waged a fierce fight against the Marylanders and the 5th North Carolina Cavalry.³²


Sounds of combat rattled through the streets of Ashland. Both sides fought dismounted, often at close quarters. "It was strange but true to see rebel and Union soldiers firing from opposite sides of the same tree," an Ohioan wrote. "The rebels were so thick that we could scarcely miss them if we fired at random," he claimed, "and but few shots went astray." A Federal recalled that for a time, McIntosh's brigade was "in serious confusion and in imminent danger of being roughly handled." The Confederates also took heavy losses. North of town on Telegraph Road, the 5th North Carolina's Sergeant Tillet led 12 men in a sortie to shoot down gunners manning McIntosh's horse artillery. Tillet's soldiers got close to the guns by creeping through bushes and fired a volley point-blank into the artillery. Union skirmishers in Purington's ditch rose and shot all of Tillet's soldiers. Only the sergeant escaped. "In the space of forty feet I counted 22 dead rebels, and there was a large number wounded," an Ohio man claimed. The 9th Virginia of Chambliss' brigade drove Connecticut troopers from a wooded area south of town, shooting

Colonel Bradley T. Johnson (left), a Marylander who chose to fight for the Confederacy. Colonel John Hammond (right), commanding officer of the 5th New York Cavalry. Hammond served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1879 to 1883.


This photograph of Ashland's business district looking north was taken just before the turn of the century. It was down this rail line that the 1st Vermont thundered to the rescue of McIntosh's embattled brigade.




Museum of the Confederacy



US Army Military History Institute



H.A. "Gus" Miller



Captain Addison J. Warner of the 1st Connecticut. The captain was wounded in the thigh, and when two officers tried to prop him up in his saddle and lead him to safety, a bullet tore through his head, killing him. A Union minie ball split a Confederate's mouth. "The contact of the ball with his teeth sounded to me very much as if it had struck and shattered a china plate or cup," a witness remembered.³³

McIntosh asked Major Wells of the 1st Vermont to send a message back to Wilson. "[McIntosh's] whole brigade was on the skirmish line," Wells told Horace K. Ide, who was to carry the message to Wilson, "and if he should withdraw, the enemy might make a rush and capture his artillery, but if General Wilson could attack with his other brigade, he thought they could drive the rebels." Wilson, it developed, had already ordered the rest of the 1st Vermont to Ashland. In the nick of time, the Vermont troopers, commanded by Colonel Preston, thundered down the rail line, drove the Maryland-

ers aside, and opened an escape route north. The infusion of fresh soldiers bought McIntosh the breathing spell that he needed. His fought-out cavalymen quickly withdrew along the tracks—"we got away the best we could," a Connecticut man admitted—and filed toward Ellett's Crossing and the main body of Chapman's brigade, leaving behind most of their dead and wounded. Confederates wounded the 2nd Ohio's Captain Albert Barnitz in the right thigh during the withdrawal and shot his horse from under him. A few Connecticut soldiers lingered at the depot long enough to bury the popular Captain Warner in a neighboring yard. Confederates seemed on the verge of overwhelming Preston's 1st Vermont when the 5th New York, armed with Spencer repeating carbines, arrived from below town and laid down a carpet of fire. "As our men were between them and the advancing tide of the enemy," a Vermonter recalled, "they did about as much damage to us as to the rebels, except perhaps the noise of the volleys con-

vinced the rebels that there was a reserve." The New Yorkers served as rear guard for the retreat up the rail line, Confederates nipping at their heels. "In getting [McIntosh] out of the scrape we got into one and had to leave on the double quick," a Vermont man conceded. Recollected another: "Soon the road was filled with the debris of several regiments drifting to the rear, which tide General Wilson and his staff vainly endeavored to check."³⁴

McIntosh's brigade joined Chapman at Ellett's Crossing near nightfall. Fagged-out Union horsemen rode back to Hanover Court House and slipped into their camps of the previous evening. "Command all extricated after much hard fighting," Wilson wrote of the affair. "Marched fifteen miles to make eight, not being able to return the way we came" an Ohioan grumbled. "As we drank our coffee that night our souls were full of bitterness, and we fully expressed our sentiments as our conversation turned on the good men who had fallen and the good men who will fall."³⁵

THE BATTLES OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE

and Ashland, as the cavalry fights came to be called, yielded mixed results. Wilson's assignment was to protect the interval between the Union army and the Pamunkey and to destroy the railroad bridges, and he achieved both objectives. His plan to divide his force and send both prongs into unfamiliar territory, however, almost cost him McIntosh's brigade. Wilson never intended to fight at Ashland and was surprised by the vehemence of the Confederate onslaught. He paid a high price in troopers, losing 183 men. McIntosh accounted for 145 of these casualties, as his troops did most of the fighting both days. The highest losses were in the 1st Connecticut, with thirty-three casualties; the 5th New York, with twenty-four; the 2nd Ohio, with sixty-five; and the 1st Vermont of Chapman's brigade, with thirty-three. Confederate laborers repaired the bridges in days, underscoring the venture's futility. In the larger picture, Wilson's expedition had no discernable impact on the campaign. It also did nothing to further Wilson's standing with his superiors or with his men. "We had a hot time at Ashland, where we ran up against a heavy force and got rather the worst of it," an Ohio trooper candidly admitted. "Our division and brigade commanders I think did not handle their commands very well," was a Vermont soldier's assessment.³⁶

The verdict on the Confederate side was also mixed. The rebels lost about the same number of men as the Federals. A recent tabulation documents about a hundred losses for Young, fifty for Chambliss, twenty for Rosser, and twenty for the Maryland troops, bringing total rebel loss for the two days of combat to approximately 190 men. Young's wounding and Colonel Brown's death cut deeply. Many Southerners also complained that Hampton had fumbled an excellent chance to capture McIntosh's isolated Union cavalry brigade. "The whole affair was badly managed on our part," Rooney Lee's aide Garnett carped, "and what should have been a great victory for us must be numbered among the 'lost opportunities.'"³⁷

But the Confederates had gained something from the fight. Hampton, critics noted, was maturing as a leader. He had improvised a plan on the spur of the



Major William Wells (left) and Sergeant Horace K. Ide, 1st Vermont Cavalry. Wells selected Ide to penetrate the enemy lines and request help for the hotly engaged First Brigade.



All US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle

moment that contained Wilson's threat and had come close to destroying part of the Union force. The Federals had managed to get away, went the argument, but not through any dereliction on Hampton's part. In an inspiring counter to the string of Union cavalry victories during the past month, Hampton had shown that the Army of Northern Virginia's mounted arm remained a formidable force. And Hampton's subordinates—particularly Rosser—had performed admirably. After the battle, Hampton received a note from General Lee expressing "gratification at the handsome defeat of the enemy." Also important to the Confederates were provisions and horses—between three and five hundred fresh mounts, according to estimates—that Rosser had captured.³⁸


The cavalry battle at Ashland, like most Civil War cavalry engagements, was stirring to participants but represented little more than a sideshow. While Wilson's troopers burned bridges and battled in the streets of Ashland, foot soldiers in blue and gray skirmished along Totopotomoy Creek and girded for battle near a crossroads named Old Cold Harbor. Infantry, not cavalry, would determine the fate of the campaign. □

GORDON C. RHEA is the author of several award-winning books on the Civil War. His latest on the Overland Campaign, *To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864*, won the Civil War Round Table of New York's Fletcher Pratt Award. This article is adapted from a chapter in his upcoming volume on the

battles at Totopotomoy Creek and Cold Harbor, due to be published by Louisiana State University Press in fall 2002.

NOTES

1. Gordon C. Rhea, "Union Cavalry in the Wilderness: The Education of Philip H. Sheridan and James H. Wilson," in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *The Wilderness Campaign* (Chapel Hill: 1997), pp. 108-09; Edward G. Longacre, *Grant's Cavalryman* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: 2000), p. 14 (original title: *From Union Stars to Top Hat*).
2. James H. Wilson's Diary, May 30, 1864, in Library of Congress; Robert K. Krick, *Lee's Colonels* (Dayton, Ohio: 1992), p. 409; Samuel J. B. V. Gilpin Diary, May 30, 1864, in E. N. Gilpin Papers, Library of Congress.
3. Wilson's Diary, May 30, 1864; Wilson to Andrew A. Humphreys, 9:00 p.m., May 30, 1864, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 3, p. 363.
4. George A. Purington's Report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 894; Albert Barnitz' Field Notes, June 2, 1864, in Brinecke Barnitz Papers, Yale University Library.
5. Isaac Gause, *Four Years with Five Armies* (New York: 1908), p. 250-51.
6. Joseph Fred Waring's Diary, May 31, 1864, in Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill; W. W. Abercrombie to wife, June 1, 1864, in Georgia Department of Archives and History; R. P. Chew's Report, in Lewis Leigh Collection, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle; "The First Connecticut Cavalry," New Haven (Conn.) *Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864.
7. Richard E. Beaudry, ed., *War Journal of Louis N. Beaudry, Fifth New York Cavalry* (Jefferson, N.C.: 1996), pp. 124-25; Wilson's Report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 880.
8. Wilson to Humphreys, 1:30 p.m., May 31, 1864, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 3, p. 413.



Colonel Addison Preston led the 1st Vermont to the rescue of McIntosh's command. He was killed in action two days later.

9. Wilson's Diary, May 31, 1864; Wilson to Humphreys, 11:00 p.m., May 31, 1864, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 3, p. 414; Wilson's Report, 881; James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (New York: 1912), Vol. I, p. 429.
10. Old Po'Keepsie to editor, May 12, 1864, in Painesville (Ohio) *Telegraph*, June 23, 1864.
11. McIntosh's Report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 888; Purington's Report, *ibid*, 894; Wilson's Report, *ibid*, 881.
12. Waring's Diary, May 31, 1864; "Recent Cavalry Operations," *Atlanta Daily Intelligencer*, June 14, 1864; "Barringer's North Carolina Brigade of Cavalry," *Raleigh Daily Confederate*, February 22, 1865.
13. Old Po'Keepsie to editor, June 12, 1864.
14. Wilson's Report, 881; "The First Connecticut Cavalry," *New Haven Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864.
15. *Ibid*; Purington's Report, 894; Gause, *Four Years in Five Armies*, 253; Luman Harris Tenney, *War Diary* (Cleveland: 1914), p. 117.
16. Gause, *Four Years in Five Armies*, 254.
17. "First Regiment Cavalry," in *Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Connecticut for the Year Ending March 31, 1865* (New Haven: 1865), pp. 412-13; Robert G. Athearn, ed., "The Civil War Diary of John Wilson Phillips," in *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, January, 1954, p. 104; "Recent Cavalry Operations," *Atlanta Daily Intelligencer*, June 14, 1864; Committee of the Regiment, *History of the Eighteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry* (New York: 1909), p. 24.
18. John W. Chowning Diary, May 31, 1864, in Mary Ball Washington Library, Fredericksburg, Va.; R. L. T. Beale, *History of the 9th Virginia Cavalry* (Richmond: 1899), p. 126; David Cardwell, "When the Gallant Lieutenant Ford was Killed," *Con-*

- federate Veteran*, Vol. 26 (1918), pp. 207-08; Gause, *Four Years with Five Armies*, 251; "The First Connecticut Cavalry," *New Haven Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864.
19. Wilson to Humphreys, 11:00 p.m., May 31, 1864, in *OR*, Vol. 31, Pt. 3, p. 414; Chester, *Recollections of the War of the Rebellion*, 81; Wilson's Diary, May 31, 1864. Alfred C. Young helped me calculate Confederate losses.
20. Wilson's Report, 881; McIntosh's Report, 888; Charles C. Suydam's Report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 890; Wilson's Diary, June 1, 1864.
21. Bradley T. Johnson to wife, June 2, 1864, in Duke University.
22. *Ibid*; William W. Goldsborough, *The Maryland Line in the Confederate States Army* (Baltimore: 1900), p. 200; Samuel H. Miller, ed., "Henry Clay Mettam Memoirs," in *Maryland Historical Magazine*, LVIII (1963), p. 154; Chapman's Report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 900.
23. George W. Booth, *Reminiscences of a Maryland Soldier* (Baltimore: 1898), pp. 117-18; Miller, "Henry Clay Mettam Memoirs," 154; George S. Woolley Manuscript, quoted in Robert J. Driver, Jr., *First and Second Maryland Cavalry C.S.A.* (Charlottesville, Va.: 1999), p. 81.
24. Chapman's report, in *OR*, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 900; Booth, *Reminiscences of a Maryland Soldier*, 117; Robert J. Trout, ed., *Riding with Stuart: Reminiscences of an Aide-de-Camp, by Captain Theodore Stanford Garnett* (Shippensburg, Pa.: 1994), p. 77.
25. Rosanne Groat Shalf, "Macmurdo House Paper - 1994," manuscript furnished by author.
26. Wilson's Report, 881; Chowning Diary, June 1, 1864.
27. Thomas L. Rosser, "Promotion for Extraordinary Skill," in *Lost Cause*, Vol. 1, N. 4 (Louisville: 1898), p. 1; "1st Regiment Cavalry," in *Adjutant General's Report*, 413; "The 1st Conn. Cavalry," *New Haven Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864. Rosser gives a slightly different rendition of the same events in "Annals of the War: Rosser and His Men," *Philadelphia Weekly Tribune*, April 19, 1884.
28. Purington's Report, 895; George Baylor, *Bull Run to Bull Run* (Richmond: 1900), p. 214; Rosser, "Promotion for Extraordinary Skill," 1; "The Recent Cavalry Operations," in *Atlanta Daily Intelligencer*, June 14, 1864; "1st Regiment Cavalry," in *Adjutant General's Report*, 413; "The 1st Conn. Cavalry," *New Haven Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864.
29. Rosser, "Promotion for Extraordinary Skill," 1; "1st Regiment Cavalry," in *Adjutant General's Report*, 413-14; "The 1st Conn. Cavalry," *New Haven Daily Palladium*, June 21, 1864; Wade Hampton's *Connected Narrative*, p. 40, South Caroliniana Room, Columbia; William N. McDonald, *A History of the Laurel Brigade* (Baltimore: 1907), pp. 245-48. Rosser was so impressed with Holmes that he told Hampton about him that day and later formally recommended him for promotion [Rosser to General ___, January 2, 1865, in Holmes Conrad CSR, Roll #61].
30. Hampton, *Connected Narrative*, 40; Chew's Report.
31. D. B. R. "Barringer's North Carolina Brigade of Cavalry," *Raleigh Daily Confederate*, February 22, 1865; Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, I, p. 430; Rufus Barringer to V. C. Barringer, January 27, 1866, in Rufus Barringer Papers, Southern Historical Collection; Louis N. Boudrye, *Historic Records of the 5th New York Cavalry* (Albany: 1874), p. 137.
32. Hampton, *Connected Narrative*, 40; "Army Correspondence," in Painesville *Telegraph*, June 23, 1864; George G. Benedict, *Vermont in the Civil War* (Burlington, Vt.: 1888), II, pp. 642-43; Horace K. Ide, *History of the First Vermont Cavalry Volunteers in the War of the Great Rebellion* (Baltimore, Md.: 2000), p. 173; Trout, ed., *Riding with Stuart*, 78; Albert Barnitz field notes, June 1, 1864, in Barnitz papers, Yale University Library.
33. "Army Correspondence," in Painesville *Telegraph*, June 23, 1864; Benedict, *Vermont in the Civil War*, II, 643; Trout, ed., *Riding with Stuart*, 78; A. McDonald to Mrs. Addison G. Warner, June 2, 1864, in Windham Country *Transcript*, June 16, 1864; George W. Beale, *A Lieutenant of Cavalry in Lee's Army* (Boston: 1918), p. 153.
34. Ide, *History of the 1st Vermont Cavalry*, 174-75; Benedict, *Vermont in the Civil War*, II, 643; "The First Connecticut Cavalry," in *New Haven Palladium*, June 21, 1864; Albert Barnitz field notes, June 1, 1864; J. L. Sperry to sister, June 5, 1864, in Duke University; Chester, *Recollections of the War of Rebellion*, 81; Eri Davidson Woodbury to family, June 5, 1864, in Dartmouth University Library.
35. Wilson's Diary, June 1, 1864; Army Correspondence," in Painesville *Telegraph*, June 23, 1864.
36. Robert W. Hatton, ed., "Just a Little Bit of the Civil War, as Seen by W. J. Smith, Company M, 2nd O V. Cavalry," in *Ohio History*, Vol. 84, 1975, p. 115; William Wells to family, June 4, 1864, in William Wells Collection, University of Vermont Special Collections.
37. Trout, ed., *Riding with Stuart*, 78-79.
38. *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, June 3, 1864; *Richmond Examiner*, June 3, 1864; "Progress of the Campaign in Virginia," *Charleston Mercury*, June 4, 1864; Baylor, *Bull Run to Bull Run*, 214; Theo. S. Barker to Wade Hampton, June 2, 1864, in Hampton, *Connected Narrative*, 41. Albert Young helped with tabulating casualties.

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

WHY DID LINCOLN CHOOSE WAR?

Slavery can neither fully explain nor ultimately justify the American Civil War. This realization is unfortunately obscured because most scholars and buffs alike have usually sought a single cause for these four years of soul wrenching conflict. The early nationalist interpretation, put forward by historian James Ford Rhodes at the turn of the 20th century, blamed one factor and one factor only: slavery. Slavery induced the southern states to secede, and Rhodes unreflectively assumed that the national government had no option but to suppress them.¹ Later revisionist historians, such as Avery O. Craven and James G. Randall,

contended that slavery was dying of its own accord and attributed the war instead to a "blundering generation" of politicians, manipulated by irresponsible extremists and fanatics on both sides.² The progressive perspective of Charles Beard also denied slavery's role and replaced it with economic considerations.³ Then, beginning in the 1950s, a neo-abolitionist school reaffirmed the centrality of slavery. Yet while these competing interpretations have waxed and waned, the underlying quest for the one, overriding cause remains unabated.

The eminent Princeton professor, James M. McPherson, writing in the November issue of this publication, offers us a neo-abolitionist survey of the Civil War's origins.⁴ I have no quarrels with the historical details of his account. Its accuracy is beyond criticism. He simply fails to prove that slavery was *the* cause of the war. Early in the article, McPherson quotes an unnamed spokesman for the Sons of Confederate Veterans, who declared that "[t]he cause of the war was secession, and the cause of secession could have been any number of things."⁵ It turns out that both links in this quoted argument are faulty. McPherson has done an admirable job of exposing the fallacy in the second half: what Southerners called their peculiar institution was indeed the fundamental cause of secession. That proposition no longer admits of any historical doubt. Historians would be hard pressed to find *any* causal claim in all human history for which the empirical support is more overwhelming.

When McPherson goes on to endorse the first link in the chain, however, and asserts that "[t]he cause of the war was indeed secession," he makes a common but logically indefensible leap.⁶ Other prominent neo-abolitionist historians, from Eric Foner to Kenneth

Stampp, have in contrast emphasized that Civil War causation breaks down into at least two questions. Why did the southern states want to leave the Union? And why did the northern states refuse to let them go?⁷ Just because slavery is the answer to the first, it does not necessarily follow that it answers the second. These two questions are often muddled together because so many Americans approach the Civil War with an implicit and unchallenged prejudice in favor of national unity.⁸ Yet secession and war are distinct issues. In order for secession to lead to war, Northerners had to be determined to use violence to hold the Union together. And the scholarly research of McPherson himself, along with that of many others, has demonstrated that slavery had very little, if anything, to do with that determination, either on the part of President Abraham Lincoln or on the part of the northern public generally.

The sole northern group that had always made opposition to slavery their primary goal was the abolitionists. They burst upon the national landscape in the 1830s, demanding the immediate emancipation of all slaves, without any compensation to slaveholders, and full political rights for all blacks. Less well known is that they were also often advocates of disunion. The most prominent and vitriolic of these abolitionists, William Lloyd Garrison, went so far as to denounce the Constitution for its proslavery clauses as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell." During one 4th of July celebration, he publicly burned a copy, proclaiming: "So perish all compromises with tyranny!" He believed that, if anything, the North should secede. That way it would get out from under the Constitution's fugitive slave clause and become a haven for runaway slaves. The slogan, "No Union with Slave-Holders" appeared on



Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison (1805-1879) denounced the Constitution as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell."

Nationwide, Lincoln received only 40 percent of the popular vote. Yet he won with the electoral votes of every free state except New Jersey. As president-elect (opposite), he raises the flag before a cheering crowd at Independence Hall on Washington's birthday in 1861.



the masthead of Garrison's weekly paper, *The Liberator*, for years.⁹

Thus, passionately opposing slavery and simultaneously favoring secession are quite consistent. And Garrison's strategic vision was hardly unique to him. Nearly all of slavery's most radical opponents initially shared it, including Frederick Douglass, the free black leader who had escaped in 1838 from slavery in Maryland, and Wendell Phillips, a wealthy lawyer and Boston Brahmin.¹⁰ Needless to say this disrespect for the Union did not go over well in the free states. Abolitionist lecturers, presses, and property were frequent targets of hostile mobs throughout the 1830s. But not all abolitionists supported disunion. Many eventually would turn away from Garrison to take up political activity in a quest for respectability and success. As the antislavery crusade split into doctrinal factions, the resort to the ballot box resulted in both a broadened appeal and a dilution of purity.

The Republican Party eventually triumphed by reducing political antislavery to its lowest common denominator. The party's main position, preventing slavery's extension into new territories, carried no taint of disunion. It allowed Northerners to take steps against slavery in a distant sphere while honoring their constitutional obligation to leave the local institutions of the southern states alone. Here moreover was an antislavery position that could be made consistent with racism. Keeping slaves out of the territories was an excellent way to keep blacks out altogether. Abolitionists had failed to win over the North because they had put their opposition to slavery ahead of the Union. Republicans succeeded because they put the Union ahead of their opposition to slavery.


That Republicans promised not to interfere with the peculiar institution in the existing states—to the point of supporting in 1861 a proposed thirteenth amendment that would have explicitly guaranteed slavery and have been unamendable—goes without saying. Even the platform of the abolitionist Liberty Party, which conducted presidential campaigns in 1840 and 1844, had respected this constitutional constraint. But there were other, constitutionally permissible steps that the central government could take and yet the Republican platform es-

chewed, such as abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and prohibiting the interstate and coastal slave trade. President Lincoln even promised in his first inaugural to enforce the fugitive slave law, so hated among many Northerners.

The plain fact that Lincoln was not an abolitionist is often cited by those who wish to deny that the seceding states were concerned about slavery's future. McPherson in his article demolishes this claim quite nicely. The observation has become commonplace today that special interests inordinately influence government policy. This has actually always been the case; it is just less noticeable or objectionable when government is small and unobtrusive. One of the most powerful special interests during the pre-Civil War period was what abolitionists and Republicans referred to as the "Slave Power." Despite constituting only one quarter of southern families in 1860, slaveholders had dominated American politics both in the southern states and at the national level.

Then in 1860 a Northerner who had not carried a single slave state, and in ten of them did not get a single recorded vote, was elected president. Nationwide, Lincoln received only 40 percent of the popular vote. Yet he won with the electoral votes of every free state except New Jersey, where he got four of the state's seven electoral votes. The contest in the South—mainly between the Southern Democratic and Constitutional Union candidates—had proved utterly irrelevant. Even if the votes of all Lincoln's opponents had been combined, he would still have won. Nothing could make the looming political impotence of the slave states more stark. Almost overnight a special interest that had dictated policy in Congress, to the Executive, on the Supreme Court, and usually in both major parties was politically dispossessed.

Southern fire-eaters recognized that a major faction within the Republican Party did favor further steps to divorce the general government from slavery. Lincoln appointed to his cabinet at least two of these radical Republicans: William Henry Seward of New York as secretary of state and Salmon Portland Chase of Ohio as secretary of the treasury. Even if the radicals did not immediately have their way, the Republican Party now controlled federal patronage, the postal ser-



Boston Public Library

Wendell Phillips (1811-1884) became a radical reformer after the murder of abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy in 1837.

vice, military posts, and judicial appointments. Lincoln could put Republicans, abolitionists, and even free blacks into public office all over the South. The fact that a national administration—for the first time—morally condemned the peculiar institution might, in and of itself, trigger slave resistance. And the Republican commitment to a territorial policy that the Supreme Court had already declared unconstitutional in the infamous Dred Scott decision showed that slaveholders could not rely upon paper guarantees.

The editors of the *Richmond Enquirer* described how Lincoln's victory must in the long term destroy slavery. "Upon the accession of Lincoln to power, we would apprehend no direct act of violence against negro property," the editors conceded. But "the use of federal office, contracts, power and patronage" would result in "the building up in every Southern State of a Black Republican party, the ally and stipendiary of Northern fanaticism, to become in a few short years the open advocate of abolition." Already a Missouri congressman, Frank Blair, Jr., whose family had long been powerful within Democratic circles, had gone over to the Republicans and delivered ten percent of that border state's presidential vote to Lincoln.

The *Enquirer* also understood that the eventual "ruin of every Southern State



Horace Greeley (1811-1872), mercurial editor of the *New York Tribune*, initially advocated "letting the erring sisters go."

by the destruction of negro labor" would be accomplished through the increase in fugitive slaves after tampering with the peculiar institution in the upper South. "By gradual and insidious approach, under the fostering hand of federal power, Abolitionism will grow up in every border Southern State, converting them into free States, then into 'cities of refuge' for runaway negroes from the gulf States. No act of violence may ever be committed, no servile war waged, and yet the ruin and degradation of Virginia will be as fully and fatally accomplished, as though bloodshed and rapine had ravished the land. There are no consequences that can follow, even forcible disunion, more disastrous to the future prosperity of the people of Virginia."¹¹

Secession was a risky gamble. By leaving the Union, Southerners were abandoning the Constitution's protections for slavery and possibly unleashing the very plague of runaways they feared. But with Republicans in control of the national government, many southern whites felt they had nothing to lose. Their peculiar institution was certainly doomed otherwise. Slaveholders could better depend upon an independent central authority to provide those protections and police the new borders. As one Georgian explained in a letter to his senator, Alexander H. Stephens, independence would permit Southerners to erect

"an impassable wall between the North & the South so that negroes could not pass over to the North or an abolitionist come to the South to annoy us any more."¹²

Other Southerners disagreed, including Stephens himself. Although he would become the Confederacy's vice president, he opposed his state's secession, judging "slavery more secure in the Union than out of it."¹³ As Lincoln took the oath of office, the Union still contained eight slave states, more than had left. Secession had so far failed in the upper South, where the black population was less dense. Even in a few states of the lower South, disunion had triumphed by only narrow margins. But southern unionists made clear their conviction that no state should be forced to remain.

Some Northerners were prepared to allow the new Gulf Coast Confederacy to depart in peace. Militant abolitionists such as Garrison, who had been championing separation from the slave states for decades, were mainly concerned that South Carolina's secession was just a bluff. The withdrawal of the deep South's representatives from Congress made free-state control over the national government more pronounced than ever. The Republicans would have a free hand in the territories, whereas the economic viability of a small, independent slave republic was in doubt, especially if it could not expand. Even Horace Greeley's staunchly Republican *New York Tribune* had briefly come out for letting the cotton states go, hoping "never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets."¹⁴

Lincoln, on the other hand, was determined to preserve the Union by force if necessary. Slavery's abolition did not figure at all in either his avowed justifications or his private motivations. "I hold that . . . the Union of these States is perpetual," the president asserted in his first inaugural address, cautiously revealing this unyielding posture. "The Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all States."¹⁵

Lincoln's determination received the hearty applause of powerful northern interests. Westerners feared the closing of the lower Mississippi River, even though

the Confederate government promised free navigation. Eastern manufacturers worried that they would lose southern markets to European competitors because of the Confederacy's free-trade policy. Yankee merchants and ship builders faced an end to a monopoly on the South's coastal trade that the government granted to United States vessels. Holders of government securities were edgy about the Union's loss of tariff revenue. But in the final analysis, American nationalism proved to be the most compelling opponent of southern independence. Republicans had promised northern voters that they could have *both* antislavery and Union. Now that the Union was imperiled, the Republican Party had to take decisive action or face political oblivion.

The deep South's refusal to abide by the outcome of a fair and legal election struck northern voters as a selfish betrayal of the nation's unique mission. "Plainly the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy," argued Lincoln. Indeed, his inaugural equated secession with despotism. "A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or despotism," because "unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible."¹⁶ Worse still, the successful breakaway of the lower South raised the possibility of other regions separating.

Yet Lincoln also wished to preserve the loyalty of the upper South. He therefore initially settled upon a defensive strategy to uphold national authority. Until the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 14, 1861, the president could not have counted on enthusiastic northern support for an appeal to arms. The attack, however, electrified the free states, as Lincoln issued his proclamation calling up the state militias. The president's call garnered an opposite reaction in the slave states. It wiped out much of the lingering unionism in those that had already seceded, and still more decisive was its impact on the wavering states of the upper South. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas all promptly transferred their allegiance to the Confederate States of America. At a

single stroke of the pen, Lincoln had more than doubled the Confederacy's white population and material resources.

Once war got underway, Lincoln continued to insist that he wanted only to preserve the Union, and the newly elected Congress confirmed this war aim shortly after it convened. The Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of July 1861 denied that the government was waging war "in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States" but only "to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union."¹⁷ In other words, the resolutions promised to leave slavery untouched in the seceding states.

It is true that northern blacks, abolitionists, and Radical Republicans, from the first salvo, did seek a crusade against the South's peculiar institution. The prospect of wartime abolition seduced even Garrison and most of his militant followers into abandoning disunion. Only a handful of slavery opponents remained true to their original principles. Among them was Boston freethinker Lysander Spooner, an abolitionist so enthusiastic about John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry that he had earnestly proposed kidnapping the governor of Virginia to hold as hostage in exchange for Brown's life. But although never a pacifist, Spooner saw absolutely no moral analogy between slaves violently rising up to secure their liberty and the central government violently crushing aspirations for self-determination on the part of white southerners. After the war, he would write that the North had fought for the principle that "men may rightfully be compelled to submit to, and support a government they do not want; and that resistance, on their part, makes them criminals and traitors." "Political slavery" had taken the place of "chattel slavery."¹⁸

Lincoln meanwhile was drifting toward the Radical position. He publicly warned that he would take whatever action he thought necessary to win the war. "My paramount object in this struggle," the president declared in his oft-quoted reply to Horace Greeley, "is to save the Union, and is *not* either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing *any* slave I would do it,

and if I could save it by freeing *all* the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do *not* believe it would help save the Union." Lincoln added, however, that "I have here stated my purpose according to my view of *official* duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed *personal* wish that all men every where could be free."¹⁹

surrender at Appomattox, two-thirds of Congress passed an amendment abolishing slavery within the United States forever. Emancipation was therefore a consequence of the Civil War. But it was a consequence unintended at the outset, and played no discernible role in the northern refusal to let the lower South go in peace.

Readers of McPherson's article will find no major surprises in the above account. But his article fails to display any awareness of how instrumental to bring-



"Old Glory" as it appeared after the bombardment of Fort Sumter by secessionist forces.

When the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was issued on September 22, 1862, it was framed as a war measure. It still gave the seceding states until the end of the year to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves. The proclamation did not emancipate any of the slaves in the four border states that had not seceded. Nor did it emancipate any slaves in those sections of the Confederacy that the Union armies had already reconquered, including all of Tennessee and large portions of Virginia and Louisiana. This anomaly inspired a cynical retort from Secretary of State Seward. "We show our sympathy with slavery," he stated the day after the final proclamation was issued, "by emancipating slaves where we cannot reach them, and holding them in bondage where we can set them free."²⁰

Of course, Northerners came around by the war's end to demanding that slavery's elimination be complete and permanent. A little more than two months prior to General Robert E. Lee's

ing on the carnage was the northern belief in the Union as absolute deity. Why was preserving the nation's existing boundaries such a big deal? Although historians have thoroughly researched southern motives for secession, they have not done as good a job with northern motives. Nationalist bias elevates perpetual union to an automatic and unquestioned standard. Exactly *how* and *why* Northerners came to embrace this standard has never been satisfactorily answered. Yet somehow the mystical identification of Union with Liberty had evolved into such a cornerstone of the Yankee civil religion that it was impervious to all reason.

Peaceful secession has become a fixture of the modern world. Even prior to America's war over secession, Belgium in 1830 had consummated a separation from the Netherlands that was almost entirely without bloodshed. Norway seceded from Denmark in 1905 and Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Since then, we have witnessed, among others,



the peaceful separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the peaceful break up of the totalitarian Soviet Union into Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and more than half a dozen other independent nations. So we ought to be able to view Lincoln's justifications for the Civil War with a healthy dose of skepticism.

As I write this, it is still uncertain whether Quebec will ever vote to secede from Canada. What is certain is that the Canadian central government has disavowed the use of force to prevent the province's departure. This example contains some striking parallels to southern secession, because the current population of Canada is about 30 million, slightly less the U.S. population in 1860. Quebec has

7 million inhabitants, making it smaller the Confederacy became (about 9 million) after Lincoln's call for troops but larger than Gulf Coast Confederacy (about 5 million) at the time of Lincoln's inauguration.

Insofar as the Civil War was fought to preserve the Union, it was an explicit rejection of the American Revolution. As a legal recourse, the legitimacy of secession was admittedly debatable. But as a revolutionary right, the legitimacy of secession is universal and unconditional. That at least is how the Declaration of Independence reads. "Put simply," agrees New-Left historian William Appleman Williams, "the cause of the Civil War was the refusal of Lincoln and other northerners to honor the revolutionary

right of self-determination—the touchstone of the American Revolution."²¹

The southern states had no right to self-determination because of slavery, runs the retort. But black slavery was practiced in every one of Britain's North American colonies, from New Hampshire to Georgia, at the opening of the War for Independence. Moreover, Virginia's royal governor issued a proclamation on November 7, 1775, very similar to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, freeing any slave who would bear arms against the rebellious colonists. At least 18,000 freed blacks accompanied British forces as they evacuated Savannah, Charleston, New York City, and other places at the end of the earlier war. South Carolina, the only colony with a slave majority when independence was declared, lost as much as one-third of its black population to flight or migration. In short, most arguments marshaled to deny the legitimacy of southern independence in 1861 apply with almost equal force against American independence in 1776.

One critic of the Lincoln administration's decision for war called the ensuing conflict "mere manslaughter."

In this illustration, wounded Confederates surrender to Federals firing from behind a rail fence. *War Talks of Confederate Veterans* (1892).

American nationalists, then and now, automatically assume that the Union's break up would have been catastrophic. The historian "is a camp follower of the successful army," to quote Lincoln biographer David Donald, and often treats the nation's current boundaries as etched in stone.²² But doing so reveals lack of historical imagination. Consider again Canada. The United States twice mounted military expeditions to conquer its neighbor, first during the American Revolution and again during the War of 1812. At other times, including after the Civil War, annexation was under consideration, sometimes to the point of private support for insurgencies similar to those that had helped swallow up Florida and Texas. If any of these ventures had succeeded, historians' accounts would read as if the unification of Canada and the United States was fated, and any other outcome inconceivable. In our world, of course, Canada and

the United States have endured as separate sovereignties with hardly any untoward consequences.

North America has managed to get along fine with two, permanent, independent Anglo republics. If there had been three—as there temporarily was when Texas was a separate nation—or more, the history of the world would have been different, but not catastrophically different. “Suppose Lincoln did save the American Union, did his success in keeping one strong nation where there might have been two weaker ones really entitle him to a claim to greatness?” asked historian David M. Potter. “Did it really contribute any constructive values for the modern world?”²³

The common refrain, voiced by Lincoln himself, that peaceful secession would have constituted a failure for the great American experiment in liberty, was just plain nonsense. “If Northerners . . . had peaceably allowed the seceders to depart,” the London *Times* cogently replied in September 1862, “the result might fairly have been quoted as illustrating the advantages of Democracy; but when Republicans put empire above liberty, and resorted to political oppression and war rather than suffer any abatement of national power, it was clear that nature at Washington was precisely the same as nature at St. Petersburg. . . . Democracy broke down, not when the Union ceased to be agreeable to all its constituent States, but when it was upheld, like any other Empire, by force of arms.”²⁴

As an excuse for civil war, maintaining the State’s territorial integrity is bankrupt and reprehensible. Yet that is the only excuse that Lincoln and the Republican Party put forward. Slavery, to repeat, neither explains nor justifies northern suppression of secession. In the final analysis, we must accept the verdict of Moncure Daniel Conway, another abolitionist, self-exiled from his home in Virginia. The Union war effort, he sadly concluded, reduces to “mere manslaughter.”²⁵

JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL is Adjunct Associate Professor, Departments of Economics and History, Golden Gate University, and author of *Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War* (Chicago: Open

Court, 1996). His great-grandfather, Colonel James C. Rogers, commanded the 123rd Regiment, New York State Volunteers, part of the Union XII Corps, which fought with the Army of the Potomac through the Battle of Gettysburg and then was transferred west, eventually participating in Sherman’s March to the Sea.

NOTES

1. James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States From the Compromise of 1850 to the Restoration of Home Rule in the South in 1877*, 7v. (New York: 1896-1906).
2. Avery O. Craven, *The Repressible Conflict, 1830-1861* (University: Louisiana State University Press, 1929); James G. Randall, *Lincoln: The Liberal Statesman* (New York: 1947).
3. Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *Rise of American Civilization*, 2v. (New York: 1927).
4. James M. McPherson, “What Caused the Civil War,” *North & South*, (volume 4, #1, Nov 2000), pp. 12-22.
5. *Newsweek* (8 Oct 1990), pp. 62-63.
6. McPherson, “What Caused the Civil War,” 21.
7. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: 1970), p. 316; Kenneth M. Stampp, in the introduction to the collection he edited, *The Causes of the Civil War*, rev. edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 3.
8. David M. Potter has pointed this out in his insightful discussion of the “The Historian’s Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa,” from *The South and Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge: 1968).
9. Until recently Garrison was not adequately served by his biographers. Now with Henry Mayer’s *All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York: 1998) we finally have a biography worthy of the crusading editor. The recently deceased Mayer did a masterly job of integrating the personal details of Garrison’s life with a sensitive exposition of Garrison’s intellectual odyssey. Other related works of importance are Aileen S. Kraditor, *Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850* (New York: 1969), and Lewis Perry, *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought* (Ithaca, NY: 1973).
10. Irving H. Bartlett, *Wendell Phillips: Brahmin Radical* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), is a biography of a prominent Garrisonian that contains one of the best discussions of their advocacy of disunion. See also Richard Hofstadter, “Wendell Phillips: The Patrician as Agitator,” in *The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It* (New York: 1948), pp. 137-63, and James Brewer Stewart, *Wendell Phillips: Liberty’s Hero* (Baton Rouge: 1986). Frederick Douglass has attracted many biographers, most recently, William S. McFeely, *Frederick Douglass* (New York: 1991).
11. 10 Jul 1860, as reprinted in Dwight Lowell Dumond, ed., *Southern Editorials on Secession* (New York: 1931), p. 141.
12. As quoted in William Barney, *The Road to Secession: A New Perspective on the Old South* (New York: 1972), p. 200.
13. Stephens to J. Henly Smith, 10 July 1860, Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, ed., *The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb* (Washington: 1913), p. 487.
14. *New York Daily Tribune*, 20 (9 Nov 1860), p. 4.
15. Fist inaugural address, 4 Mar 1861, James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington: 1922), v. 7, pp. 3208-209.
16. *Ibid.*, 3210.
17. The Crittenden Resolutions, House of Representatives, 22 Jul 1861, reprinted in Henry Steele Commager and Milton Cantor, eds., *Documents of American History*, 10th edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1988), v. 1, pp. 395-96. The Johnson Resolutions, which passed the Senate on 25 July 1861, have almost identical wording.
18. Lysander Spooner, *No Treason, No. 1* (Boston, 1867), iii, reprinted in Charles Shively, *The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner* (Weston, MA: 1971), v. 1.
19. Lincoln to Horace Greeley, 22 Aug 1862, in Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, NJ: 1953), v. 5, pp. 388-89.
20. Donn Piatt, *Memories of the Men Who Saved the Union* (New York: 1887), p. 150.
21. William Appleman Williams, *America Confronts a Revolutionary World: 1776-1976* (New York: 1976), p. 113.
22. David Donald, “Died of Democracy,” in Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: 1960), p. 79.
23. David M. Potter, “Civil War,” in C. Vann Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: 1968), p. 141.
24. *London Times*, (13 Sep 1862), p. 8.
25. Moncure Conway, *Autobiography: Memories and Experiences of Moncure Daniel Conway* (Boston: 1904), v.1, p. 222.

"North & South is the best magazine I have ever read on the Civil War. It's a knockout every time I pick it up." —David Storck, Rochester, New York

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE:

(Mails to subscribers on October 17, on sale in stores November 7.)

THE BATTLE OF GLENDALE The battle that presented Robert E. Lee with his best opportunity to destroy the Army of the Potomac. —Stephen Sears

AFTER THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION Lincoln's role in ending slavery. —William C. Harris

SULTANA: A CASE FOR SABOTAGE Significant evidence relating to the 1865 river disaster has hitherto been overlooked. —D.H. Rule


STONEWALL JACKSON AT FRONT ROYAL Traditional accounts of the battle are sharply at variance with the historical facts. —Gary L. Ecelbarger

"POISONOUS TECHNIQUES AND DRESSINGS" During the course of the Civil War more than 30,000 patients passed through U.S. General Hospital #1 in Frederick, Maryland. —Terry Reimer

UNDERSTANDING LEE'S AUDACITY Lee's audacity was rooted neither in biology nor in emotion, but in a cool, analytical, professional expertise. —Richard Rollins

"Your magazine is an exceptionally fine production and I eagerly await each issue."

—Glenn Charlton, Halifax, Nova Scotia



SOME GOOD THINGS TO LOOK FORWARD TO

COLD HARBOR: ANATOMY OF A BATTLE Go back to the actual casualty reports, and you will find much of what we thought we knew is mythical. —Gordon C. Rhea

"A WAR AMONG THEMSELVES" Internecine warfare in south-east Florida. —George E. Buker

BLACKS IN GRAY: MYTH OR REALITY? What truth is there in the widespread claims that large numbers of blacks fought for the Confederacy? —Jason Silverman

WHY WOULDN'T JOE JOHNSTON FIGHT? Is the key to Joseph Johnston's Civil War career to be found in his understanding of the tactics of Frederick Great? —Steven H. Newton




BECOMING JOSHUA CHAMBERLAIN A close look at the personal development of an unlikely warrior. —Glenn LaFantasie

STONEWALL'S FOG OF WAR The events of May 24, 1862, were critical for the development of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, but at the time they were mired in confusion. —by Gary L. Ecelbarger

TO SUBSCRIBE, simply complete the feedback card and mail it together with your payment or credit card number to: NORTH & SOUTH, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. Or call the 800 number below. **SUBSCRIPTIONS: U.S. AND CANADA** \$29.95 U.S. dollars for one year (seven issues); \$49.95 for two years; \$69.95 for three years. **OVERSEAS SUBSCRIPTIONS** add \$10.00 per year (U.S. funds only) to your subscription. **TO JOIN THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY**, add \$10.00 per year to your subscription (lifetime membership, includes yearly 7-issue subscription \$500).




Overseas Telephone: 559-855-8637



Join or Subscribe Today 800-546-6707

CHICKAMAUGA/ CHATTANOOGA TOUR

The Society's third tour of the year took place August 3-5. Chickamauga battlefield historian Jim Ogden was the principal speaker and guide, ably assisted by *North & South* associate editor Ron Furquerson. Saturday was spent touring the Chickamauga battlefield, gaining a keen appreciation of the significance of the terrain and of the real limitations imposed on movement by logistics. Sunday morning was spent scrambling around Look-out Mountain. A high point, in both senses, was standing on the projecting rock from which Captain John Wilson waved the Stars and Stripes to signal the Union victory in the "battle above the clouds." It was easy to imagine how, as the cheers of the men below echoed between the mountains, this must have



COVER STORY

"Colonel of the Confederacy" by Don Troiani, depicts John B. Gordon as a Confederate colonel at the Battle of Seven Pines, May 31, 1862—a battle at which he displayed exemplary courage. Unusually, the painting was not executed directly from a photograph; instead Troiani used a friend as a model—a friend who bore an uncanny resemblance to Gordon.

For more information, contact
Historical Art Prints:
(203) 262-6680
or visit the website at
www.historicalartprints.com

been one of the most sublime moments in Wilson's life. The tour concluded in the afternoon with visits to Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge. All in all an extremely enjoyable weekend, at the end of which many of the participants expressed their intention to participate in the Society's events next year, especially the proposed "Jackson in the Valley" tour (look for details of next year's events in this column in an upcoming issue).

WEB SITE

The *North & South* web site has been updated, under the guiding hand of new webmaster Deb Rule. In the following months more features will be added, including a bulletin board for Society members, with an opportunity to correspond with the authors of articles which appear in the magazine. Watch out for the mouse icon in the magazine—indicating that fuller documentation can be found on the website. See for example page 87 in this issue. The web address remains: northandsouthmagazine.com.

RESOURCES WANTED

We have received a request from subscriber David Marshall, who teaches American history at an inner-city school in Miami. The school's resources are limited, he says, and he is hoping that fellow *North & South* readers might be able to provide, for example, books, magazines, videos, or posters. David can be contacted at: Homestead Senior High School, 15146 SW 108 Terrace, Miami, FL 33196 or by email at: dmarshall@hshs.dadeschools.net.


TACTICS RESEARCH

In our last issue we invited readers to take part in a research project concerning Civil War battlefield tactics, focusing on infantry firepower and field fortifications. The response has been excellent, and by the time you are reading this the accumulation of information should be well under way. Those interested in contributing should email me at kpoulter@aol.com, or write to me at 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667.

—Keith Poulter

LAST BATTLEFIELD TOUR OF 2001

A MAJOR FOCUS OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY TOUR BELOW will be Civil War infantry tactics—the prewar debate over doctrine, the impact of new weaponry, and the evolution of fieldworks. Participants will thus learn not just about a particular battle, but about Civil War combat as a whole. The special issue on infantry tactics (*N&S*, volume 4, #6) will be an invaluable aid. **SOCIETY RATES** apply to all household members, even if



only one of them is a Society member. The prices for the tours include everything apart from hotel accommodation (and breakfast) and travel. We have been able to negotiate an excellent group rate at a good hotel. **BATTLEFIELD MAPS**, name tags, etc., will be provided prior to each tour. For information and booking details, call the Civil War Society at 559-855-8636.


SEPTEMBER 28-30, 2001: FIELDS OF FIRE

BUS AND WALKING TOUR of the war's most studied battle—Gettysburg. Detailed consideration of the plans of the commanders, and the tactics and terrain of the battlefield, reveal that there is much still to be learned—and some surprises along the way. **Venue:** Liberty Mountain Resort and Conference Center, 78 Country Club Trail, Carroll Valley, PA 17320. Hotel facilities include Health Club, Indoor pool, and Atrium. **NOTE:** We have booked the entire hotel—40 rooms, \$100 per room, per night (plus tax), all rooms are suitable for double occupancy—at \$50.00 per person, per night (plus tax). **Cost:** Civil War Society members: \$299, non-members \$449.

TO JOIN THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY for only \$39.95 per year (includes a seven-issue subscription to *North & South*), call **800-546-6707** (existing subscribers: simply add \$10.00 to your subscription). **FOR INFORMATION AND BOOKING DETAILS ON THIS UPCOMING TOUR**, contact the Civil War Society at: **559-855-8636**, or write Civil War Society, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667



✱ **NEW AND FORTHCOMING BOOKS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE PRESS** ✱



Bound to Be a Soldier

THE LETTERS OF PRIVATE JAMES T. MILLER,
111TH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY, 1861-1864
Edited by Jedediah Mannis and Galen R. Wilson

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

James T. Miller served in the 111th Pennsylvania Infantry and was killed in its last major engagement, the Battle of Peachtree Creek. His letters record his steady maturation from an idealistic and untutored farmer to an engaged and perceptive participant in the Civil War.

272 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-119-4, \$30.00

Uncommon Soldiers

HARVEY REID AND THE 22ND WISCONSIN MARCH
WITH SHERMAN

Edited by Frank L. Byrne

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

"Scholars and general readers alike will enjoy these superbly edited letters. At once insightful and entertaining, they vividly illustrate the reactions of both Union soldiers and Southern civilians to the hardships and fortunes of war."—Daniel E. Sutherland, University of Arkansas

October, 328 est. pages, illus.
ISBN 1-57233-129-1, \$32.00

All's for the Best

THE CIVIL WAR REMINISCENCES AND LETTERS OF
DANIEL W. SAWTEELE, EIGHTH MAINE VOLUNTEER
INFANTRY

Edited by Peter Buckingham

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

A self-educated enlisted man from Maine, Daniel W. Sawtelle wrote numerous letters during his service as well as a memoir some fifty years later. This volume includes both that memoir and the most interesting of his letters.

October. Price and page-count information to come.

Doctor to the Front

THE RECOLLECTIONS OF CONFEDERATE SURGEON
THOMAS FANNING WOOD, 1861-1865

Edited by Donald B. Koonce

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

"Filled with perceptive observations about military leaders, morale in the Confederacy, life in the Southern capital of Richmond, and a range of medical topics, including the treatment of wounded."—Gary W. Gallagher, University of Virginia

280 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-082-1, \$30.00

The Blues in Gray

THE CIVIL WAR JOURNAL OF WILLIAM DANIEL
DIXON AND THE REPUBLICAN BLUES DAYBOOK

Edited by Roger S. Durham

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

"The best daily account of garrison duty along the Atlantic coast that I have ever read. Dixon's descriptions of combat operations as well as his commentary as a company commander on such issues as army politics, desertion, sickness, supply problems, and the use of black laborers will be a real eye opener for general readers and a valuable research tool for scholars."—Daniel E. Sutherland, University of Arkansas

424 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-101-1, \$46.00

Shipping & handling: \$4.00 for first book; \$1.00 for each additional book.

Thinking Confederates

ACADEMIA AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
IN THE NEW SOUTH

Dan R. Frost

The author examines Confederate veterans who entered academia after the Civil War and transformed Southern higher education from its antebellum classical and republican orientation to a postwar focus on science and utility.

224 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-104-6, \$27.00

Confederate Engineer

TRAINING AND CAMPAIGNING WITH
JOHN MORRIS WAMPLER

George G. Kundahl

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

This first study of Confederate engineering in more than forty years combines biography with an overview of the profession to present the life and accomplishments of one talented individual.

360 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-073-2, \$34.00

Quest for a Star

THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARIES OF COLONEL
FRANCIS T. SHERMAN OF THE 88TH ILLINOIS

Edited by C. Knight Aldrich

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War writings of Francis T. Sherman, son of a Chicago mayor, are notable not only for their descriptions of wartime experience but also for their insights into the volatile politics of the era.

240 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-064-3, \$34.00

Ninety-eight Days

A GEOGRAPHER'S VIEW OF THE VICKSBURG
CAMPAIGN

Warren E. Grabau

Grant's campaign against Vicksburg has been studied from many perspectives—but always with the outcome in the foreground. Featuring sixty-eight detailed maps, this study examines the actions of Union and Confederate commanders as they unfolded.

720 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-068-6, \$48.00

The Union Must Stand

THE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
CAMPBELL, FIFTH IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY

Edited by Mark Grimsley and Todd D. Miller

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

A politically aware Union soldier with strong abolitionist beliefs, John Campbell recorded not only his own reflections on wartime matters but also those of his comrades and the southerners he encountered.

296 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-069-4, \$38.00

NEW IN PAPERBACK

A Southern Boy in Blue

THE MEMOIR OF MARCUS WOODCOCK,
9TH KENTUCKY INFANTRY (U.S.A.)

Edited by Kenneth W. Noe

VOICES OF THE CIVIL WAR

"[Woodcock's] narrative reveals much about the early, erratic days of volunteer regiments, about the politics of the border states, and about the comic aspects of the war, such as camp riots caused by bad whiskey or stray animals."—*Booklist*

376 pages, illus., ISBN 1-57233-126-7, \$18.00 pa

Wilderness


A TALE OF THE CIVIL WAR

Robert Penn Warren

With an Introduction by James H. Justus

"A moving and disturbing work—one which goes beyond events, to brood upon their meanings."

—Samuel Hynes, *New York Times Book Review*
July, 336 pages, ISBN 1-57233-134-8, \$19.50 pa




The University of Tennessee Press
KNOXVILLE 37996-4108
sunsite.utk.edu/utpress

THE BATTLE F L A G

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL SYMBOL



John M. Coski



**"IT WAS NOT THE FLAG OF THE CONFEDERACY, BUT
SIMPLY THE BANNER, THE BATTLE FLAG, OF THE
CONFEDERATE SOLDIER. AS SUCH IT SHOULD
NOT SHARE IN THE CONDEMNATION WHICH
OUR CAUSE RECEIVED, OR SUFFER FROM ITS
DOWNFALL. THE WHOLE WORLD CAN UNITE IN A
CHORUS OF PRAISE TO THE GALLANTRY OF THE
MEN WHO FOLLOWED WHERE THIS BANNER LED."**

—Sergeant Carlton McCarthy, veteran of the famed Richmond Howitzers,
in his 1882 book *Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia*.

General
Lee's

Flea
Market

TATTOO

DIXIE
TRAILER SALES

Ironically, in the one hundred and twenty years since McCarthy's appeal, the battle flag has become in perception what it never was in reality: the flag of the Confederacy. As such, it not only shares in, but receives most of the criticism aimed at the Confederate cause.

WHILE OPINION POLLS reveal that a majority of Americans still revere the battle flag as a memorial to Confederate soldiers or as a neutral symbol of "history," Americans regard the St. Andrews cross battle flag as the Confederate equivalent to the Stars and Stripes and mistakenly call it the "Stars and Bars." Informed students of the Civil War grow apoplectic at the inability of headline writers to grasp the distinction between the battle flag and the Stars and Bars and may rail at the injustice of condemning the battle flag as a symbol of slavery and racism. Conventional wisdom among modern students of the Confederacy is that the St. Andrews cross was *just* the battle flag and that if any flag should bear the burdens of the Confederate cause it should be the first national flag—the real Stars and Bars.²

It is not, however, the headline writers and the ignorant modern American public who have transformed the battle flag into *the* Confederate flag. The truth is that the St. Andrews cross battle flag has been, in effect, *the* flag of the Confederacy virtually since its introduction in 1861. Even as Carlton McCarthy and his comrades carved out a niche for the battle flag as an apolitical war memorial, he and the rest of the Confederate generation made the battle flag the embodiment of Confederate nationalism and the standard of the Confederate cause. This article explores the battle flag's history as a *de facto* national symbol and the consequences of this.

The modern confusion between the battle flag and the Stars and Bars is ironic because the St. Andrews cross flag was born as an alternative to the Stars and Bars. The Confederate Congress chose the Stars and Bars in 1861 as the national flag for the very quality that later made it impractical and unpopular—its resemblance to the Stars and Stripes. The congressional committee charged with choosing a flag found itself "overwhelmed with memorials not to abandon the 'old flag.'" Accordingly, the committee bowed to the "strong and earnest

THE STARS AND BARS

Students of the Civil War know that the Confederate St. Andrews cross pattern flag was not *the* Confederate flag, nor even *the* Confederate battle flag. This article acknowledges and explains these truths, but for simplicity uses "Confederate battle flag" when referring to the St. Andrews cross pattern flag, regardless of shape and size. Because the emphasis of the article is on the flag's post-Civil War symbolism, clarifying the nuances of Confederate vexillology is less important than clarifying how and why the St. Andrews cross pattern has become *de facto* the Confederate flag. Similarly, in order to explore in some detail lesser-known aspects of the flag's history, only cursory attention is given to the more familiar history of its origins and wartime use.

Right: a secession rosette and badge—the silk badge bears an image of the first national flag of the Confederacy. The seven stars represent the Southern states that had seceded from the Union by the time Fort Sumter fell.



a desire to retain at least a suggestion of the old 'Stars and Stripes.'"³

By tradition, the national colors also became the battle flag of a nation's military units. When Confederate regiments marched off to war in 1861, most carried the Stars and Bars. At the First Battle of Manassas in July 1861, at least one Confederate regiment fired on another, possibly because of its inability to distinguish between battle flags, and General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard during a critical point in the battle could not tell whether his army was being reinforced or flanked by the enemy.⁴

Beauregard, like other generals throughout the Confederacy, determined to adopt a distinctive battle flag. For advice Beauregard turned to a volunteer aid, Senator William Porcher Miles, who had also been chairman of the Congressional Committee on the Flag and Seal and who had unsuccessfully championed his own favorite design: a St. Andrews cross. Beauregard wrote to his new commanding officer, General Joseph E. Johnston, suggesting that they ask the War Department for "badge flags made of red with two blue bars crossing each other diagonally on which shall be introduced the stars...."⁵ Johnston agreed, but suggested

that the battle flag should be perfectly square and thus better proportioned. The flags issued to the units of the army were of standard size, varying according to service branch. The army quartermaster arranged to make prototypes of the pattern (the most famous of which were those made by sisters Jenny and Hetty Cary and their cousin Constance), and consigned the task of making one hundred and twenty silk flags to seventy-five women in four Richmond churches.⁶

On the afternoon of November 28, 1861, the Confederate Army of the Potomac assembled on the heights overlooking Centreville, Virginia, for a ceremonial presentation of the new battle flags. "The troops looked well as the colonels successively received their colors to defend," wrote staff officer G. Moxley Sorrel.⁷ The general order read to the troops infused the new battle flags with associations similar to those of the silk flags that many communities had presented to their volunteer companies:

A new banner is intrusted to-day, as a battle-flag, to the safe keeping of the Army of the Potomac. Soldiers: Your mothers, your wives, and your sisters have made it. Consecrated by their hands, it

must lead you to substantial victory, and the complete triumph of our cause. It can never be surrendered, save to your unspeakable dishonor, and with its consequences fraught with immeasurable evil. Under its untarnished folds beat back the invader, and find nationality, everlasting immunity from an atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for yourselves—or death.⁸

The army that would subsequently be known as the Army of Northern Virginia had acquired the flag under which it was to fight its greatest battles.

Thanks primarily to its well-traveled patrons, generals Beauregard and Johnston, the St. Andrews cross flag was soon introduced into other Confederate armies, as the generals took it with them to their new commands. While many units in the western armies continued to carry national flags or other patterns adopted early in the war as battle flags, by 1864 the St. Andrew's cross reigned supreme throughout the Confederacy. When Joseph Johnston assumed command of the Army of Tennessee in late 1863, he introduced as that army's official flag a rectangular variant of the St. Andrews cross pattern—similar to the Confederate naval jack and the version most widely seen in modern America.⁹

In all theaters of war, battle flags of all patterns served important practical and, especially, emotional functions. Flags were tangible cloth embodiments of units' *esprit de corps* and camaraderie. Carrying the regimental colors was a high honor and grave responsibility; losing colors a source of grief and usually an indication of high casualties. Stereotypical stories of men picking up the regimental colors from the hands of fallen comrades are based on the very real heroism of men such as the fourteen members of the 26th North Carolina Infantry who fell carrying the regimental flag on the first day of Gettysburg. In this way the battle flag was "consecrated" on the field of battle.¹⁰

Just as the Stars and Bars proved impractical as a battle flag, it proved uninspiring as a national flag—for precisely the same reasons that it had been adopted in the first place. Influential southerners and southern newspapers began lobbying as early as August 1861 to replace the flag denounced as a "servile imitation of the Stars and Stripes," and "too much like the old concern for the emblem of a separate and independent nation."¹¹ The new Confederate Congress appointed a flag committee, which reported in April 1862 that any new pattern must symbolize "our absolute severance from the 'United States' and the complete separation of every sen-

timent indicating the faintest hope of reconstruction."¹²


Significantly, when the Confederate people were ready symbolically to declare their "absolute severance" from the old Union, the St. Andrews cross was the pattern that made this statement of heightened nationalism. While later generations of Americans have confused the St. Andrews cross and the Stars and Bars, the patterns were ideological opposites: the St. Andrews cross symbolized the rejection of the sentiments reflected in the Stars and Bars. The Confederate nation was ready to adopt the St. Andrews cross as its national flag in 1863. The *Southern Illustrated News* urged that the battle flag alone replace the Stars and Bars, which, it opined, "is suggestive of the detested Federal Government and its oppressions. . . . We repeat that the baptism of blood and fire has made the battleflag of General Johnston [*sic*] our national emblem. It is associated with our severest trials and our proudest achievements."¹³ On May 1, 1863, the Confederacy adopted a new national flag—the so-called "Stainless Banner"—which emblazoned the square St. Andrews cross battle flag on a white field.¹⁴ This was the first official government recognition of the Confederate battle flag.

Reaction to the new national flag was favorable. "The new flag, which was displayed from the Capitol on Thursday

Stereotypical stories of men picking up the regimental colors from the hands of fallen comrades are based on very real heroism. In this way the battle flag was "consecrated" on the field of battle.

"First Day at Gettysburg" by James Walker.

West Point Museum Art Collection, United States Military Academy



[May 14, 1863], it is gratifying to say, gives universal satisfaction,” commented the *Richmond Daily Dispatch*. “Almost any sort of a flag, to take the place of the detested parody of the ‘Stars and Stripes’ for so long the lawful emblem of the Confederacy, would have been hailed with pleasure.” The new flag was all the more satisfactory because “in it is preserved that immortal banner—the battle flag—which has been consecrated on so many battle fields. . . .”¹⁵ In the final months of the Confederacy’s life, Congress modified the design by adding a vertical red stripe to the flag’s fly edge.¹⁶

In the spring of 1865, amid scenes rich with “agony of expression,” Confederate regiments furled their battle flags at Appomattox and Greensboro, while other units rent or hid their colors to avoid surrendering them.¹⁷ Within days of Appomattox, Father Abram J. Ryan, “the Poet Priest of the South,” penned “The Conquered Banner,” the poem that made the St. Andrews cross battle flag a metaphor for the Confederate dead and the Confederate cause:

Furl that banner, softly, slowly,
Treat it gently—it is holy—
For it droops above the dead;

Touch it not, unfold it never,
Let it droop there, furled forever,
For its people’s hopes are dead.¹⁸


The era in which former Confederates felt compelled to “furl that banner” was short-lived. Occupying Federal forces did not officially prohibit display of Confederate flags, but individual commanders did arrest citizens who flaunted them. Whatever repression there was of Confederate symbols ended with the “redemption” of each state. In October 1870 (nine months after native whites regained control of the Georgia state government), Atlantans gathered to dedicate the cornerstone of a cemetery monument to Confederate dead; the cornerstone was draped in a Confederate battle flag. The coffins of Confederate soldiers transferred in 1872 from the Gettysburg battlefield to Richmond’s Hollywood Cemetery were draped in Confederate flags.¹⁹ South Carolinians unfurled an actual battle flag—that of the 10th South Carolina Infantry—during the quasi-military operations to “redeem” their state from Reconstruction rule in 1876. C. Irvine Walker, commander of the Carolina Rifle Club (later a commander-in-chief of the United Confederate Vet-

erans) later boasted that his club “had the honor of being the first military body of white men which paraded in the streets of the city or the State, bearing arms and the first to march under the Confederate Banner, since the struggles of the War had ceased.”²⁰

Flags, especially St. Andrew’s cross pattern battle flags, were an integral part of Confederate memorial rituals and of the Confederate memorial organizations that flourished beginning in the late 1880s. Monument dedications became occasions for collective remembrance of the war and celebration of what southerners called the “Lost Cause.”²¹ In 1889, the various local veterans organizations coalesced into the United Confederate Veterans (UCV). Southern women formed the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) in 1894, and the veterans orchestrated the creation of the (United) Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) in 1896 and charged them with defending the honor of the Confederate veterans and their cause. Annual meetings and reunions held throughout the

old Confederacy featured parades and other events that gave white southerners opportunities to cheer the boys of the sixties. For those parades the graying veterans unfurled their battle flags—sometimes the very ones carried during the war—and the onlookers waved small battle flags from the sidewalks and windows.

The veterans themselves were the ones most aware of what modern flag historians know—that there was great diversity in battle flag patterns carried by Confederate military units. Yet it was the UCV in 1904 that officially declared the square St. Andrews cross to be the Confederate battle flag. Disturbed that the battle flags manufactured (mostly in the North) and sold for reunions and parades were oblong (rectangular), not square, the UCV created a special committee to investigate the proper shape of the battle flag. The committee inspected the largest collections of flags—the captured battle flag collection housed at the U.S. War Department.²² At its 1904 reunion the UCV received the committee’s report and passed a resolution declaring that the Confederate battle flag was a square St. Andrews cross. It was ironic that an organization based in Tennessee, a state whose regiments carried oblong battle flags and other patterns, imposed this historically inaccurate uniformity in the name of “true” history. One veteran who served under the Hardee pattern battle flag wrote to the committee suggesting “you should have on your committee



Richmond Newspapers, Inc.

Left: Memorial Day service, 1993. Photograph by Lindy Keast Rodman. Below: Veterans Cemetery, Beauvoir, Mississippi. Photograph by John Coski



Some one familiar with the army of Tennessee." The report did not ignore the other patterns, but minimized their importance.²³



While acknowledging that the South had a right to salute its chieftains, Richmond *Planet* editor, John Mitchell, Jr., criticized elaborate heritage ceremonies as liable to retard the South's reintegration into the nation.

Above: a gathering at the General Robert E. Lee monument at the end of the SCV centennial parade. Photograph by John Coski

A June 3, 1906, general order promulgated the resolution and requested all members of all Confederate memorial associations "to exert their utmost influence" to have flag manufacturers, designers, and engravers represent the battle flag correctly.²⁴ Proclaiming the square flag the correct flag did not, however, make it the most available flag. Just as most Americans today consider the oblong flag the correct flag, flag manufacturers in the early twentieth century resisted the memorial organizations' "utmost influence" to produce square Confederate battle flags. Only by contracting to purchase an agreed upon number did the UDC in the late 1920s convince a New York flag manufacturer to produce square flags. Annin Flag Company and other manufacturers claimed that the problem was not supply, but demand: people wanted the rectangular, or "oblong," flags even though they were technically "incorrect."²⁵ Ironically, this was true because of the flag's popularity and prominence.

Even in the first decades of the twentieth century, the flag was used effectively as the Confederate flag and often mislabeled the Stars and Bars. Because people perceived it as the Confederate counterpart to the Stars and Stripes, they wanted a flag shaped like the Stars and Stripes. "There will always be a greater demand for the oblong sizes that compare with the U.S. Flags in use for they are used together so often," explained a Norfolk, Virginia, flag maker to the UDC in 1926.²⁶

What was the meaning of Confederate flags during this era of Confederate remembrance and celebration? Despite the rhetoric that the flag was merely the flag of the Confederate soldier, the speeches and rituals surrounding it celebrated the cause for which the soldiers fought. "It is the revered symbol of our martial life in the Confederacy, and a token of our everlasting comradeship," declared UCV Commander-in-Chief General Clement A. Evans in 1903. "It is too dear to us to be furled, for it proclaims a Cause that was never lost."²⁷ The prevailing attitude of postwar southern whites was consistent with advice offered immediately after the war by Richmond editor Edward A. Pollard: defeat meant that the South must concede the abolition of slavery and the impracticality of secession, but it did not mean that the South must concede the error of state rights or the inferiority of southern civilization, including white supremacy.²⁸ Southerners insisted that it was in no way indicative of disloyalty to the United States, though for thousands of proudly "unreconstructed" Confederates, display of the flag no doubt meant contempt for the federal government. Displaying and honoring the flag (especially the battle flag) was a means for former Confederates to express their dual loyalty. Former Confederate staff officer Randolph McKim told a UCV reunion on Flag Day, 1904:

Strange as it may seem to one who does not understand our people, inconsistent and incomprehensible as it may appear; we salute yonder flag—the banner of the Stars and Stripes—as the symbol of our reunited country, at the same moment that we come together to do homage to the memory of the Stars and Bars [*sic*!]. There is in our hearts a double loyalty to-day; a loyalty to the present, and a loyalty to the

dear, dead past. We still love our old battle flag with the Southern cross upon its fiery folds! We have wrapped it round our hearts! We have enshrined it in the sacred ark of our love; and we will honor it and cherish it evermore,—not now as a political symbol, but as the consecrated emblem of an heroic epoch; as the sacred memento of a day that is dead; as the embodiment of memories that will be tender and holy as long as life shall last.²⁹

Non-southerners increasingly embraced this interpretation of Confederate flags. A consensus developed in America that it was possible to honor—or at least tolerate—the Confederate flag as a symbol of soldiers who fought bravely in a war that faded in its passions and grew in legends of reconciliation.³⁰ It was by no means a smooth or complete process. In 1887, President Grover Cleveland raised a firestorm when he endorsed a War Department plan to turn over to the appropriate southern states the battle flags captured from Confederate units. Union veterans organizations denounced Cleveland (who had avoided military service by hiring a substitute) as a "viper," "traitor," "skulker," and "contemptible politician." An Iowa post of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) protested "the surrender of the rebel flags to the men who bore them in their mad attempt to destroy the country...." The battle flags, they wrote, "can now have no other meaning than a representation of treason."³¹

The occasion for returning the flags came a decade later when southerners, including several former Confederate generals, rallied around the Stars and Stripes during the war with Spain. The UCV sent a formal resolution of support to President William McKinley, and Union veterans reciprocated by calling for the return of the captured flags. U.S. general James Harrison Wilson, who, as a young cavalry officer in 1865, led one of the most destructive raids through the Confederate heartland, published an open letter in *Confederate Veteran* praising the South's support of the Spanish-American War. "[A]s to the flags," Wilson wrote, "send them back. The men who fought under them are as loyal to the stars and stripes now as if they had never thought of any other standard.

They know as well as we do that their flags represent nothing today, but are dear to them because of associations connected with painful memories." Accordingly, Congress in 1905 and 1906 voted to turn over the captured flags to the southern states and to the Confederate Museum in Richmond.³²

Important as it was, this gesture did not signal the end of hostility to the Confederate flag. Though not loudly or often, black commentators consistently warned that public display of Confederate flags suggested a resurgence of rebelliousness. After witnessing the ceremonies dedicating the Lee monument in 1890, John Mitchell, Jr., editor of the *Richmond Planet*, observed that while the South had the right to honor its chiefs, such an elaborate celebration "serves to retard its progress in the country and forges heavier chains with which to be bound. All is over."³³ Modern historians have noted that the turn-of-the-century reconciliation of North and South was related intimately to the North's surrender to "Jim Crow" segregation in the South.³⁴ The acceptance of Confederate battle flags as symbols of soldierly valor and principle similarly dismissed African-American views of the war as part of an ongoing struggle for racial justice.

Agreeing with John Mitchell, individual members and posts of the GAR continued to protest the flag's public display and associate it with treason. As the flag carried by men who fought to destroy the Union, the St. Andrew's cross inevitably evoked hostility from those who could not forgive and forget the war. Such sentiment was especially evident during the planning for the 50th and even the 75th anniversary commemorations of Gettysburg, in 1913 and 1938. Confederate participants in 1913 insisted on being able to carry their flags, and agreed to participate only after Pennsylvania's governor gave the southerners the necessary assurance.³⁵ A few old Confederates were indignant at the reunion's symbolic subordination of the Confederate to the U.S. flag; they stated for the record that attending the reunion was not an admission of "the folly of secession."³⁶ In the mid-1930s, GAR officials intimated that they would not tolerate the Confederate flag at the 75th anniversary. A Massachusetts veteran declared that he would "rather pass out than go down there and

be a member of that gang and have them bring in that rebel flag. I, for one, won't stand for it." The commander-in-chief of the Sons of Confederate Veterans boasted that in response to the GAR's hostility, he "introduced a resolution telling them to go to hell." The secretary of the Pennsylvania State Commission for the Blue & Gray told the 1935 UCV reunion: "If you do vote to come to Gettysburg to a joint Reunion, I want you to know this: that you can fly the Confederate Flag and give it all honor when and where you desire."³⁷



Use of the battle flag in war was praised as symbolizing a merger of American patriotism and Southern militarism.



Left: photograph taken in Korea in 1952. *Courtesy Kenneth "Shep" Eldridge.*
Right: M-48 medium tank of the Third Tank Battalion, USMC. A few miles southwest of Danang, Viet Nam, March 1966. *Courtesy Harry L. Jackson.*

For the half-century when the losers of the Civil War were the rulers of the New South, the flag was a symbol associated primarily with Confederate veterans and memorial organizations, widely revered in white southern society and thus protected from abuse or misuse. With only a few exceptions, the flag was not used in advertising or in politics or divorced from the context of Confederate remembrance.³⁸ Because the flag did not achieve status as a wider cultural symbol, it did not acquire other symbolic meanings.

College football and college campus life in general were apparently the means by which the battle flag evolved from a symbol of Confederate memorial organizations into a popular culture symbol. Instrumental in this process were the members of the Kappa Alpha Order, a fraternity founded in 1865 at Washington College—of which a retired general

named Robert E. Lee was then president. Consistent with the Order's emphasis on the ideals of southern chivalry, Kappa Alphas in the late 1920s began staging elaborate "Old South" balls and parades, reportedly using Confederate flags.³⁹ When intercollegiate sporting events between northern and southern schools became more common after World War II, so, too, did use of the flag as a symbol of southern sporting spirit. University of Virginia fans "invaded" Pennsylvania in the autumn of 1947 carrying (oblong versions of) the same flags that their forebears did when they invaded the state in 1863.⁴⁰

Before that pivotal development occurred, however, white southerners in the World War II era infused the flag with several new meanings. Several times during the war, white southern servicemen

grabbed national headlines by displaying the Confederate battle flag overseas. Most notable was a facetious "Confederate Forces Solomon Islands" (CONFORSOLS), formed by a group of southerners in an air combat intelligence unit in the Pacific. The CONFORSOLS standard was a small Confederate battle flag sent to a Richmond, Virginia, native by historian and editor Douglas Southall Freeman, and placed in a peanut butter jar. Employing the symbols, slogans, and holidays of southern nationalism, the men of CONFORSOLS generated sectional rivalry and elicited some hostility.⁴¹ More dramatic were the actions of a self-styled "Dixie company" of the 1st Marine Regiment, led by Captain Julian D. Dusenbury, of Florence, South Carolina. On at least two occasions, Dusenbury or his men raised a small Confederate flag (provided by a South Carolina Daughter of the Confederacy) over captured enemy

positions in the Pacific. On May 30, 1945, they made the Confederate flag the first American flag raised over the hard-fought ruins of Shuri Castle on Okinawa.⁴²

While commanding officers consistently enforced regulations against the display of non-official banners, they and American reporters apparently saw no secessionist or racist intent. On the contrary, the battle flag was often praised as symbolizing an appropriate and encouraging melding of American patriotism and southern militarism.⁴³

youths who saluted and displayed the battle flag.⁴⁵

In the decade after World War II, these divergent uses and meanings of the flag—youthful high jinks, benign regionalism and malignant racism—became more visible and occasionally intertwined. The most important watershed was the 1948 presidential campaign of the States Rights Democratic Party. The campaign marked the formal association of the St. Andrew's cross flag with modern politics and ideology and precipitated



Also occurring during the war years was the earliest documented use of the flag in the ritual of a group that modern Americans associate closely with it: the Ku Klux Klan. The founders of the original, Reconstruction-era Klan were former Confederates. Confederate memorial organizations praised the original Klan's principles and actions and occasionally used the Confederate battle flag in conjunction with events commemorating the original Klan, but there is no evidence that the original Klan used the flag in its rituals or activities. Similarly, the rebirth of the Klan in 1915 did not bring any visible use of the flag. Apopos of a nativist group, the new Klan made the Stars and Stripes and the Christian cross its primary symbols.⁴⁴ By 1943, however, one of the many Klan splinter groups had begun using the Confederate flag in its rituals. Klan infiltrator Stetson Kennedy attended meetings of the Klavern No. 1 in Atlanta and the "Columbians," a group of Klan-Nazi

a nationwide flag fad that fixed the flag's place in American popular culture.

The so-called "Dixiecrat" movement began when Alabama and Mississippi delegates bolted the 1948 Democratic National Convention to protest the adoption of a civil rights platform plank. Founded on the interrelated commitment to state rights and preservation of the racial status quo, the Dixiecrat Party inevitably invited comparison with the Confederacy. Party standard bearers, J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Fielding Wright of Mississippi, sought to attract a national following, but in reality the Dixiecrats were a sectional party.⁴⁶

It was not the party leaders, but youthful followers who made Confederate symbols highly visible party symbols. The States Rights Democrats convened in the hot, overcrowded city auditorium of Birmingham, Alabama, in July 1948. At 10:18 a.m. on July 17, a group of student delegates marched into the auditorium carrying a Confederate battle flag.

"The entire audience stood silently with hats over hearts. . . ." During the most prolonged of the uproarious demonstrations, the student-delegates waved flags and held aloft framed photographs of Robert E. Lee, while the "Texas Beauties" sang a spirited rendition of "Dixie."⁴⁷ Significantly, the symbolism of the occasion spilled over from the convention hall back to the campus. "We're just here to protest," a University of Alabama student told a reporter. "Every fraternity at Tuscaloosa is flying a Confederate flag from the roof today."⁴⁸ Throughout the campaign, reporters and photographers occasionally took note of supporters (usually young men) waving Confederate flags—apparently against the wishes of party leaders, who shunned association with the Confederacy.⁴⁹

College football and campus life in general were apparently the means by which the battle flag evolved from a symbol of Confederate memorial organizations into a popular culture symbol.

Left: entitled "Here Comes That Flag Again," this photograph taken during a 1955 game appeared in the 1956 University of Mississippi Yearbook. *J.D. Williams Library*

The flag's association with the Dixiecrats cannot, however, be dismissed as a product of collegiate shenanigans. Certainly the college students who waved it did not regard it so. Student use of the flag at the University of Alabama in 1948 apparently had nothing to do with shenanigans or tradition. A reporter for the student newspaper noted that the flags hoisted over fraternity row were brought "out of mothballs." The flags would stay on the fraternity houses, one student insisted, "until the North calls its wolves away from attempting to devour our Southern culture."⁵⁰ Significantly, the University of Alabama Kappa Alpha fraternity chapter's first Old South Ball, with Confederate flags flying high, was held the spring *after* the Dixiecrat movement. Dixiecrat supporters clearly and correctly perceived the flag as the ultimate symbol of state rights. For black citizens, the Dixiecrats' understanding of state rights held sinister implications. In preparation for a state rights meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, in late May 1948, the city's main street was bedecked with battle flags.

Governor Fielding Wright delivered a radio address in which he warned blacks: "If any of you have become so deluded as to want to enter our white schools, patronize our hotels and cafes, enjoy social equality with whites, then kindness and true sympathy requires me to advise you to make your home in some other state than Mississippi." At the Dixiecrat convention in Birmingham, Strom Thurmond was escorted by United States and Confederate flags to the stage where he delivered his infamous challenge that "there's not enough troops in the army to force the southern people to break down segregation and admit the negro race into our theaters, our swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches."⁵¹

The flag's strong ideological overtones no doubt contributed to the unprecedented popular demand for Confederate flags that followed in the wake of the Dixiecrat campaign. Flag manufacturers and dealers reported 3,000 to 10,000 percent increases in sales of Confederate flags over previous years. A Richmond, Virginia, dealer noted that most of his sales were the "grave size" flags popular around every Memorial Day. Other dealers admitted that politics was behind the surge in sales: "Everyone wants Confederate flags," a Deep South dealer gloated. "It's the Dixiecrat movement against Truman."⁵² Even if they became enamored of the flag because of its new political punch, purchasers of the flags certainly did not use them for strictly political purposes. "Ole Miss" home economics students created a huge flag, dubbed "Pride of the South," that became the school football team's unofficial symbol for the next dozen years.⁵³

The flag's popularity did not abate with the party's defeat in the November 1948 election. On the contrary, by 1950-1951, use of the flag became a nationwide fad, foreshadowing coonskin caps and hula hoops as phenomena of the 1950s. Just how the fad began was and is the subject of some dispute. Certainly the Dixiecrat campaign gave the flag a high nationwide profile—along with an attitude of defiance and rebellion. But the pre-Dixiecrat association with college football persisted. Virginia and North Carolina football fans made headlines in the North when they brought flags with them to games in Pennsylvania and New York in the fall of 1949.⁵⁴



South Carolina became the first state since Mississippi in 1916 to make desecration of the Confederate flag a crime—but the laws proved ineffective against commercial use of the flag.



Above: General Lee's Flea Market near Nashville Tennessee. John Shelton Reed and Dale Reed
Right: Dixie Trailer Sales located in Newport News, Virginia. John Coski

Whatever the cause, the fad became an undeniable fact when "pert little rebel banners" began appearing in the inner sanctums of Yankeeedom. A prankster raised a Confederate flag over the Massachusetts state house sometime after midnight on Memorial Day, 1950. In 1951, Washington, D.C., capitol police were hard pressed to enforce a regulation against the display of flags other than the Stars and Stripes in the U.S. capitol parking lot. Cars with New Jersey, Ohio, Wisconsin and other northern state plates were trying to enter the capitol grounds with Confederate battle flags on their antennae.⁵⁵ "The fad that began slowly last year reached mammoth proportions in the July 4 parade at Daytona Beach, Fla.," reported *Newsweek* in September 1951. "Rebel flags were flown from planes at the air races in Detroit, carried by shriners in their New York jamboree, and flaunted at the New York City Beauty pageant."⁵⁶

Use of the flag was especially evident among American military forces. Soldiers

serving in Korea and Japan requested and received flags from United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters and displayed them in or over their tents.⁵⁷ Vehicles of the 28th Army Division participating in the massive August 1951 training exercise, Operation Southern Pines, flew Confederate flags as they drove from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Indiana.⁵⁸ American soldiers serving in Korea under the United Nations banner flew Confederate flags as "American" banners. Soldiers flying Confederate flags joked that the country was finally fighting on the right side—that of *South Korea*.⁵⁹

Editorials and pundits across the nation wondered aloud what lay behind the fad. Although some writers raised the possibility of lingering Dixiecrat spirit, most dismissed the flag's popularity as a fad and noted its close association with youth culture. Even a writer in *The Crisis*, the magazine of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), agreed that there was nothing sinister in the flag's revival.⁶⁰

There were a few dissenting voices, however. In the spirit of his GAR forebears, a chaplain of a Sons of Union Veterans post in New Jersey (where the fad was especially strong) warned that the flag was "subversive" and a potential source of "dissension among the people of our nation."⁶¹

African-American newspaper editors agreed. In several articles reviewing and analyzing the flag fad, the *Pittsburgh Courier* termed the flag's widespread use (and especially its toleration by American military officials) a "national disgrace." While the reporters noted that black servicemen resented the flag as "an odious symbol of slavery and servitude," most of the paper's criticism and warnings underscored the flag's implication of rebellion and disunity.⁶² *The Afro-American* warned that the flag fad was, despite its apparent innocence, "an attempt to popularize the South's opposition to Civil Rights." "KEEP YOUR EYES ON THOSE CONFEDERATE FLAGS!" cautioned the *Afro's* editors:

Stop a moment! Ask yourself what sinister forces are behind this sudden craze to make the whole nation rebel conscious?...

Have we so soon forgotten what the Confederate flag represents?

The Confederate flag stands for slavery and human degradation.

The Confederate flag stands for rebellion and treachery.

The Confederate flag stands for bloodshed and segregation.

The Confederate flag stands for oppression and disfranchisement.

The Confederate flag stands for white supremacy and everything in which democracy and Christianity are opposed.

These are no laughing matters.

AWAKE AMERICA!⁶³

Contrary to the insistence of heritage groups today that African-American leaders did not care about the Confederate flag until it became expedient to do so in the 1990s, they in fact protested the flag's wider public presence as soon as it began.

The most vocal critics of the flag's proliferation were Confederate heritage organizations that, for the first time, had to cope with the widespread use of a symbol they understandably regarded as their own. The United Daughters of the

Confederacy was the first to react. Responding to "certain demonstrations of college groups and some political groups" (no doubt referring to the Dixiecrats), the UDC in November 1948 created a committee to protect the flag from "misuse." The Daughters not only adopted a code for proper use of the flag within the organization, but also drafted model legislation which it asked southern state legislatures to adopt.⁶⁴ The UDC even opposed the 1956 change in the Georgia state flag, which replaced the Stars and Bars with a St. Andrews cross. While consistently censuring "misuse" of the flag, the UDC enthusiastically distributed flags to American servicemen and was ambivalent about the proliferation which increased awareness of the Confederacy even as it increased the chances of misuse.⁶⁵

and vulgar exhibitions; and by limiting its use among us to such places and occasions as are fit and becoming." The Advisory Council requested that its members cease using the flag on neckties, caps, automobile windshield stickers, etc.⁶⁶ At its August 2001 convention, Kappa Alpha passed a resolution prohibiting the use of the battle flag at KA chapter houses, on articles of clothing bearing the KA symbolism or at KA functions or gatherings. The commander-in-chief of the newly revived Sons of Confederate Veterans similarly declared in 1952 that "[n]o one has the moral right to use or display the Confederate Flag or any other article of dress bearing the Confederate Flag unless he feels the Affection, the Reverence and the undying Remembrance with which we salute the Confederate Flag."⁶⁷



African-Americans pose with a flag of protest in Columbia, South Carolina, on July 1, 2000.

Photograph by Eric D. App

The Kappa Alpha Order acted more decisively. At the 1951 meeting, the Order's leaders issued a "statement of principles" concerning the flag. "We are aware of and deplore the indiscriminate misuse and abuse of the Battle Flag by those who would make it a political symbol," declared the statement, "and by those who would derive financial gain from it by promoting its sales or using it in advertising their merchandise." "As we were largely responsible for popularizing its display," the statement explained, "today so we can help to restore respect for it by promptly disassociating ourselves from all manner of cheap, tawdry

Confederate heritage organizations led a movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s to pass state laws protecting the Confederate flag from "desecration." Prompting the adoption of South Carolina's pioneering law in 1958 was a well-publicized case of commercial misuse. The UDC, SCV, and others mobilized to punish the New York-based manufacturer of a Confederate flag beach towel. The state legislature passed a resolution declaring the Martex executive who suggested the towel "an unworthy American" and condemned the towel as a "crude method of advertisement." A few weeks later, South Carolina became the first



Segregationist Governor Orval Faubus, of Arkansas, addresses a crowd as court-ordered integration of schools begins.



Little Rock, Arkansas, August 20, 1959—the first day of school after integration.

state since Mississippi in 1916 to make desecration of the Confederate flag a crime. By 1961—the first year of the Civil War centennial—three other southern states (Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana) had passed similar laws.⁶⁸

The laws proved ineffective against commercial use of the flag. Ironically, in an effort to “win” the war one hundred years after the fact, the southern states aggressively marketed the centennial and precipitated the avalanche of flag trinkets and campy “Forget, Hell!” sloganeering that made commercial flag “desecration” an integral part of American culture.⁶⁹ Subsequent decades have only intensified this tendency, resulting in a material culture that emblazons death’s heads on the flag and sells flag products such as shot glasses, dog leashes, and baby diapers. By the 1960s, the flag had become a “redneck” symbol associated with stock car racing, truckers, bikers, and “rebels” of all kinds. The popular television series, “The Dukes of Hazzard” (1979–1983), and its car-hero, the “General Lee,” made the flag a metaphor for the “good ol’ boy.” Yesterday’s “desecration” had become today’s “honor.”

A more serious threat to the flag’s reputation came when white southerners made it a symbol of resistance to civil

rights after the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka*. Before World War II, the flag was a staid symbol of a secure established social order that enjoyed the tacit support of the federal government. After the fight over civil rights was joined, the flag became a belligerent symbol of an order under attack from the federal government. In circumstance and in attitude, there is a fundamental difference between a symbol of the status quo and a symbol of protest.

In Little Rock, Tuscaloosa, Richmond, New Orleans, Oxford, Birmingham, Greensboro, and other cities, white Southerners carried the flag in protests against integration, displaying it with signs demanding “STOP the race mixing” and “Keep Birmingham Schools White.”⁷⁰ More systematic was the use of the flag by extremist groups, especially Ku Klux Klan groups under the leadership of the flamboyant Lycurgus Spinks and Grand Dragon Robert Shelton, for whom the flag was a personal totem, and the blatantly racist National States Rights Party. The NSRP proclaimed triumphantly that the Confederate flag “is now the symbol of the white race and White supremacy.” NSRP leaders Jesse B. Stoner and Edward R. Fields wore and carried

the battle flag wherever they went in their prodigious travels to stir up outrage against integration.⁷¹

Observers of the Civil War centennial noted that the commemoration of the war occurred against a political and social backdrop eerily reminiscent of the war itself.⁷² That the Confederate battle flag was present during the pitched battles of the civil rights movement heightened the irony. Virginius Dabney, the Pulitzer Prize-winning editor of the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, railed at the misuse of the flag by rabid segregationists. Two weeks before the Appomattox observance, while commenting on the popularity of the flag among white youths heckling the Selma-to-Montgomery marchers, Dabney wrote: “The Confederate flag is being used in Alabama in a manner which represents a gross perversion of things it stood for a century ago. . . . [T] rue Southerners object strenuously to having the flag under which their forefathers fought and died dragged into today’s interracial controversies, where it is almost invariably made to seem synonymous with ‘bigotry’ or ‘racism.’”⁷³

However, ordinary white southerners continued to drag the St. Andrews cross battle flag into interracial controversies because for them it expressed their hostility to integration. Significantly, they did not reach for the Stars and Bars or any of the Confederacy’s “political” flags, but the battle flag—the flag that for generations had been the *de facto* symbol of the Confederacy. What better symbol to represent opposition to the federal government’s interference in the South’s racial status quo than the *de facto* symbol of the nation that fought against the federal government’s interference with the racial status quo a century earlier? Once the flag became a symbol of segregationism, African-Americans not unreasonably perceived it as a symbol of hostility to their interests if not to their safety and security. Confederate heritage organizations in recent decades have sought to repair some of the damage inflicted on the flag’s image during the civil rights era—in particular by frequently denouncing the Klan’s appropriation of the flag.⁷⁴

The flag’s use as a racist symbol and the consequent reaction against it have, however, transformed the terms on which Confederate heritage organizations and Americans generally discuss

the flag. Beginning in the 1960s, African Americans protested against the officially sanctioned use of the Confederate flag and other symbols in southern states. For a decade, such protests were as predictable as they were fruitless. In the late 1980s, the Southeast Region of the NAACP launched a concerted campaign to eliminate the battle flag from the state flags of Georgia and Mississippi and from the capitol domes of Alabama and South Carolina. The campaign received support from liberal reform and conservative business groups and gained wider support in the state legislatures. The flag controversies that have seized headlines since the late 1980s owe primarily to this campaign. While flag defenders blame the NAACP for politicizing the flag out of self-interest, African-American activists' modern campaign against the flag is an expression of an attitude that became evident soon after African Americans in the South achieved a measure of political power. The flag controversies today are a "second wave," louder echoes of similar, forgotten, controversies of the late 1960s and 1970s. As recently as July 2001 the NAACP voted to renew its call "for the removal and relocation of the Confederate battle flag to a place of historical rather than sovereign context."

The perceived enemies of the flag are the KKK and other hate groups, and the NAACP, the media, and others who react against the flag based on its "misuse" by the KKK.

African-American protest against the flag has steered Confederate heritage organizations, many Civil War enthusiasts, and a great many white Americans into a position of defending the display of the flag in most circumstances. The perceived enemies of the flag are the KKK and other hate groups, and the NAACP, the media, and others who react against the flag based on its "misuse" by the KKK. Gone or muted are earlier concerns with "desecration" of the flag by its use on beach towels, T-shirts, or state flags. In 1995, Don Hinkle, author of a book subtitled "A Reasonable Defense of the Confederate Flag," declared that "Anyone who uses the Confederate battle flag for any purpose other than to honor the Confederate dead is desecrating a sacred sym-



Members of the KKK proclaim their views at a rally in Montgomery, Alabama.
Southern Poverty Law Center



White students protest against integration in Birmingham, Alabama, September 1963.
Birmingham Public Library

bol." Confronted, however, with the growing opposition to the public display of the flag, Hinkle compromised this straightforward delineation of proper flag use, and defended and apparently celebrated the right of individuals to display the flag on clothing items, souvenirs, and even tattoos. He did not explain how exactly a tattoo of the cartoon character "Tasmanian Devil" carrying a Confederate flag honored the Confederate dead.⁷⁵

Earlier generations of flag defenders realized that wider use of the flag meant

that they would lose exclusive ownership of its meaning. That is, of course, exactly what has happened. The debates over the flag today are the inevitable consequence of proliferation. Perhaps the majority of (white) Americans continue to believe that the flag is an honored and honorable symbol of the Confederate dead or merely a neutral symbol of "history." Others, however, use the flag as a symbol of varying degrees and varieties of individual rebellion, of collective resistance to authority, and of racism. These are all


"meanings" of the flag that are very real in their intent and in their consequences. Flag defenders insist that the flag has a "true" or "legitimate" meaning (as a symbol of the Confederate soldier) and that others are illegitimate "misuses" of the flag. This view is unrealistic and precludes understanding of why critics of the flag do not share reverence for it. If we wish to understand what has happened to the flag, and the ways in which it is viewed today, it is essential to ask why other people believe what they do, rather than vilify them.

The flag that has been at the center of these modern debates is the St. Andrews cross battle flag. Only occasionally (most notably in 1993 when Senator

Carol Moseley-Braun convinced the U.S. Senate not to renew a Congressional patent for the insignia of the UDC) has the Stars and Bars been at the center of the storm. Instead, moderates in the flag debates have customarily offered the Stars and Bars as a compromise that flag defenders and critics could accept—because it did not carry the same "baggage" as the battle flag. Until the sudden resolution of the issue in 2001, the campaign to change the Georgia state flag would have resulted in the pre-1956 pattern based on the Stars and Bars. The Georgia legislators who adopted the new flag in 1956 and those who defended it throughout the 1990s rejected the Stars and Bars design and its "meaningless" stripes. Only the Confederate battle flag sufficed to communicate—for whatever reason—homage to the Confederacy.⁷⁶ Similarly, when the city manager of Pensacola in 2000 changed the Confederate flag in the city's official five flags display from a battle flag (naval jack) to a Stars and Bars, outraged citizens denounced the change as "changing history." Never mind that the Confederate

The Confederate battle flag continues to be a contentious symbol that reflects America's divided mind over the origins, life, and legacies of the Confederacy.

Left: in protest, outraged opponents of the flag set it on fire on the steps of the South Carolina capitol. Below: confrontation of pro- and anti-flag demonstrators. These photographs were taken on July 1, 2000, by Eric D. App.



battle flag was logically inconsistent with the four national flags in the display and that the battle flag had no history in a city that fell to the Federals early in 1862.⁷⁷

Contrary to what Carlton McCarthy declared in 1882, it is the St. Andrews cross battle flag that defenders and critics alike have made the symbol of the Confederacy. As the spirited discussions in the pages of this magazine suggest, this association alone would make the flag a source of controversy—since Americans disagree as to what exactly the Civil War and the Confederacy were all about. The flag was not furled forever in 1865, but continues to be a living symbol of ideas and causes that latter-day Americans have drawn from its Confederate association—of "rebellion," of state rights, of national liberation, and of a social order subordinating the rights of blacks. It seems unlikely that Americans will spontaneously agree to retire the use of the battle flag to purely commemorative events, and just as unlikely that supporters and opponents of the flag will reach agreement as to its meaning. The Confederate battle flag will continue to be what it has been for almost half a century: a contentious symbol that reflects accurately America's divided mind over the origins, life, and legacies of the Confederacy. □

JOHN M. COSKI is historian and library director at The Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond, and the author of *Capital Navy: The Men, Ships, and Operations of the James River Squadron*. He is currently working on a history of the Confederate battle flag. This article is adapted from "The Confederate Battle Flag in Historical Perspective," published in *Confederate Symbols in the Contemporary South*, edited by J. Michael Martinez, et. al. (University Press of Florida, 1999), and used with the permission of the University Press of Florida.

NOTES

1. Carlton McCarthy, *Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia* (Richmond: 1882), p. 220.
2. William C. Davis, *The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy* (Lawrence, Kansas: 1996), pp. 189-90.
3. R.S. Trapin to William Porcher Miles, 22 April 1862, in file 51, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of North Carolina; *Journal of the Congress*

- of the Confederate States of America (Washington, D.C.: 1904-1905), 1:102.
4. *War of the Rebellion, Official Reports of the Union and Confederate Armies*, (Washington, D.C.: 1880-1900), series I, volume 2, p. 538
 5. P.G.T. Beauregard to Joseph E. Johnston, 5 September 1861, Elenor S. Brockenbrough Library/Museum of the Confederacy [ESBL/MOC].
 6. "The Confederate States' Flag. . ." in *Southern Historical Society Papers* [SHSP], 31(1903): p. 69-70.; W.L. Cabell, "Vivid History of Our Battle Flag," *Confederate Veteran*, May 1900, pp. 238-9. Constance Cary Harrison, *Recollections Grave and Gay* (New York: 1916), pp. 61-64; "Our Flag and Seal," *Southern Illustrated News*, March 21, 1863, p. 2; SHSP, 8 (1880), p. 155.
 7. Brig. Gen. G. Moxley Sorrel, C.S.A., *Recollections of a Staff Officer*, Bell I. Wiley, ed. (Jackson, Tennessee: 1958), pp. 28-29.
 8. Roman, *Beauregard*, vol. I, p. 481.
 9. Madaus and Needham, 23-24 and passim.
 10. For the best analysis of the flag's symbolism to soldiers, see Richard Rollins, *The Damned Red Flags of the Rebellion* (Redondo Beach, California: 1997).
 11. Matthew Fontaine Maury to Franklin Minor, 21 August 1861, letterbook #14, Maury Papers, Library of Congress; *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, November 14, 1861; [George W. Bagby], "Editor's Table," *Southern Literary Messenger*, January 1862, p. 67.
 12. *Journal*, 5:272,
 13. "Our Flag and Seal," 2; *Charleston Mercury*, May 6, 1863.
 14. Cannon, *Flags of the Confederacy*, 19.
 15. *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, May 16, 1863.
 16. Maj. Arthur L. Rogers to Edward Sparrow, January 2, 1865, transcript in ESBL/MOC.
 17. Joshua L. Chamberlain, *The Passing of the Armies* (1915; reprinted, Dayton: 1974), pp. 261-62; Sam R. Watkins, Co. Aytch: *A Side Show of the Big Show* (1882, reprinted, Jackson, TN: 1952), p. 227.
 18. Abram Ryan, "The Conquered Banner," *Confederate Veteran*, January 1893, p. 29.
 19. [Katie Walker] (Mrs. W. I.) Behan, compiler, *History of the Confederate Memorial Associations of the South* (New Orleans: Confederate Southern Memorial Association, 1904), p. 93; Mary H. Mitchell, *Hollywood Cemetery: The History of a Southern Shrine* (Richmond: 1985), pp. 88, 94.
 20. *Carolina Rifle Club Charleston, S.C. July 30th, 1869*. By C. Irvine Walker, Vice Pres. 1869-1873, President 1875-1879 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 45-48 (quote 46).
 21. This interpretation of the era is from Gaines M. Foster, *Ghosts of the Confed-*

eracy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South 1865 to 1913 (New York: 1987).

22. William H. Pope to Lewis, November 6, 1893 and Alexander Robert Chisholm, December 8, 1903, Samuel Lewis Papers, VHS, box 18, folder 1.
23. John H. Hill to Lewis, January 3, 1905 and May 7, 1905, Lewis Papers, Virginia Historical Society [VHS], box 18, file 3; Lewis, draft of "Report," Lewis Papers, VHS, box 20, file 8; C. Irvine Walker to Lewis, July 1, 1904, Lewis Papers, VHS, box 18, folder 2; Lewis, "Explanatory Matter," typescript page 38, Lewis Papers, VHS, box 20, folder 8.
24. Special Order #23, November 19, 1903, in *Orders [of the] United Confederate Veterans General and Special*, vol. I (New Orleans: United Confederate Veterans, 1904); *The Flags of the Confederate States of America* (New Orleans: 1907).
25. *Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth General Convention, United Daughters of the Confederacy*, Memphis, 1932, pp. 195-196; Minutes of the Eighteenth General Convention, United Daughters of the Confederacy, Richmond, 1911, p. 303; Janet Weaver Randolph to Annin Flag Company, September 21, 1925, Janet Randolph Papers, ESBL/MOC.

Monument dedications became occasions for collective remembrance of the war and celebration of what white Southerners called the "Lost Cause."

Right: On July 10, 1996, opponents gather in protest at the dedication of the statue of Arthur Ashe on Richmond's Monument Avenue. Photograph by John Coski

26. U. S. Flag and Signal Co. to Mrs. N. V. Randolph, March 15, 1926, Randolph Papers.
27. *Minutes of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting and Reunion, United Confederate Veterans*, 1904, 33.
28. Edward A. Pollard, *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the Confederacy* (New York: 1866), p. 751.
29. Randolph H. McKim, *A Soldier's Recollections: Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate* (London: 1911), p. 289.
30. David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge: 2001).
31. Robert McElroy, *Grover Cleveland: The Man and the Statesmanship: An Authorized Biography* (New York: 1923), pp. 208, 211-212; John M. Taylor, "Grover Cleveland and the Rebel Banners," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, September/October 1993, pp. 22-224.

32. *Confederate Veteran*, May 1898, pp. 252-55; *The Flags of the Confederate Armies. Returned to the Men who Bore Them by the United States Government* (St. Louis: Buxton & Skinner, 1905; reprinted: Redondo Beach, CA: Rank & File Publications, 1995).
33. [John Mitchell, Jr.], "The Lee Monument Unveiling," *Richmond Planet*, May 31, 1890, 1:2.
34. Blight, *Race and Reunion*; Cecilia O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton: 1999).
35. *Confederate Veteran*, October 1909, p. 514; *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg: Report of the Pennsylvania Commission* (Harrisburg: 1914), pp. 17-18.
36. Rev. James H. McNeilly, in *Confederate Veteran*, December 1913, p. 556.
37. "No Flags Furled, Declares U.C.V.," *Richmond Times-Dispatch* [RTD] April 15, 1936, and "Dixie Flag Not Wanted at Reunion," RTD, September 4, 1935, in Scrapbook C10, ESBL/MOC; Virginus Dabney, *Below the Potomac: A Book About the New South* (New York: 1942), pp. 265-68.



The St. Andrews Cross. The Scottish flag is regarded as one of the oldest national flags still in existence.

38. *Confederate Veteran*, June 1907, p. 283; *New York Times* [NYT], January 15, 1907, 11:4.
39. Reynold S. Cheney, "The Old South Ball. . . Its 53rd Anniversary," *The Kappa Alpha Journal*, Winter 1973-1974.
40. College Topics [University of Virginia], November 8, 1947, p. 1; *Time*, October 25, 1947, p.25; *Corks and Curls* [University of Virginia], 1948, p.138; Chris Springer, "The Rebel Flag: The Confederate Flag and Its Image in America, 1865 to the Present" (B.A. Thesis, Brown University, 1990), p. 18.
41. "Confederate Flag Waves in Solomons," *Richmond News Leader*, February 18, 1944; J. Bryan, III, *The Sword Over the Mantel: The Civil War and I* (New York, 1960), pp. 1-20.
42. *United Daughters of the Confederacy Magazine*, February 1947, p. 12; Walter Wood, "A heroic Memorial Day flag raising," *The Washington Times*, May 26, 1986, pp. 2A, 2B.
43. Sociologist Charles Ogburn quoted in *UDC Magazine*, February 1947, p. 12; "Authorizing The Carrying of Civil War Battle Streamers With Regimental Colors," House Report 1423, 80th Congress, 2d Session, 25 February 1948; *NYT*, 10 March 1948, 22:4.
44. Wyn Craig Wade, *The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America* (London: Simon & Schuster); Nancy MacLean, *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (New York: 1994).
45. Stetson Kennedy, *I Rode With the Ku Klux Klan* (London, 1954), pp. 21, 59, 96, 99, 120; "The Ku Klux Klan Tries A Come-back," *Life*, May 27, 1946, pp. 42-43.
46. John Popham, "Thurmond, Candidate of Rebels, Decries 'White Supremacy' Idea," *NYT*, 20 July 1948, p.1; Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (New York: 1993), pp. 174-76.
47. "Hats Go Off For Stars and Bars," *Birmingham Post*, July 17, 1948, p. 1; AP wirephotos in *Birmingham News*, July 17, 1948, p. 1; July 18, 1948, p. 43.
48. Gene Wortman, "There's An Auditorium full of Suspense Before Opening," *The Birmingham Post*, July 17, 1948, p. 2.
49. See photographs in *The Houston Chronicle*, August 12, 1948, p. 1; August 29, 1948, p. A16; September 15, 1948.
50. Note Jim Harland, "Confederate Flags Fly Again On Capstone Fraternity Houses," *Crimson-White*, July 20, 1948, p. 2.
51. "Governor Wright Bids Negroes Be Quiet," *NYT*, May 10, 1948, p. 5; Roland Dopson, "Thurmond and Wright Head States Rights Ticket," *Atlanta Constitution*, July 18, 1948, p. 1A; Barnard, 177.
52. Sylvia Costen, "Dixiecrat Banner," *Richmond News-Leader*, August 10, 1948; Betty Sessler, "Confederate Flag Sales

Show No 'Dixiecrat' Boom in City," *RTD*, August 10, 1948; Frances Boushall, "Dixie's Flag Still Waves (and Sells)," *RTD*, May 30, 1948, in *Richmond Newspapers* clippings files.

53. Kevin Pierce Thornton, "Symbolism at Ole Miss," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 86 (Summer 1987): pp. 255-67.
54. "Silly Confederate Flags," November 20, 1949, in *Richmond Newspapers* clippings files; Chris Springer, "The Troubled Resurgence of the Confederate Flag," *History Today*, 43 (June, 1993), p. 7.
55. "Stars and Bars Fly Again; Oh, Happy Student Days," *NYT*, May 31, 1950, 2:4; "Autos Flying Confederate Flags Barred From Parking at Capitol," *NYT*, November 9, 1951, 1:2.



Above: Seoul, Korea, 1953: banners and souvenirs for sale. Right: an American officer poses next to the battle flag. Both photographs courtesy Lawrence (Bud) Lander, USN.

January 12, 1952, p. 5. "Awake America," editorial in *Richmond Afro-American*, April 19, 1952, p. 4

64. *Minutes of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Convention of the General Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy*, 1948, pp. 185-87; *Minutes of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Convention of the General Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy*, 1950, pp. 195-96.
65. Tommie Phillips LaCavera, compiler, *The History of the Georgia Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy 1895-1995*, Vol. II (Atlanta: 1995), pp. 589-93.
66. Statement of Policy of the Advisory Council of the Kappa Alpha Order, December 7-8, 1951, *The Kappa Alpha Journal*, May 1966, pp. 1-2.

American soldiers serving in Korea with the United Nations forces flew Confederate flags as "American" banners.



56. "Those Rebel Flags," *Newsweek*, September 24, 1951, p. 24.
 57. *Minutes of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the General Convention, United Daughters of the Confederacy*, November 1951, p. 124; *UDC Magazine*, May 1952, p. 9; August 1952, p. 19; August 1953, p. 23; *NYT*, March 23, 1952, 1:3.
 58. *NYT*, August 31, 1951, 8:1.
 59. Letters to author from Korean War veterans responding to query placed in *The Graybeards*, October 1998.
 60. See for example, John E. Long, "Conquest by Bunting," *NYT Magazine*, October 14, 1951, p. 52; Ruth Danehower Wilson, "Confederate Flag-Wavers," *The Crisis*, April 1952, p. 242.
 61. Quoted in *NYT*, August 29, 1951, 27:7.
 62. A. M. Rivera, "National Disgrace Sweeping Country," and Stanley Roberts, "Top Brass Silent As Alarm Spreads," *Pittsburgh Courier*, September 29, 1951, pp. 1, 5; "Rebel Day' in Chicago," *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 6, 1951, p.1.
 63. "Confederate Flag Revives Issues of Civil War: Historian Says Dixie on Political Offensive," *Richmond Afro-American*,
67. "Message From the S.C.V. Commander," *UDC Magazine*, October 1952, pp. 32-33. The commander-in-chief's statement incorporated the final line of the SCV's formal salute to the Confederate flag.
 68. *Journal of the Senate of South Carolina*, 1958, p. 434; *Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of South Carolina, Regular Session of 1958*, pp. 1676-1677; "Those Confederate Beach Towels," *Richmond Times-Dispatch* [RTD], March 3, 1958; *Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia*, 1960 (Atlanta: State of Georgia, 1960), p. 985; Code of Louisiana, section 14:116; Code of Florida, section 256:051.
 69. See for example "The South Will Rise Again," *Newsweek*, December 12, 1960, p. 64; "Centennial of the Civil War. . . Business Booms Like the Gettysburg


Cannon," *Newsweek*, March 27, 1961, pp. 76-78; Peter Zack Geer, "Georgia Will Commemorate the War Between the States," *Georgia Magazine*, December 1960/January 1961, pp. 10-11; Charles H. Wesley, "The Civil War and the Negro American," *The Journal of Negro History* 47(April 1962): 80-81; John Bodnar, *Remaking America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 212-15.

70. For selected documentation of the flag's use as a racist symbol in the aftermath of Brown, see opinion in *Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board*, 316F. Supp. 1176 (1970); E. Culpepper Clark, *The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation's Last Stand at the University of Alabama* (New York:), pp. 66, 79; Russell H. Barrett, *Integration at Ole Miss* (Chicago: 1965), p. 139; *Birmingham Post-Herald*, September 11, 1963, p. 1; September 12, 1963, pp. 1, 3; William H. Chafe, *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom* (New York: 1980), pp. 118-19; *RTD*, August 28, 1956, pp. A1, A8, 21; February 1960, p. 5.
71. Margaret Long, "The Imperial Wizard Explains the Klan," *NYT Magazine*, July 5, 1964, pp. 8, 25. See, for example, *The Thunderbolt*, August 1963, pp. 6-7; photograph in *The Thunderbolt*, May 1963, p. 6; "Dr. Fields Carries Flag Protesting B'Nai B'rith Meeting," *The Thunderbolt*, May-June 1964, p. 6; "Atty. Stoner and Dr. Fields Lead School Demonstrations," *The Thunderbolt*, September 1964, p. 9; message from the editor, *The Thunderbolt*, June 1965, p. 8 "Fly the Confederate Flag," advertisement in *The Thunderbolt*, No. 64 (February 1965), p. 12 and subsequent issues.
72. C. Vann Woodward, *The Burden of Southern History* (Baton Rouge: 1961), pp. 86-87; Charles G. Sellers, *The Southerner as American* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), p. v.
73. "The Perverted Banner," *RTD*, March 23, 1965; also "An Insult to the Confederacy," July 3, 1864; and "Outlawing Desecration," January 14, 1968, copies in Richmond Newspapers Inc., clippings files.
74. Don Hinkle, *Embattled Banner: A Reasonable Defense of the Confederate Flag* (Paducah: 1995), pp. 56-57; *Confederate Veteran*, March-April 1990, p. 3.
75. Hinkle, 59, 75, 80-81.
76. C. Kelly Barrow, "The TRUTH About Georgia's Flag," *Confederate Veteran*, September-October 1992, p. 5; John Head, "Common ground on the Ga. flag," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 3, 1992.
77. Cindy George, "Pensacola's Confederate flag swap draws several layers of criticism," *Pensacola News Journal*, February 16, 2000.

"The Damned Red Flags of the Rebellion":

The Confederate Battle Flag at Gettysburg

by Richard Rollins



Now
Available
in
Paperback
\$19.95 pb
\$38.95 hc

42 full color
photographs of
flags captured
at Gettysburg

S/H: \$4 for 1,
+\$1 each add'l
Ca. res. add 8.25%

Rank and File Publications
1926 S. PCH #228
Redondo Beach, Ca 90277
(310) 540.6601

Dave Taylor's CIVIL WAR ANTIQUES



Quality Antiques,
Guns, Swords,
Uniforms,
Equipment,
Buckles,
Insignia,
Drums,
Flags, Letters,
Diaries,
Photos,
Autographs,
etc.



EVERYTHING ORIGINAL & 100% GUARANTEED!

Dave Taylor/ Civil War Antiques
P.O. Box 87-CWS • Sylvania, Ohio 43560
(419) 878-8355 weekdays.


www.civilwarantique.com

Shop open by appointment in Waterville, Ohio • Catalog Subscriptions \$10.00
e-mail: davetaylor.civilwar@sylvania.sev.org

Kenneth W. Noe

LAST STAND


THE OTHER HIGH WATER MARK



RIDGE

Starkweather's stand would soon be forgotten in the smoke and din of other battles, but its effects were decisive.

In this painting by A.E. Mathews, the men of the 21st Wisconsin fire a volley at Maney's brigade as it advances toward the western face of the "Open Knob." The men of both armies fell in droves among the corn stalks. Inset: Brigadier General John C. Starkweather.



Generals in Blue



Library of Congress

In July 1863, the Battle of Gettysburg seized the mind of the American people. Nearly 140 years later, Abraham Lincoln's "hallowed ground" continues to fascinate and inspire. Reinforced by Lincoln's celebrated address later that year, scores of books and articles, and more recently a successful film, the popular notion persists that the American Civil War was lost or won on those low, rolling Pennsylvania hills. Not surprisingly, Gettysburg has become for many Americans the secular equivalent of Mecca, requiring at least one pilgrimage in a lifetime. Close to two million visitors answered the call in 1999. As they walked among the park's 1,400 monuments, most surely felt what William Faulkner meant when he wrote that at Gettysburg, "yesterday today and tomorrow are Is: Indivisible.... It's all *now* you see, Yesterday wont be over until tomorrow and tomorrow began ten thousand years ago."¹


the "high water mark of the Confederacy." Gettysburg visitors invariably end their tours along Cemetery Ridge, where Union forces massed behind a stone wall turned back the gray tide in a moment that came to be known more or less accurately as Pickett's Charge. It takes little imagination, standing at that wall today, to look past the numerous monuments, souvenir stands, and modern highway to see Lee and Longstreet in the distance, the waves of Virginians and North Carolinians marching in precise order, or the tragic Brigadier General Lewis Armistead striding over the stone wall with his hat on his sword. The High Water Mark Monument, a massive bronze book placed on the site of the legendary "copse of trees" in 1892, continues to focus visitors' attentions on that decisive moment. If Gettysburg is the Civil War to most Americans, Pickett's Charge is Gettysburg.

Proclamation in 1862, desperate and bloodied Federal troops arrayed behind that wall in Kentucky's Chaplin Hills secured the promise of the proclamation when they stopped an equally desperate Confederate attempt to drive them away. While this clash at the Battle of Perryville has no familiar name, neither "Cheatham's Charge" nor "Starkweather's Stand," it nonetheless marked the high water mark of the *western* Confederacy.

The sequence of events that climaxed on Last Stand Ridge, as modern guides call it, began far away on the Tennessee River. Following the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862, the Confederate Army of the Mississippi had limped back into Mississippi. General Braxton Bragg, the army's dour and dyspeptic new commander at Tupelo, faced an almost impossible task. His men sick and demoralized, his numbers vastly outgunned, Bragg seemed bedeviled no matter which way he turned. With stern discipline and real skill, he rebuilt the army in surprisingly quick time, but he still hesitantly faced the decision of what to do with it. A drive to recapture Corinth, seemingly the obvious choice, required too many men, horses, and wagons to be a realistic prospect. On the other hand, General Henry Halleck had temptingly supplied an alternative target. Halting most of his massive force at Corinth, dispersing much of it to hold his tenuous rail and river communications while the heat and diseases of the summer passed, Halleck had dispatched his rival, Major General Don Carlos Buell, west across Alabama's northern counties, in hopes of seizing the vital railroad junction at Chattanooga, Tennessee. Slowed by drought and Confederate horsemen, Buell's march slowed to a snail's pace. Bragg now had the option of striking Buell's Army of the Ohio, either in his rear, or, more daringly, in his front at Chattanooga.

Increasingly, Bragg leaned toward the Chattanooga option. Although the most daring and the most logistically ambitious, it offered the best chance not only of defeating Buell, but of reclaiming Middle Tennessee and the Kentucky Bluegrass, successes that would be crowned with glory in Richmond. Another factor edging a hesitant Bragg toward East Tennessee was that region's Confederate department commander, General Edmund Kirby Smith. Already faced with a Federal force at Cumberland

Both From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War




Major General Don Carlos Buell (left), and General Braxton Bragg

Bragg had the option of striking Buell's Army of the Ohio, either in its rear, or, more daringly, in its front at Chattanooga.

As a native Mississippian and grandson of a Confederate officer, Faulkner's interest in the battle involved more what could have been than what actually happened. Southerners in general came to regard the battle as the last realistic chance the Confederacy had to win the war, the moment when their cause became lost. Despite the increasingly controversial nature of that interpretation in modern scholarship, as well as recent initiatives undertaken by the National Park Service to instead stress Gettysburg's role as the impetus for "a new birth of freedom," the battle today remains best known as Faulkner knew it,

ROUGHLY 450 MILES TO THE SOUTHWEST, another stone wall runs along another ridge line. There are no monuments there, however, no bronze tablets describing brave deeds, not even any T-shirt shops or wax museums in view. There are no throngs of tourists either, for the land remains privately owned, fenced with barbed wire and serving as a pasture for a farmer's cattle. Perhaps a few dozen people stroll there with permission each year. Yet that isolated stone wall is every bit as significant historically as the one at Gettysburg. Days after Lincoln announced the preliminary Emancipation



CONFEDERATE INVASION OF KENTUCKY

August–October, 1862

- Union troop concentrations
- Confederate troop concentrations
- Union movements
- Confederate movements

Gap, and now about to bear the brunt of Buell's juggernaut, Kirby Smith pleaded for help. At last, Bragg acted. In early August he loaded most of his army on rail cars and dispatched them to Chattanooga, along a circuitous, 776 mile route than sent them south to the Gulf of Mexico and across Mobile Bay on ferries before other trains took them north to Chattanooga. Despite the deficiencies of the Confederate rail network, Bragg made it to Chattanooga ahead of the plodding Buell.

Arriving in the city, Bragg met with Kirby Smith, who had come down from his headquarters in Knoxville. Together,

the two generals drew up a plan that involved Kirby Smith's reduction of Cumberland Gap, followed by a joint thrust against Buell in Tennessee. Hardly was the ink dry on the agreement before Kirby Smith duplicitously reneged. Anxious to win fame as the liberator of Kentucky, and buoyed by the state's beloved Colonel John Hunt Morgan's assurances that thousands of men there were ready to join the Confederate cause, Kirby Smith made excuses, bypassed the Federals ensconced in Cumberland Gap, and drove his army straight into the Bluegrass State. Perplexed and unwilling to pull rank, Bragg agreed to support the invasion on a parallel course to the west. Within days, Kirby Smith's army, augmented by a two-brigade division of Bragg's army commanded by Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne, had swept away a Federal force at Richmond, Kentucky, and seized Lexington.

As promised, Bragg followed, his army crossing the Cumberland River in late August. His men pushed hard, across the dry, drought-ridden Cumberland plateau, and drove rapidly on to the Kentucky border. Things went wrong nonetheless. Buell, already anxious to abandon Halleck's Chattanooga campaign, fell back at the first hint of Confederate activity and raced toward Nashville. From there, he determined to fall back all the way to Louisville. Buell's decision not only annoyed his superiors but surprised Bragg, who expected a more leisurely pursuit. Worse yet, drought and Federal occupation had left his line of march almost devoid of supplies. Bragg changed his route, but to no avail. At Munfordville, Kentucky, Bragg followed up an unauthorized minor attack on the well-defended Federal garrison there by changing course again and surrounding the town with his entire force. Although locally successful, the Munfordville episode wasted valuable time and allowed Buell again to catch up. Then came the final nail. Interpreting a dispatch from Bragg liberally, Kirby Smith refused to move west to combine the two armies, a move that would have cost him independent command. Thoroughly confused now, Bragg determined to detour to Bardstown, where he could gather supplies and recruits, and more easily effect a junction with Kirby Smith.

Bragg's men expressed disappointment, particularly as they had hoped to

UNION ARMY OF THE OHIO (Left Flank)

Library of Congress



BRIGADIER GENERAL
LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU

USAMHI



Brigadier General
James S. Jackson. Killed in
action at Perryville.

9  **Colonel Leonard A. Harris**

38th IN  2nd OH  33rd OH  94th OH 
10th WI  5th Battery,
Indiana Light Artillery 

17  **Colonel William H. Lytle**

42nd IN  88th IN  15th KY  3rd OH 
10th OH  1st Battery,
MI Light Artillery 

28  **Colonel John C. Starkweather**

24th IL  79th PA  1st WI  21st WI 
4th Battery A,
Indiana Light Artillery  Battery A,
Kentucky Light Artillery 

33  **Brigadier General William R. Terrill**

80th IL  123rd IL  105th OH  Mixed detachment,
7th KY, 32nd KY, 3rd TN 
Improvised battery 

 = infantry  = artillery
XX = division; X = brigade; III = regiment; I = battery

CONFEDERATE ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI (Right Flank)

Museum of the Confederacy



MAJOR GENERAL
BENJAMIN F. CHEATHAM

 **Brigadier General Daniel S. Donelson**

8th TN  15th TN  16th TN  38th TN  51st TN  Carne's
TN Battery 

 **Brigadier General Alexander P. Stewart**

4th TN  5th TN  24th TN  31st TN  33rd TN  Stanford's
MS Battery 

 **Brigadier General George Maney**

41st GA  1st TN  6th TN  9th TN  27th TN  Smith's
MS Battery 

take Louisville from the largely inexperienced force that had gathered to hold it. Their mood, however, paled in comparison to that of Buell's men. Long before the retreat, Buell's Federals had grown to hate their commander, whom they condemned as aloof, unfeeling, and too solicitous of southern civilians. A slave owner and husband of a southern woman, Buell strictly forbade his men to forage from civilians. Hungry and angry, they did it anyway. During the retreat's hellish pace and the consequent tightening of belts, Buell sank even lower in the eyes of his men. His refusal to force a fight, coupled with a halt that allowed Bragg to take Munfordville, confirmed their worst suspicions. Buell, they now believed, was a traitor. Rumors swept the army that Bragg and Buell were brothers-in-law who slept together every night. By the time they arrived in Louisville, late in September, the army was nearly mutinous.


While his army recuperated in Louisville, Buell put down numerous brush fires. Some of the theater's generals angled for command, even as the Lincoln administration decided to replace Buell with Major General George H. Thomas. Buell held onto the army only because Thomas refused to accept it. Meanwhile, Buell loyalist Major General William "Bull" Nelson died at the hands of brother officer Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis. In the midst of such chaos, Buell reorganized his army and laid plans to crush Bragg at Bardstown. He divided the reinforced army into three corps. Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, one of Ohio's celebrated "Fighting McCooks," would command I Corps. II Corps went to Kentuckian Major General Thomas L. Crittenden. Both men had served under Buell throughout his command. Nelson would have taken III Corps had he lived, but instead it went to Charles Champion Gilbert. Although officially only a captain, the former Buell aide had in the babel of an invaded Kentucky acquired major general's stars, much to the consternation of other officers.

Buell's plans to defeat Bragg were well made. The key was the continued disjunction among the Confederates. Kirby Smith had moved west to the state capital at Frankfort, where he and Bragg intended to install a Confederate governor who would inaugurate conscription.

General Leonidas Polk remained with the Army of the Mississippi at Bardstown. On October 1, Buell sent two divisions toward Frankfort, hoping to deceive Bragg, but marched the rest of the army toward Bardstown on three separate roads. Buell's bluff worked perfectly. A week later, Bragg continued to believe that Buell and most of his army lay across the Frankfort front. There, near Versailles or Salvisa, he would unite the two forces and give battle. Polk did not help matters, reporting Federal movement toward his army in cryptic and obtuse dispatches. Instead of moving north as Bragg intended, Polk retreated to the east. On the night of October 7, most of the army lay between Harrodsburg and Perryville, the latter town noted for its road junction

and limited supply of water, a precious commodity during Kentucky's drought. Bragg sent word to attack the presumably small enemy force at Perryville in the morning and then race north to join Kirby Smith. Half of Polk's own wing, however, a division under Major General Jones Withers's command, continued moving north toward the Kentucky River and the planned junction. At Perryville, Polk had about 16,800 men.

Spearheaded by his cavalry, Buell's force, numbering about 55,000 men,² approached Perryville on the 7th. Gilbert's III Corps came from the west, up the Springfield Road, and stopped about three miles west of town. To the south, II Corps' right pincer moved tardily up the Lebanon Road, while north



of Gilbert, McCook's left pincer halted at Mackville. That night, Buell perfected orders for the morrow. Once all three corps were up, he would move against the Confederates and crush them. Events of the next morning, however, doomed Buell's plans. A division of III Corps fought a fierce but small morning action at Peters Hill, but by 10:00 a.m. the field again had grown quiet. By then, a frustrated Buell, already aching from an angry altercation with one of his soldiers that led to the general being thrown from his horse, admitted that his two wing corps would never be up in time. Both McCook and Crittenden had started hours later than their orders specified, through a combination of lost orders and sheer exhaustion. Always a perfectionist, and unable to ride, Buell decided to delay the attack one day.

Meanwhile, Bragg awoke in Harrodsburg expecting to hear gunfire from Perryville. When he did not, he rode there himself, only to discover that Polk had not attacked as ordered. With a dawning sense of what he faced, Polk had broken off the Peters Hill fight and had fallen back into a defensive line. That angered Bragg, but what really made him fume was Polk's poor positioning of that line. Crucially, the right remained in the air, even as Federals seemed to be preparing to exploit the gap. Anxious to fight and move on, Bragg ordered Major General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham's division from the far left to the far right. Once in position, Cheatham would strike the enemy's apparently open flank. General William J. Hardee's wing would then drive forward in echelon to finish off the enemy. Bragg planned the attack for 1:00 p.m. after an artillery barrage, but further Federal movements delayed the attack one hour.

What Bragg interpreted as a pending attack was in fact only the units of McCook's corps leisurely, and in some cases haphazardly, arriving and taking position. Two of Brigadier General Lovell H. Rousseau's brigades, commanded by Colonel Leonard Harris and Colonel William H. Lytle, had arrived first, hiking straight up the Mackville Road to the commanding heights just east of the so-called Dixville Crossroads, the intersection of the Mackville and Benton roads. McCook ordered the brigades into line on the heights, Harris on the left, Lytle to the right. Convinced by Cheatham's


dust clouds that the Confederates were in retreat again, Rousseau also allowed his men to move forward from the heights to Doctor's Creek, where scattered pools of water offered respite for his parched men.

Rousseau's final brigade, commanded by Brigadier General John C. Starkweather, should have come up next, but confusion in the rear prevented that. Born in New York, Starkweather had been practicing law in Wisconsin when the war began. His brigade, consisting of the 24th Illinois, the 79th Pennsylvania, his own 1st Wisconsin, the 21st Wisconsin, Captain Asahel Bush's 4th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, and Captain David Stone's Battery A, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery, had mainly spent the war protecting rail-

roads from the likes of Morgan. The 21st Wisconsin was a brand new regiment, and in the march down from Louisville had acquired a reputation for gross insubordination, if high principles. At one point, the Kentuckian Rousseau had ordered the entire regiment into a hollow square and threatened to shoot them all for hiding two escaped slaves and attacking their owners.³

Starkweather's veterans also carried a chip on their shoulder, for they ached to prove themselves in battle. "During the first year of our service," Elias Hoover of the 1st Wisconsin Infantry later wrote, "we thought we were somewhat abused, as we were in the rear guarding railroad bridges and watching John Morgan's command, with occa-

MAP 2 THE FIGHT FOR THE OPEN KNOB, 3:00PM



sionally a little skirmish, and the boys were really itching for a fight.”⁴

At first, however, such eagerness seemed misplaced, for once again that morning bad luck seemed to seek out Starkweather’s regiments. After abandoning the train they had guarded the night before, Starkweather’s men came up from the rear of the division to draw commissary stores in Mackville as ordered. That took time, too much time in the opinion of the always volatile Brigadier General James S. Jackson, McCook’s other division commander. With every minute’s delay, Jackson grew hotter. Eager for battle, he had awakened his rookie division at 3:00 a.m. and had them in line so quickly that most of them ate no breakfast. Jackson was ready to move, but now he had to wait as Starkweather’s men lined up for supplies before moving out. At length, he could take no more. Around 8:00 a.m., Jackson ordered his division toward Perryville despite McCook’s orders, and in so doing cut Starkweather off from the rest of Rousseau’s division. Rousseau therefore could not expect their support anytime soon. Starkweather’s men themselves would come up last of all on the Mackville Road, once again frustratingly in the rear. Unsurprisingly some wondered if once again they had missed “seeing the elephant.”⁵

Jackson’s division now moved to the front. The lead element, Colonel George Webster’s brigade, went in to line to the rear of Harris. Shortly before 2:00 p.m., after consultation with Harris and others, McCook placed Brigadier General William R. Terrill’s all-rookie brigade to the left and several hundred yards to the front of Harris, occupying a high open knoll that commanded the entire area. Anchoring the “Open Knob” were eight guns commanded by Captain Charles Parsons. It was a critical position for raw recruits.

Starkweather meanwhile moved up the Mackville Road as quickly as possible, all the while eating Terrill’s dust. Some companies proved so anxious to get into action that regimental formations began to break down as men surged forward. “Free admission to the circus, boys!” called out one man. “McCook is tickling Bragg’s hinder,” responded another. The men’s enthusiasm, however, played them false, for the growing heat, coupled with their commander’s haste, quickly produced fatigue and a dire need for water.⁶

As they drew near the Dixville Crossroads, Jackson’s column to their front ground to a halt as his division waited to go into line, creating yet another traffic jam on the Mackville Road. The sounds of artillery fire up ahead suggested a battle already in progress, and Starkweather, unwilling to dawdle in the

crowded road and wait for Jackson to disperse, momentarily decided on his own to get to the front the quickest way possible, which meant abandoning the road and taking off cross-country, across fields and through forests. Unaware that the balance of his division lay directly ahead, he chose to go left. At roughly 1:15 p.m. the column began to move. Eventually, the brigade came to a halt on the long, high ridge to the left and rear of Webster. Starkweather promptly dispatched a messenger to Rousseau to inform him of his actions and position.

Starkweather’s brigade, Rousseau later wrote, had occupied “the very spot where it was most needed.” That bit of self-serving hindsight was not what he thought at the time, however. Starkweather had placed the 24th Illinois and 79th Pennsylvania, both largely composed of native German speakers, in the front line. He had already ordered Stone’s battery to unlimber and had turned to Bush’s battery when Colonel John Wharton’s Confederate cavalry appeared on the Benton Road. Using his two Parrott rifles, Stone fired off fifteen or twenty well-placed shots before the horsemen disappeared into woods. The Federals believed they had been driven off by the fire, but in fact they were merely following the road as it took a sharp turn. Archeological evidence suggests that Bush got at least one shot off as well. Not only Starkweather, but also McCook, Jackson, and Terrill on the Open Knob, stopped to admire the Federal gunnery. While his gun crews fired at the enemy horsemen, the rest of Starkweather’s hungry, footsore, and desperately thirsty men wearily stacked their arms, sat down on the ground, and began to eat lunch.⁷



As Wharton’s horsemen disappeared into the distance around 1:45 p.m., Rousseau galloped onto the scene. As the men stood and cheered, the general rode up and down their lines, waving his hat. Starkweather remained at the rear of the brigade, however, irked by his superior’s grandstanding. Their relationship could only have soured further in the next few minutes. Despite his later praise, Rousseau at the time did not like what he saw of Starkweather’s dispositions, and he quickly pulled rank and altered them. Roughly a hundred yards farther lay the northern extension of the same long ridge occupied by Lytle and Harris, one Rousseau must have ridden across

Anchoring the critical “Open Knob” were eight guns commanded by Captain Charles Parsons.


Left: Parsons as a West Point cadet (*US Army Military History Institute*).

Below: Starkweather’s initial position as seen today from his last line at the “high water mark” (*Photograph courtesy John Walsh, Jr.*).






Maney expressed confidence that “one strong and spirited Regt might do much” to break the Federal left. Accordingly, he brought up the 1st Tennessee....



hold the center. It was an important and dangerous position for a raw unit, especially one as undisciplined as the 21st. The 79th Pennsylvania and 24th Illinois on the right took their positions on the sloping face of the ridge. “This formation gave a cross-fire,” Rousseau explained.⁸

That crossfire would soon be needed. At 2:00 p.m., Polk ordered Frank Cheatham’s Confederate column forward against Harris’ Federal brigade. Unaware of Terrill and Starkweather’s presence, because of the rolling topography, Brigadier General Daniel S. Donelson’s brigade did not strike an open flank as promised, but instead drove straight into that crossfire, taking heavy casualties. Parson’s eight-gun battery particularly raked the gray line, but Starkweather’s guns bloodied the enemy as well, particularly those of the 24th Illinois, which occupied the crucial gap between their brigade and Harris’. As Donelson fell back, Cheatham ordered Brigadier General George Maney’s brigade to swing right and take the Open Knob, which he now clearly saw anchored the Federal left. Any thought of Napoleonic finesse immediately vanished, as the planned flanking attack metamorphosed into a straight-ahead assault, force against force. With each Confederate hammer blow, the more inexperienced and poorly led blue line weakened. Foolishly wasting his superior terrain, Terrill spent his raw brigade with two charges down the knob, so anxious was he to save his guns. Around 3:30 p.m., after desperate fighting, Terrill’s gallant “fresh fish” broke to the rear and poured downhill through the confused ranks of the 21st Wisconsin, even as the brigades of Donelson and Brigadier General Alexander Stewart drove forward on Maney’s left.



Top left to right: Brigadier General Daniel S. Donelson (*Museum of the Confederacy*); Brigadier General William R. Terrill (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*); and Brigadier General George Maney (*Library of Congress*). Above center: Maney’s approach as seen today from Parson’s position on the Open Knob (*Photograph courtesy John Walsh, Jr.*) Bottom: “Polk flag” of the 1st Tennessee Infantry, captured by the 1st Wisconsin at Perryville (*Wisconsin Veterans Museum*).

earlier. At the northern end of that ridge, a junction with yet another crest formed a right angle of high ground overlooking the Benton Road from the west, the northernmost ridge angling diagonally toward the front. Beyond that in a narrow valley lay a cornfield that rose to the western face of the Open Knob. Rousseau

immediately ordered Starkweather’s two batteries forward to the extreme left of the intervening ridge, accompanied by the 1st Wisconsin to support them. Bush would unlimber farthest on the left. The turbulent, often insubordinate 21st Wisconsin, thrust ahead of the others to the foot of the hill and the cornfield, would



Now facing Maney's full onslaught as well as part of Stewart's, Starkweather reeled the 24th Illinois back into his lines and refused it, for the combined Stewart-Donelson attack on his right could easily turn into disaster if Harris faltered. Maney's front line, though "much broken" and "greatly disordered" in its commander's words, meanwhile continued moving quickly down the open knob's western slope, through a thin belt of woods toward the cornfield below and then uphill to Starkweather's position on the ridge above, watching Terrill's men break, Maney expressed confidence that "one strong and spirited Regt might do much" to completely break the Federal left. Accordingly, he brought up the 1st Tennessee, which barely had missed the fight for the knob, and threw it forward on the extreme Confederate right.⁹

Much that occurred in the next few minutes reinforced Maney's confidence. As they poured over and around the crest of the Open Knob, Maney's and Stewart's reinforced Confederates swept aside Terrill's rallying troops and bore down on the 21st Wisconsin. So new and inexperienced was Starkweather's front regiment that it had no colors around which to rally, and with only four days of drill under their belts, the men probably would not have been able to rally on the colors even if they had had them. Armed, like many other newly recruited regiments, with obsolete Austrian rifles that often served as little more than glorified clubs, their flanks lay completely open and unanchored. Tall corn, ten to twelve feet high, restricted the regiments's vision even when standing. Unable to see more than a few feet to the front, it came as a surprise to the balance of the regiment when their skirmishers raced in from the belt of trees and through the field into the main line, chased by many of Terrill's panic-stricken troops and then by Rebel shells.

The overwhelmed 21st Wisconsin held long enough to fire two effective, point-blank volleys into the enemy, but then understandably wavered. In a last ditch effort to stop the enemy tide, both Stone's battery and the 1st Wisconsin, the latter back up on the ridge to the left, opened fire into the melee, canister and musketry killing and wounding friend and foe alike. Men from both armies fell in droves among the corn stalks. The bal-

Worse yet, just as Stone began pulling his guns to the rear, Maney, along with Stewart's rightmost regiments, renewed his infantry assault.

Right: Brigadier General Alexander Stewart (*Museum of the Confederacy*). Below center: Site of Stone's battery as seen from the Benton Road in 1885 (*U.S. Army Military History Institute*). Bottom: Confederate attack on Harris' brigade (*HARPER'S WEEKLY*, November 1, 1862. Photograph by Tom Beggs).



ance of the regiment took off for the rear; dozens more fell as they retreated.

Two companies of the 21st, originally held in the rear to guard the train, arrived just as the balance of their regiment broke. Confused as to what to do next, they obeyed Rousseau, who ordered them to line up and lie down to the left of the 1st Wisconsin, just in the rear of Bush's battery. Also scattered among the battery's defenders at that moment were a contingent of stubborn soldiers from Terrill's 105th Ohio and 123rd Illinois. According to one witness, Charles Par-

sons was there as well, working a gun that may have been the only one he rescued when Maney seized the rest of his battery. Rousseau later reported that the men placed their caps on the ends of their bayonets and shouted at the Confederates in defiance.¹⁰

In the valley below, Maney's veterans, joined by the 4th and 5th Tennessee of Stewart's brigade, poured across the cornfield and up the ridge toward Starkweather's brigade, hard on the heels of the broken 21st Wisconsin. On the left, the 5th Tennessee outpaced the 4th and

6th Tennessee up the slope to a rail fence that ran in front of Stone's battery. To their right, the 9th and 27th Tennessee made for Stone's battery as well. Although Stone unloaded canister directly into their faces, many men in those regiments reached the crest and fired a murderous volley into the battery's gunners. As they did, panic seized Stone's men, and possibly Stone himself, who according to his lieutenant ran to the rear and lay down to hide behind his limbers and caissons. Unwilling to take the time to limber up, those gunners still standing and game enough grabbed their pieces by hand and for a moment tried to pull them to the rear, their fleeing comrades providing human shields as they worked. Before long though they abandoned the guns entirely and fell back. Undaunted, a handful of men from the 21st Wisconsin, notably two savvy ex-Prussian soldiers, took over a gun and got a few last shots off. The Confederates fell back.¹¹


Starkweather was in a dire situation nonetheless, for as Cheatham swept toward him, a second threat appeared in the form of Captain William Carnes' Tennessee battery, operating squarely on the Federal left flank. Thus supported, the 1st Tennessee crossed the corn field and the Benton Road, and then strode up the ridge face toward Bush's battery from the north. Supporting the gunners on the crest, the 1st Wisconsin, Companies B and C of the 21st Wisconsin, and some of Terrill's orphans shifted their aim and opened up on the new wave of attackers. At the same time, Stone's battery as well as the 79th Pennsylvania to the south enfiladed the Confederates' exposed left flank. The Union veterans, many wielding superior rifles, bloodied the Confederates. Men fell by the dozens, including at least two color bearers. Somehow, the dogged Tennesseans kept moving anyway, charging to the base of the hill where the Federal gunners, unable to depress their guns enough, could no longer hurt them.

The 1st Tennessee were hidden for a moment by the terrain, then surged up and over the brow of the hill and into the muzzles and smoke of the battery. As the Confederates reappeared in his sights, Bush hit them with canister at thirty yards, in Sam Watkins' words "mangling and tearing men to pieces.... We did not recoil, but our line was fairly hurled back by the leaden hail that was poured into

our very faces. Eight color bearers were killed at one discharge of their cannon. We were right up among the very wheels of their...guns." Slowly, ferociously, the Confederates slugged the men in blue back away from the guns with bayonets and the butts of their muskets, only to fall back to the base of the hill in confusion just as quickly. It was now about 4:15 p.m.¹²

The brutal savagery of the attack, coupled with Carnes' unexpected barrage on the left, temporarily unnerved Starkweather, who worried that Kirby Smith had arrived with his army. Surely, he reasoned, Bragg would not have attacked alone. Fearing the worst, Starkweather made a crucial decision. Having almost lost his batteries once, he

decided to withdraw them both from their present position to the steeper and higher ridge behind him, the position he had occupied before Rousseau ordered him forward. There his guns would be safer. Just as importantly, that steep ridge, running roughly parallel to the Mackville Road, could provide a formidable last stand for defending the Dixville Crossroads from the north. Were that junction to fall, I Corps would be totally cut off from the rest of Buell's army and disaster would follow. The plan was simple. While the 79th Pennsylvania, 24th Illinois, and elements of the 1st Wisconsin held the lower ridge line, Starkweather ordered the balance of his men to drag the artillery back down the road to the steep, narrow ridge in the rear. To sup-



port the batteries there, Starkweather would leave the reunited 21st Wisconsin as well as whatever was left of Terrill's brigade.

Although hammered by Federal artillery, Carnes limbered his guns and raced forward. Worse yet, just as Stone began pulling his guns to the rear, Maney, along with Stewart's rightmost regiments, renewed his infantry assault. On Maney's extreme right, the 1st Tennessee, along with forty or fifty stragglers from other regiments, probably the now shattered 27th Tennessee and 41st Georgia, once again moved up the ridge in an attempt to seize Bush's guns. Maney's remaining regiments, along with the 4th and 5th Tennessee of Stewart's brigade, rolled up the ridge toward Stone's pieces. Slashing


and clubbing their way back to Bush's guns, the 1st Tennessee seized them once more and at bayonet point drove back their protectors, aided at an opportune moment by enfilade fire provided by their 9th Tennessee comrades on the left. Just as quickly, however, the 79th Pennsylvania and 24th Illinois decimated the regiment with several volleys, killing or wounding a dozen men with each according to Field. The 1st Wisconsin then mounted a charge to retrieve Bush's guns. The melee that followed, again in Maney's words, was "perhaps one of the bloodiest and fiercest contests of the war for the numbers engaged."¹³

What was left of the 1st Tennessee finally had no choice but to fall back again into the cornfield. The equally bat-

tered 1st Wisconsin did not pursue, but instead returned to the desperate task of pulling Bush's guns back to the next ridge. On the 1st Tennessee's left, the rest of Maney's brigade joined by elements of Stewart's made more progress. The 9th Tennessee came up on their left and pushed on through at bayonet point, past four of Stone's guns abandoned by their fleeing gunners, and into the open wood lot on the opposite slope. On the left, the 5th and 4th Tennessee followed, the 6th Tennessee in between. Slowly, the Stewart-Maney line pressed Starkweather's dogged but beleaguered forces away from their position, through a thin strip of woods, down into the corn field that filled the steep ravine that divided the two ridges, and up the steep of the Last Stand Ridge, where they joined Terrill's brigade and their batteries. Bush's surviving gunners dragged caissons and limbers while the 1st Wisconsin manhandled the guns. One Federal wrote his father that Starkweather's left fell back in small groups as they ran out of ammunition, rather than in one line. Once the guns were well on their way, the 79th Pennsylvania and 24th Illinois, joined by disorganized men of a half-dozen other regiments, followed, defiantly holding the enemy off as they pivoted away. Taking a position on the brow of the hill behind a low stone fence, Starkweather's conglomeration of regiments opened fire into their pursuers, while Bush and Stone's guns, divided into three ad hoc sections, hammered Carnes and Turner.

The Stewart-Maney line, tired and thin, pursued the retreating Federals into the ravine and began to scale a slope steeper than the one already surmounted. Adding to the natural strength of the position, Federal soldiers stood six deep behind the stone wall exchanging firing positions. As they ascended the hill the Confederates encountered a murderous fire of rifle balls as well as canister, especially from Bush's battery on their right. The 9th Tennessee veered and drove to within fifty yards of those guns before halting, but then received orders from Stewart to fall back and let him have a go. Maney's 6th Tennessee and the 4th and 5th Tennessee of Stewart's brigade now were in position to replace the 9th Tennessee, but some of the 9th pushed ahead anyway. Somehow, a forlorn few Confederates reached the summit, but

MAP 4 THE PERRYVILLE BATTLEFIELD, 8:00 PM



devastating fire either killed them or drove them back down the ridge. Ordered by Maney to try again, the Confederates resumed their deadly ascent, only to be driven back a second time. A third attempt to take the hill also failed. Firmly checked by the enemy, and low on ammunition, Stewart finally pulled the men under his control back to Starkweather's previous position. Unsupported on the left by the Donelson-Stewart mixed line, stymied at the moment in a stationary fight, the Maney-Stewart attackers could make no headway against the imposing position and its mass of desperate

defenders, and fell back for good. The high water mark of the western Confederacy, no less important than the Angle at Gettysburg, had been reached. The Union army, as at Gettysburg a year later, held.

As the sun sank toward the horizon, a few minutes after 4:30 p.m., the Battle of Perryville was over for John Starkweather's mangled brigade. Three of Starkweather's four front line regiments; the 79th Pennsylvania (216 casualties, 51.4 percent), the 1st Wisconsin (204 casualties, 50.1 percent), and the 21st Wisconsin (198 casualties, 49.0 percent),


more or less lost half their strength. The 24th Illinois lost almost 30 percent of its men. Losses in Maney's command were as great if not greater.¹⁴

To the south, at the crossroads, the battle of Perryville raged on long after dark, but in the end, thanks to Starkweather, McCook's I Corps held the line. That night, for the first time fully aware of the numbers he faced, Bragg ordered a withdrawal. After briefly contemplating another attempt to hold Kentucky, Bragg and Kirby Smith fell back into Tennessee, toward a rendezvous with Buell's army, minus Buell, along Stone's River. Never again would the Confederacy have a chance to bring Kentucky fully into the fold. Starkweather's Stand would soon be forgotten in the smoke and din of other battles, but its effects were decisive. His men had dashed Confederate hopes in the West, at the other, forgotten, high water mark. □

KENNETH W. NOE is the Draughton Professor of Southern History at Auburn University, Alabama, and the author or editor of several books on the Civil War. His next book, *Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle*, is due to be published by the University Press of Kentucky in August 2001.

NOTES

1. William Faulkner, *Intruder in the Dust* (New York: 1949; reprint ed., New York: 1991), p. 190.
2. Kurt Holman, "Perryville Order of Battle," unpublished document, n.d. Manager of the Perryville State Historic Site, Holman kindly loaned me the document, a summary of his several years' of research into numbers and losses at Perryville. Using a variety of sources, Holman has constructed a computerized data base of casualty figures that promises to provide the first firm estimate of numbers and losses at the battle.
3. John Henry Otto Memoirs, Oct. 3, 4, 1862, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisc. [hereafter cited as SHSW]; Charles Carr, Near Perryville, Ky., to Sarah, Oct. 10, 1862, Carr Collection, Chicago Historical Society [hereafter cited as CHS]; and Michael H. Fitch, *Echoes of the Civil War As I Hear Them* (New York: 1905), pp. 55-56.
4. Elias H. Hoover, "Battle of Perryville," *National Tribune* 8 (June 20, 1889), p. 3.
5. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, I, 16, pt. 1, (Washington D.C.: 1886), pp. 293-94, 344, 1045



Two perspectives of the "high water mark" of the western Confederacy as they look today (photographs courtesy John Walsh, Jr.).

- [hereafter cited as OR]; Joseph P. Glezen Diary, Oct. 8, 1862, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Ind.; Otto Memoirs, 98, SHSW; A.D. Cleaver, Perryville, to Wife and Children, Oct. 11, 1862, 123rd Illinois File, Perryville State Historic Site, Perryville, Ky. [cited hereafter as PSHS]; Silas Emerson, Perryville, Ky., to Nancy Ann Emerson, Oct. 14, 1862, Nancy Ann Emerson Letters, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Oh.
6. Otto Memoirs, SHSW, 98-102. For a similar account, see Fitch, *Echoes of the Civil War*, 57-58.
7. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1041, 1045, 1060; D.C. Stone, Crab Orchard, Ky., to Sir, Oct. 17, 1862, Stone, Murfreesboro, Tenn., to Sir, Feb. 28, 1863, "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Court-Martial of D.C. Stone," and J. Holt to Edward R.S. Canby, May 26, 1863, all in Battery A, Kentucky Artillery Collection, Union Artillery-Primary Sources, Kentucky Department of Military Affairs, Frankfort, Ky. [hereafter cited as KDMA]; Holmes, *Soldier of the Cumberland*, 98; Hoover, "Battle of Perryville," 3. Documentary evidence suggests that only Stone fired on Wharton, but the presence of a single 12-pound solid shot, found on private property near a 10-pound Schenkl obviously fired from a James rifle, suggest that both batteries engaged. See Kurt Holman, Perryville, Ky., to Kenneth W. Noe, June 19, 2000, Author's Collection, PSHS.
8. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 344, 1041, 1045, 1060. See also John Eicker Memoir, 10, Harrisburg Civil War Round Table Collection, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. [hereafter cited as USAMHI]; Otto Memoirs, 105, SHSW; Edward B. Quiner Scrapbooks, v. 6, pp. 142, 148; Hoover, "Battle of Perryville," 3; Knowles, "Battle of Perryville," 3; Fitch, *Echoes of the Civil War*, 58-59.
9. [George Maney], Knoxville, Tenn. to Marcus J. Wright, Oct. 24, 1862, Braxton Bragg Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio. [cited hereafter as WRHS.] See also OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1113, 1115, 1118-19; James Iredell Hall Diary, 61, James Iredell Hall Papers, Coll. #302, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; Cheatham, "Battle of Perryville," 705; Thomas H. Malone, *Memoirs of Thomas H. Malone: An Autobiography Written for His Children*, Introduction by J.M. Dickinson (Nashville, Tennessee: 1928), pp. 130-32; L.B. McFarland, "Maney's Brigade at the Battle of Perryville," *Southern Bivouac* 1 n.s. (April 1886): p. 469; Edwin H. Rennolds, *A History of Henry County Commands Which Served in the Confederate States Army, Including Rosters of the Various Companies Enlisted in Henry County, Tennessee.* (Jacksonville, Florida: Sun, 1904), pp. 46-47.
10. Evan Davis Speech, SC 85, University of Wisconsin-Oskosh. See also ORI, 16, pt. 1, p. 1046; Orson P. Clinton Letter, Oct. 9, 1862, SHSW; Charles Paine, Perrysville, Ky., to Father, Oct. 11, 1862, Paine Family Papers, SHSW; Quiner Scrapbooks, v. 6, p. 143, SHSW; Robert B. Taylor Diary, 56, 92SC82 (microfilm 1146), Kentucky Historical Society; *Oshkosh [Wisc.] Courier*, Oct. 24, 1862; Radcliffe, "Terrill's Brigade at Perryville," 8; Paul M. Angle, ed., *Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of Major James A. Connolly* (Bloomington: 1959), p. 21. That Parsons was working his own gun is conjecture, but see Kurt Holman, Perryville, Ky., to Kenneth Noe, July 26, 1999, Author's Correspondence, PSHS.
11. ORI, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1115, 1116-17, 1118; Otto Memoirs, 107, SHSW; Rennolds, *History of Henry County Commands*, 48-49. Stone was exonerated of cowardice by a court-martial in March 1863 but found guilty of three others of offenses, including being absent without leave and behaving in an abusive manner toward Lieutenant Thomas S. Thomasson, the officer who brought the charges. Enlisting the aid of old friends who could testify to his loyalties, Stone later managed to have the convictions overturned. See J. Holt, to Edward R.S. Canby, May 26, 1863, and General Orders No. 49, Murfreesboro, Tenn., May 15, 1863, both in Battery A, Kentucky Artillery Collection, Union Artillery—Primary Sources, KDMA. In his official report, Stone claimed credit for the canister fire that stopped the Confederate attack. See D.C. Stone, Crab Orchard, Ky., to Sir, Oct. 17, 1862, Battery A, Kentucky Artillery Collection, Union Artillery—Primary Sources, KDMA.
12. Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch," *Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment; or, A Side Show of the Big Show* (Chattanooga: 1900; reprint ed., New York: 1962), p. 62.
13. [George Maney], Knoxville, Tenn. to Marcus J. Wright, Oct. 24, 1862, Bragg Papers, WRHS. See also Clark Diary, v. 2, p. 44, USAMHI; *Valparaiso [Ind.] Republic*, Nov. 13, 1862.
14. ORI, 16, pt. 1, p. 1113; William Mebane Pollard Diary, 4, Confederate Collection, TSLA; "Fatalities in One Company at Perryville, Ky.," *Confederate Veteran* 20 (1912), p. 210; Holman database.


DO YOU KNOW?

Name the Battlefield on which each of the following appears.

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Young's Branch | A. Antietam |
| 2. Bald Hill | B. Gettysburg |
| 3. Fairview Heights | C. Atlanta |
| 4. Shy's Hill | D. Shiloh |
| 5. Round Forest | E. Gaines' Mill |
| 6. Owl Creek | F. Chancellorsville |
| 7. Horseshoe Ridge | G. Manassas |
| 8. Benner's Hill | H. Brandy Station |
| 9. Nicodemus Hill | I. Nashville |
| 10. Boatwain's Creek | K. Chattanooga |
| 11. Orchard Knob | L. Resaca |
| 12. Camp Creek | M. New Market |
| 13. Bushong's Hill | N. Stones' River |
| 14. Fleetwood Hill | O. Chickamauga |

TEASER QUESTION

This Union general, in addition to being a lawyer, was an accomplished poet. His 1858 "Anthony and Cleopatra" earned him national recognition.



THE ANSWERS to questions 1-14 are below. If you know the answer to the teaser question, send it on the feedback card to the editorial address below. The author of the correct answer drawn from the *North & South* hat will receive a free book prize.

NORTH & SOUTH
33756 Black Mountain Road
Tollhouse, CA 93667

WE DO NOT HAVE A WINNER!

No correct answers were received to the admittedly tough Teaser question in volume 4, #5, "which Southern statesman was at one time called 'first lumberman of Wisconsin?'" The answer is—Jefferson Davis! While serving in the army in 1828, Davis was stationed in Wisconsin, and was ordered to construct a new fort, to be known as Fort Winnebago. In the course of construction the men of his command felled so many trees that Davis acquired the pseudonym.

Do You Know? Answers

Fleetwood Hill, Brandy Station
Resaca (13) Bushong's Hill, New Market (14) Orchard Knob, Chattanooga (12) Camp Creek, Gaines' Mill (11) Or-
(10) Boatwain's Creek, Gaines' Mill (11) Or-
Gettysburg (9) Nicodemus Hill, Antietam
shoe Ridge, Chickamauga (8) Benner's Hill,
Stones' River (6) Owl Creek, Shiloh (7) Horse-
(4) Shy's Hill, Nashville (5) Round Forest,
Fairview Heights, Chancellorsville
Atlanta (3) Fairview Heights, Chancellorsville
Bald Hill, (2) Young's Branch, Manassas (1) Young's Branch

SPECIAL OFFERS ON BACK ISSUES

VOLUME 1, #1

COULD THE CONFEDERACY HAVE WON?: North & South interviews Shelby Foote, who has some surprising views.

IN DEFENSE OF FIGHTING JOE HOOKER: He was not a drunk and never lost his nerve in battle. —Stephen Sears

LAFAYETTE MCLAWS ON GETTYSBURG: Recently discovered manuscript.

THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER LINE: AN AMERICAN MAGINOT: Were Confederate General Francis Shoup's ingenious fortification designs years ahead of their time or a white elephant? —William Scaife

THE MAN WHO TAUGHT THE ARMY HOW TO FIGHT: Ulysses S. Grant—the remarkable general whose approach to warfare underlies the U.S. Army's doctrines to this day. —Geoffrey Perret

SOME CAME HOME: The Story Of The 2nd Illinois Cavalry. One of the finest U.S. Cavalry regiments has never had a historian—until now. —Keith Poulter

THE MANY STORIES OF THE STONEWALL JACKSON MEDAL: Commissioned, locked away, forgotten, lost and then found... on the trail of a mystery medal. —Frank Wheeler and Peter Bertram

VOLUME 1, #2

DECISION IN THE WEST: PART I, "THE ENTERING WEDGE": Drowned swampland blocked the approaches to Vicksburg. A column of a thousand men were dispatched down the Mississippi to find a way out of the impasse. —Keith Poulter

A FIGHT OR A FOOTRACE?: The Tullahoma Campaign is usually regarded as something of a masterpiece. But was it? —Ron Furquerson

THE GREAT CAVALRY RAID: General Sherman had little faith in his cavalry. The results of the Great Cavalry Raid confirmed his worst fears. —William B. Scaife

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED ON THE NUECES RIVER?: Tradition would have you believe that James Duff massacred large numbers of loyal Germans. New research suggests otherwise. —Richard Selcer and Paul Burrier

HE DON'T CARE A DAMN FOR WHAT THE ENEMY DOES OUT OF HIS SIGHT: A perspective on U.S. Grant and Military Intelligence. —William B. Feis

VOLUME 1, #3 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

DECISION AT GETTYSBURG: Information from a little known Colonel doomed Pickett's charge even before it began. —Edwin C. Fishel

THE DAY AFTER Is it fair to condemn Braxton Bragg for failing to follow up

his victory at Chickamauga. —Richard L. DiNardo and James R. Furquerson

THE SOUTH ALMOST WON BY NOT LOSING: A REBUTTAL: Did the capture of Atlanta have any effect on the presidential election that followed? —Larry J. Daniel

THE BATTLE OF LEXINGTON: By attempting too much with too little the Federal high command set itself up for disaster. —Jeff Patrick

DECISION IN THE WEST: PART II, "THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN RUNNING THE BATTERIES": Before the Army of the Tennessee could come to grips with the enemy, the navy had to brave the batteries at Vicksburg.... —Keith Poulter

APPOINTMENT IN SAMARA: Confederate agent Wat Bowie bore a charmed life, until he decided to rob a Quaker store. —James O. Hall

ROBERT E. LEE AND THE COMMAND CRISIS OF 1863-1864: More than a proven combat record went into Lee's decisions as to who should be appointed to corps command. —Richard DiNardo

VOLUME 1, #4

A CERTAIN BULLHEADEDNESS: In the opinion of Lafayette McLaws, Longstreet had "nothing to recommend him...but the possession of a certain bullheadedness." —W. Todd Groce

BATTLE OF THE RAMS: Charles Ellet Jr. told Edwin M. Stanton that his unarmed rams would "either control the Mississippi or be sunk in the attempt." —Chester G. Hearn

BUILDING A CIVIL WAR LIBRARY: Picking and choosing from an explosively growing volume of literature requires careful analysis. —David J. Eicher

FREEDOM BEGAN HERE: The Christiana Riot of September 1851 was a milestone in the growing conflict between the sections. —Edward Steers, Jr.

STORY OF A POEM: Margaret Mitchell used two short stanzas from a poem in "Gone with the Wind." Few people know the full history of that poem. —Mel Young

THE DEFENSE OF BATTERY WAGNER: The movie "Glory" told the story of the 54th Massachusetts and its gallant attack upon Fort Wagner. Here is an account from the defenders' viewpoint, written by a Confederate staff officer who was there. —Hon. Lieutenant Colonel T.D.D. Twiggs

PICKETT BEFORE GETTYSBURG: Just who was Pickett, and how did he find himself cast to play a lead role in the epic that was Gettysburg? —Lesley J. Gordon

DECISION IN THE WEST, PART III: "FIVE BATTLES IN EIGHTEEN DAYS": Outnumbered and in the midst of enemy territory, the Army of the Tennessee won five victories, defeating the enemy in detail. —Keith Poulter

VOLUME 1, #6 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★


WHO ORDERED LINCOLN'S DEATH?: John Wilkes Booth was far from being a lone assassin, and his plot was only one of several aimed at the

Union President. —James E. T. Lange & Katherine DeWitt, Jr.

LEE'S INVASION STRATEGY: In moving north in June 1863, Lee had multiple objectives—but what was his overriding objective? —Charles P. Roland

THE STEPHEN'S "PEACE" MISSION: In Jefferson Davis's plan, Lee's military success would be complemented by a diplomatic offensive on the part of Vice President Alexander H. Stephens. —Thomas E. Schott

GENERAL LEE SPECIAL





Vol. 1, #3, "Robert E. Lee and the Command Crisis of 1863-1864."

During the second half of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee faced a command crisis of profound proportions, beginning in the aftermath of the Chancellorsville Campaign and coming to a head in the Wilderness Campaign. Between May 1863 and May 1864, Lee had to replace, either temporarily or permanently, all of his corps commanders.

"Thanks for not tar brushing Confederates as slavers and traitors. Keep your balance..."

John Carr, SCV/MOS&B, Fairfield, Texas



Vol. 3, #6, "Lee: The Twilight Years." Soon after Robert E. Lee surrendered his army to Ulysses S. Grant, the Confederacy's ranking general retired to a residence in Richmond. But in the blasted ruins of Virginia's capital, Lee found no rest. He was weary and careworn, and the oppressive emotions of the war-torn city made the general long for the simplicity of country life.... Lee advised his former charges to "go home, all you boys who fought with me, and help build up the shattered fortunes of our old state."

LEE'S GALLANT 6000?: Just how many men attempted the impossible under Major General George E. Pickett, on the climactic third day of the Battle of Gettysburg? —*John Michael Priest*

"I'LL BE DAMNED IF I'LL EVER SURRENDER": When Brigadier General Edward Moody McCook ran out of fight, an obscure colonel saved the day. —*Paul D. Haynie*

ENGLAND'S GIFT TO THE CONFEDERACY: Brigadier General Collett Leventhorpe

was "most truly a knight." —*Michael C. Hardy*

CHAOS ITSELF: THE BATTLE OF MINE CREEK: A dramatic cavalry charge against great odds heralded defeat for the enemy. —*Kip Lindberg*

THE SONS OF ABRAHAM Like so many others, the Jonas family was divided by the Civil War. —*Mel Young*

VOLUME 1, #7

WITHOUT MERCY, AND WITHOUT THE

BLESSING OF GOD: Could guerrilla warfare have been the key to Confederate victory? —*Daniel E. Sutherland*

"A GRIM WARNING TO OTHERS OF THEIR KIND...": The Cumberland Ford Tragedy. —*James M. Prichard*

THE BATTLE OF BISLAND: Nathaniel Banks planned a brilliant amphibious coup. But things didn't work out that way. —*Lawrence Lee Hewitt and R. Christopher Goodwin*

"LET ME EDGE INTO YOUR BRIGHT FIRE": We cannot fully understand the men in blue or gray unless we realize how important their families were to them. —*James Marten*

DEVIL'S DEN: DEATH OF A SHARPSHOOTER: Is the most famous photograph of the Civil War genuine after all? —*James C. Groves*

THE GOVERNMENT GIVES, AND THE CAPTAIN TAKES AWAY: Pay and discipline in Mr. Lincoln's Navy. —*Dennis J. Pringle*

VOLUME 2, #1

HOMESPUN GENERALS OF THE CONFEDERACY: The amateur generals of the Confederacy were a decidedly mixed bag; but the best displayed outstanding natural military ability. —*Steven E. Woodworth*

AMBUSH AT VIENNA: On June 17, 1861, the first tactical use of a railroad by the U.S. Army ran smack into an ambush. —*Mitchell Yockelson*

LINCOLN AND "OLD BRAINS": Why did Abraham Lincoln keep the inept Henry Wager Halleck on as general-in-chief for so long? —*John Y. Simon*

THE MILITARY CAREER OF AN ASSASSIN: Before joining the Confederate Secret Service, Lewis Powell was a Florida infantryman and a Mosby Ranger. —*Betty Ownsbey*

STOLEN THUNDER: The double-barrelled cannon said to be "the hero of Barber's Creek" is in fact nothing of the sort. —*David Evans*

MR. LINCOLN'S MAIL BAG: 19th century Americans were not bashful in letting their president know what they thought, or what they wanted. —*Harold Holzer*

FAST FIRING BY THE RANK AND FILE: Could Civil War troops achieve a rate of fire of five rounds per minute with muzzle-loading firearms? —*Louis A. Garavaglia and Charles G. Worman*

VOLUME 2, #3

HOW SHOULD AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE CIVIL WAR?: It is important to see the events of 1861-65 through contemporary eyes, not through those of the late 20th Century. —*Gary W. Gallagher*

PHIL SHERIDAN AND HIS CAVALRY COME OF AGE AT THE BATTLE OF MEADOW BRIDGE: Squeezed between the Richmond defenses on one side, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the other, Phil Sheridan found himself in a tight place. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

A COMBINED AND CONCENTRATED FIRE: THE FEDERAL ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 3, 1863: On the third day of Gettysburg, Henry Hunt finally got to use his guns the way he wanted to. —*Richard Rollins and Dave L. Schultz*

LITTLE MAC AND THE HISTORIANS: Verdicts on George B. McClellan have varied widely. Perhaps because there were four different General McClellans. —*Stephen Sears*

UNION AND CONFEDERATE SUBMARINE WARFARE: Recent discoveries at the National Archives reveal that North and South both produced revolutionary and operational underwater craft. —*Mark K. Ragan*

VOLUME 2, #4

WAS GENERAL "STONEWALL" JACKSON FRAGGED?: For thirty years a veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia claimed that he deliberately caused Jackson's death. Did Preston Layman really fire the fatal shot? —*James E. T. Lange and Katherine De Witt, Jr.*

NOTICE SERVED: In November of 1862 the once-despised Union cavalry drove Jeb Stuart's troopers from the Loudoun Valley. —*Patrick Brennan*

THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION: Did the Confederate government have a hand in the assassination? Believers and sceptics argue the pros and cons. —*William B. Feis, James O. Hall, William A. Tidwell, Edward Steers, Jr., James E. T. Lange, Katherine De Witt, Jr., and John Y. Simon*

CHINESE IN THE CIVIL WAR: Chinese volunteers served in both Union and Confederate armies, and in the Union navy. —*Thomas L. Lowry and Edward S. Milligan*

THE CONFEDERACY'S FIGHTING POET: An anti-slavery immigrant poet, John A. Wagener was hardly the stereotype of a Confederate general! —*Jason H. Silverman and Robert M. Gorman*


CIVILIZING THE "ROVING PAGANS OF THE PRAIRIE": The Confederate Bureau of Indian Affairs. —*Alan Downs*

VOLUME 2, #5


"DON'T YIELD AN INCH!": The story of the Missouri State Guard. —*William Garrett Piston and Thomas P. Sweeney*

PICKETT'S CHARGE REVISITED:

• "A Brave and Resolute Force" There simply is no evidence that large numbers of Pickett's men failed to complete the charge: a response to




Vol. 3, #5, The Robert E. Lee Special Issue. Several of the articles revolve around a central theme: what was the Confederacy's optimum grand strategy, and did Lee pursue it? Two of the authors—Gary Gallagher and Joe Harsh—take a generally pro-Lee position, Alan Nolan is deeply critical, and Peter Carmichael adopts an intermediate position. Gordon Rhea examines the notion of Lee's "prescience."




Vol. 4, #4, "In the Shadow of Washington: Robert E. Lee and the Confederacy." Lee consciously lived his life in the shadow of Washington. Faced with a similar chance to lead his own revolution, he wore a colonel's uniform like Washington, rode a horse named for one of Washington's favorite mounts, packed Washington's sword in his baggage, and strove to win his cause as he believed Washington had done.... He knew well that he was kin to prominent revolutionaries who served with Washington throughout their lives...and spent the early years of his life under their gaze, and learned their stories.

MORE ARTICLES FEATURING ROBERT E. LEE can be found in volume 1, #6 ("Lee's Invasion Strategy"); volume 4, #3 ("Last Chance For Victory"); and volume 4, #5 ("Pickett's Charge and the Principles of War").



How Great A Captain?

By concentration on his individual campaigns, Lee's protagonists have sometimes conveyed the impression that he had no overall strategy.



John Michael Priest's "Lee's Gallant 6000?" — *Wayne E. Motts*

- **"Getting Beyond All That":** It is time to stop debating the "old soldier" questions, and look at other aspects of the Battle of Gettysburg. — *Rich Rollins*

"MANY WERE BROKEN BY VERY SLIGHT SHOCKS, AS IN MOUNTING AND DISMOUNTING": In late 1863 the Cavalry Bureau asked cavalry officers, what they thought of their weapons. This is what they said. — *Louis A. Garavaglia and Charles G. Worman*

- **"It Would Be Wicked to Falter":** Richard Henry Pratt was not one to truckle to authority. — *Keith Poulter*

MISTER LINCOLN'S JUSTICE: Recent research throws new light on Abraham Lincoln's review of courts-martial. — *Thomas L. Lowry*

FOLLOW THAT GREEN FLAG!: The epic tale of Irish Brigade color bearer John Dillon — *Kevin O'Brien*

THE FORGOTTEN BATTLE OF DAVIS BRIDGE: In October 1862 Ulysses S. Grant hoped to catch the Confederate army under Van Dorn between two converging columns. — *Timothy B. Smith*

A QUESTION OF RHETORIC: Is the story of the moving mutual tribute at Appomattox between Chamberlain and Gordon three parts romance? — *William G. Marvel*

VOLUME 2, #6: RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG SPECIAL

TEN DAYS IN JULY: THE PURSUIT TO THE POTOMAC: Long overshadowed by the battle at Gettysburg, what followed contained some of the most desperate fighting of the war. — *Ted Alexander*

"HURRY WAS THE ORDER OF THE DAY": The epic tale of a determined commander who brought a wagon train seventeen miles long, crammed with 10,000 wounded, to safety. — *Steve French*

"A NIGHT NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN": Midnight, Monterey Pass, July 4-5, 1863. Union Cavalry and Confederates clash on a mountain side in the midst of a downpour, the darkness lit only by lightning and the flashes of guns. — *Eric J. Wittenberg*

A GOLDEN BRIDGE: Shrugging off the disaster of July 3, Robert E. Lee conducted one of the most masterful retreats in military history. — *Kent Masterson Brown*

"WE HAD ONLY TO STRETCH FORTH OUR HANDS": In the aftermath of Gettysburg, Lincoln thought he could see the end of the war. — *Frank J. Williams*

"BAD FAITH SOMEWHERE": George Gordon Meade and the Committee on the Conduct of the War. — *Bruce Tap*

ERRORS THAT DOOMED A CAMPAIGN: It might have been possible to trap Lee north of the Potomac.... — *Keith Poulter*

VOLUME 2, #7

TACTICAL STALEMATE: The way in which the armies of the Civil War were raised, organized, and led, practically guaranteed that most battles would be indecisive — *Gerald J. Prokopowicz*

A QUESTION OF FAITH: WAS LINCOLN A CHRISTIAN?: Despite several attempts to falsify history, the record is clear. — *Edward Steers, Jr.*

"NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT": In 1860, coffee was an expensive rarity. The Civil War changed all that. — *Gregory W. Baxter*

CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY PREPARES FOR PICKETT'S CHARGE: The artillery plan for July 3 was the most detailed and complex ever devised by the Army of Northern Virginia. On its success would hinge the success of the infantry assault — *Richard Rollins*

FAILURE BEFORE KNOXVILLE: Longstreet's assault on Fort Sanders was regarded by his own soldiers as "a useless slaughter of men." — *Terry A. Johnston*

FORGOTTEN WARRIOR: William Payne rose to command a brigade under Stuart, yet until now has largely been lost to history. — *John Coski*

VOLUME 3, #1

MOSBY IN THE VALLEY: Just what impact did "Mosby's Confederacy" have on the Civil War? — *James A. Ramage*

ALL THE TRUMPETS SOUNDED: An appreciation of Bruce Catton. — *Stephen Sears*

"SHOOT IF YOU CAN BY ACCIDENT": Union death lists included the names of both men and women suspected of aiding Tennessee guerrillas. — *Michael Bradley and Milan Hill*

"THEY FOUGHT CONFOUNDED PLUCKY": For green troops of the Heavy Artillery, the Battle of Harris Farm was a bloody initiation into combat. — *Gordon C. Rhea*

EVERY CONDITION OF HORROR: During McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, the army's provision for the wounded was woefully inadequate. — *Nancy S. Garrison*

TRUE TO THE UNION: Men had mixed motives for joining the 1st and 2nd Texas (Union) Cavalry. — *James Marten*

VOLUME 3, #2

MONTANI SEMPER LIBERI: The creation of West Virginia. — *Ed Steers, Jr.*

MR. DAVIS' MAILBAG: Jefferson Davis re-

ceived letters from cranks, critics, patriots, and poltroons — *Lynda Crist*

ORDNANCE AND LOGISTICS: THE FAILURE OF CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG: In relying on the artillery to pave the way for Pickett's Charge, the Confederates faced problems both with the guns themselves and with logistics. — *Richard Rollins*

REASON DETHRONED: Loyalty to the Union could be a dangerous thing, in Texas. — *Karen Gerhardt*

A REFLECTION OF THEIR OWN IMAGE: Not all the contacts of the 154th New York with the enemy were hostile. — *Mark H. Dunkelman*

THE FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY IN PICKETT'S CHARGE: No amount of heroism could overcome the shortcomings of the Confederate artillery on July 3, 1863. — *Richard Rollins*


"FORMIDABLE ONLY IN FLIGHT?": Joe Johnston's Atlanta Campaign strategy was based on a false premise. But that does not mean he was a bad general. — *Steven H. Newton*

"MANY ARE ... DELIGHTED": The last days of the Confederacy in North Carolina. — *John Coski*

INTO THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH: The Corcoran Legion at Cold Harbor. — *Kevin M. O'Beirne*



Volume 1, #6



Volume 4, #3



Volume 4, #5

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE SPECIAL

Get any THREE OR MORE of the seven issues featuring Robert E. Lee for only 5.00 each—U.S. & Canada shipping free. Overseas: shipping charge \$1.00 per issue.

VOLUME 3, #3

NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA: During May and June of 1864, Robert E. Lee received over 30,000 reinforcements; but he also suffered far higher losses than previously believed. — *Alfred Young*

"SHANKS": PORTRAIT OF A GENERAL: Alcoholic, arrogant, and insubordinate. Was this a fair picture of Nathan Evans? — *Jason H. Silverman, Samuel N. Thomas, and Beverly D. Evans IV*

THUNDER AT CHANTILLY: Did the counterattack at Chantilly really save the Union army? — *John Hennessy*

THE SECRET YANKEES: Deep in the heart of the Confederacy, in the city of Atlanta, there existed a secret circle of Union loyalists. — *Thomas Dyer*

REVERE THE EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BARBARIANS: In mid-1863 a naval action off Japan threatened to embroil the U.S. in a foreign war. — *Theodore P. Savas*

VOLUME 3, #4

TREACHERY IN FLORIDA Nowhere were loyalties more confused than in Taylor county, Florida.... — *Pat Imbimbo*

VOLUME 3, #5 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ROBERT E. LEE SPECIAL ISSUE

THE GENERALSHIP OF ROBERT E. LEE: Lee's offensive strategy was vital to the maintenance of the South's morale. — *Gary W. Gallagher*

DEMOLISHING THE MYTH: Lee's offensive style of operations bled the Confederacy of men and lost the South its chance of independence. — *Alan Nolan*

LEE, PRESCIENCE, AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The Overland Campaign reveals clearly that prescience was not one of Lee's strong points; but decisive action in the face of the unexpected was. — *Gordon C. Rhea*

LEE'S QUEST FOR THE BATTLE OF ANNihilation: Lee's offensive strategy was appropriate up until Gettysburg, but he failed thereafter to adapt to the new situation facing the Confederacy. — *Peter Carmichael*

"AS STUPID A FELLOW AS I AM....": The real genius of Lee was that he clearly grasped the Confederacy's strategic needs. — *Joseph L. Harsh*

HOW GREAT A CAPTAIN?: To what extent can we now draw up a balance sheet of Lee's strengths and weaknesses? — *Keith Poulter*

VOLUME 3, #6 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION: The states *did* have a right of secession. —*Kent Masterson Brown*

AN EARLIER BRIDGE TOO FAR: The Battle of Staunton River Bridge. —*Philip Bolté*

THE VEILED LADY The mysterious Sarah Slater.... —*James O. Hall*

CUT TO PIECES AND GONE TO HELL: The aftermath of the Battle of Poison Spring was a gruesome reminder that "war is hell." —*Gregory J.W. Urwin*

LEE: THE TWILIGHT YEARS: Robert E. Lee's behavior in the years remaining to him after the Civil War cast a revealing light on the the man. —*Pat Brennan*

GALLOPING THUNDER The Stuart Horse Artillery Battalion carved for itself a record that could stand with that of any unit north or south. —*Robert J. Trout*

VOLUME 4, #1

WHAT CAUSED THE CIVIL WAR? Subsequent "political correctness" notwithstanding, contemporary evidence makes it quite clear what caused the Civil War. —*James M. McPherson*

COMRADES OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS In the aftermath of the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne came up with an imaginative way to

HONOR REDEEMED: Criticized for his poor performance at Shiloh, Lew Wallace redeemed his honor at the Battle of Monocacy. —*Gloria Baker Swift and Gail Stephens*

ONE WHO GOT AWAY: John Surratt was a key player in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Yet he was never found guilty. —*James E. T. Lange and Katherine DeWitt, Jr.*

MY OLD KENTUCKY HOME—AT WAR: For the women of war-torn Kentucky, the Civil War was often literally right at their door. —*Susan Lyons Hughes*

THE INNER FLORIDA BLOCKADE: The U.S. navy battle against rebel steamers operating on the St. Johns River.

—*George E. Buker*

VOLUME 4, #3 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC?: Why was it that the army seemed unable to get it together on the battlefield? —*Gordon Rhea, Richard Rollins, Stephen Sears, and John Y. Simon*

"THE BEST HATED MAN IN THE ARMY": The brilliant, stormy career of Major General William Babcock Hazen. —*James R. Furquerson*

RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR: Just as race had helped to cause the war, so attitudes toward—and definitions of—race helped shape it. —*Mark Grimsley*

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT SNAKE CREEK GAP?: Did William T. Sherman really bamboozle Johnston at Snake Creek Gap? —*Steven H. Newton*

THE OTHER DAHLGREN: Union Admiral John Dahlgren had a Confederate brother. —*Bruce Allardice*

LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY: At the conclusion of the first day's fighting at Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee had a number of options. Did he choose wisely? —*Scott Bowden and Bill Ward*

VOLUME 4, #4 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

IN THE SHADOW OF WASHINGTON: How far did Lee shape his role on that of Washington? —*Rick McCaslin*

APOSTLES OF SECESSION: What were the arguments of secession commissioners in the winter of 1860-1861? —*Charles B. Dew*

"THE HOTTEST PLACE I WAS EVER IN": The seven-hour Battle of Haw's Shop would show what Wade Hampton was made of. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

DESPAIR, HOPE, AND DELUSION: Even as their military effort collapsed, the morale of many Southerners continued to be high. —*George C. Rable*

TWO TALES OF TENNESSEE: Two actions, one from 1862 and one from 1863, demonstrate the importance both of

the commander on the spot and of the overall organization of cavalry to its success. —*Lawrence Schiller*

VOLUME 4, #5 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

PICKETT'S CHARGE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: Pickett's Charge is often seen as a bad move on Lee's part. In fact there were cogent reasons for making the attempt. —*Richard Rollins*

CHARLIE BELL: UNION SCOUT: One of the most successful scouts of the war, Bell carried out no fewer than thirty-seven missions behind enemy lines, and made an important contribution to the Vicksburg Campaign. —*William B. Feis*

"IT HAUNTS ME NIGHT AND DAY": Fate brought Major General James G. Blunt's wagon train and William Quantrill's guerrillas together on the Kansas prairie on October 6, 1863, setting the scene for one of the war's bloodiest episodes. —*Kip Lindberg and Matt Matthews*

"A PERFECT PICTURE OF HELL": Captured *en masse* several times during the war, the men of the 12th Iowa were in a unique position to observe the deterioration of prison camp conditions. —*Ted Genoways and Hugh H. Genoways*

THE "BEST HATED MAN" IN THE ARMY: PART II: From the opening of the Cracker Line to service on the western frontier, General William Babcock Hazen was an outstanding, and outspoken soldier. —*James R. Furquerson*

VOLUME 4, #5: SPECIAL INFANTRY TACTICS ISSUE

THE INFANTRYMAN IN COMBAT: What was it like to be an infantryman in the Civil War? —*Reid Mitchell*

BACKGROUND TO BLOODSHED: In many ways the lessons the U.S. Army learned in the Mexican-American War were highly misleading. —*Perry Jamieson*

THE CHANGING FACE OF BATTLE: Technological changes rendered frontal assaults more often than not suicidal, but some commanders were slow to learn. —*Herman Hattaway*

ARMS AND THE MAN: Exactly what were the changes that took place in infantry small arms, and what was their effect on the battlefield. —*Louis A. Garavaglia and Charles G. Worman*

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS: Did the extensive use of field fortifications truly usher in a "new species of warfare?" —*David Lowe*

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF INFANTRY TACTICS: How did the evolution of Civil War infantry tactics relate to what had gone before and what came after? —*Keith Poulter*

SPECIALS ON ALL BACK ISSUES

1. Get ALL SIX available back issues of volume #1 for only \$30.00. *Shipping Free**

2. Get ALL SIX available back issues of volume #2 for only \$30.00. *Shipping Free**

3. Get ALL SEVEN back issues of volume #3 for only \$35.00. *Shipping Free**

4. Get ALL 25 AVAILABLE BACK ISSUES for only \$125.00. *Shipping Free**

ALL SINGLE ISSUES: \$4.95 each. Shipping & handling: \$1.50 for first copy ordered, \$1.00 per copy thereafter.

CW SOCIETY MEMBERS: 10% discount on ALL back issue orders.

Telephone Orders: 800-546-6707 Overseas Telephone Orders: 559-855-8637—Or write N&S, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667 (US Funds Only)



FIRE IN THE STREETS: The preliminaries to the Battle of Fredericksburg included a vicious fire fight in the streets. —*George C. Rable*

VOLUME 3, #7

"REBELLION THUS SUGAR-COATED" In 1860 secessionists claimed a unilateral right to withdraw from the Union. Lincoln denounced this as an "ingenious sophism." —*John Y. Simon*

GLORY DENIED: FIRST DEEP BOTTOM: In July 1864 U.S. Grant entrusted an important operation to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philip H. Sheridan. The result was a grave disappointment. —*Bryce Sudarow*

THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION REVISITED: New evidence regarding the assassination of Abraham Lincoln should not be lightly dismissed. —*William Hanchett*

BLACK SLAVERY, WHITE LIBERTY: The prewar conflict in "Bleeding Kansas" was not so much about black slavery, as about the liberty of whites. —*Nicole Etcheson*

RISKING THE WRATH OF GOD: During the Civil War Dr. Luke Blackburn attempted to create yellow fever epidemics in northern and northern-occupied cities. —*Edward Steers, Jr.*

reinforce the *esprit de corps* of his division. —*Mauriel Joslyn*

BREVET MAJOR GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH: THE STUFF OF LEGENDS: For some, no sacrifice was too great. —*Wayne Mahood*

"BUTCHER" GRANT AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The ghost of "Grant the butcher" haunts Civil War lore. But what of the facts? —*Gordon C. Rhea*

"GIVE 'EM HELL": The Battle of Fayetteville, April 18, 1863, pitted Unionist Arkansans and Confederate Arkansans against one another. —*Russell L. Mahan*

ONE OF THE MOST GALLANT MEN: From Gettysburg to Petersburg, Irish color guard Patrick De Lacy of the 143rd Pennsylvania appeared to have a charmed life.... —*Kevin O'Brien*

A NOSTALGIC PANORAMA The Kurz and Allison Civil War illustrations. —*Harold Holzer and Mark Neely*

VOLUME 4, #2

"ONLY A MIRACLE CAN SAVE US" Early in August 1864 U.S. Grant resolved to try again to crack the rebel defenses north of the James. The result was the Second Battle of Deep Bottom. —*Bryce Suderow*

“A REGULAR SLAVE HUNT”


**THE ARMY OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA AND BLACK
CIVILIANS IN THE
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN**

**“They took up all
they could find, even little
children, whom they had to
carry on horseback before
them. All who could get
there fled to the woods, and
many who were wise are
hid in the houses of their
employers.”**

—Jemima K. Cree

Ted Alexander

“A Ride for Liberty—the Fugitive Slaves”
(circa 1863) by Eastman Johnson (1824-1906).
*Courtesy Brooklyn Museum of Art (40.59A),
gift of Gwendolyn O.L. Conkling.*





On Friday, June 26, 1863, McNeill's Rangers, a Confederate partisan band operating on the fringe of the Army of Northern Virginia, entered the small south-central Pennsylvania farming community of Mercersburg. Named after Revolutionary War hero Dr. Hugh Mercer, and birthplace of President James Buchanan, the town boasted one school of note, the Reformed Church Theological Seminary. During the Civil War one of its leading professors, Dr. Philip Schaff, kept a detailed diary of events in and around Mercersburg. On June 26 he recorded that "this guerilla band came to town on a regular slave-hunt, which presented the worst spectacle I ever saw in this war."¹

ONE OF THE GREAT OVERLOOKED STORIES OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN is the abduction of free blacks and fugitive slaves from their homes in south-central Pennsylvania. African-Americans had first come to this region in the mid-eighteenth century as slaves of Scots-Irish and German settlers. In 1780 the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a law that allowed for the gradual emancipation of slaves—all adult slaves were to be liberated on or before July 4, 1827, and children born in the interim were to be freed when they reached the age of twenty-one. Thus, by the outbreak of the Civil War, free blacks had been living in the area for several generations; the 1860 census listed 1,738 blacks and mulattos living in the county—some making a living as small farmers, others as craftsmen and laborers. Many had taken on the family names of their former masters: Scots-Irish names such as Crunkleton, McCulloch and Campbell, and German (Pennsylvania Deutsch or "Dutch") names such as Stoner, Keefer and Snowberger.


The same law which abolished slavery in the state also provided that escaped slaves coming into the state were to be set free. Franklin County, its southern boundary resting on the Mason-Dixon Line and the slave state of Maryland, its southwest corner just six miles from the Potomac river and the state of Virginia, became a haven for fugitive slaves. By 1861, enclaves of these fugitives had been established in the region; one southwest of the town of Mercersburg came to be known as "Little Africa." With the coming of the war the number of runaways naturally increased.²

The national Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 required all citizens to help apprehend runaways or face imprisonment and fines. But in the summer of 1861 Union general Benjamin Butler circumvented this law, declaring runaways who reached his lines to be "contraband of war"; escaped slaves would henceforth be regarded as federal property. Butler refused to return any property—including slaves—to disloyal owners, unless they were willing to take an oath of loyalty to the United States.

Legislation followed which further undermined the institution of slavery. Following the Confiscation Acts of summer 1861 and summer 1862, an even more sweeping step was taken

after the Battle of Antietam, when President Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. This was to take effect in January 1863. Although it did not free all the slaves, and indeed did not free *any* immediately, it did declare all slaves in areas controlled by the Confederates to be free, and essentially paved the way for total emancipation.

From late 1861 bands of contrabands, sometimes numbering in the thousands, congregated around Union camps. Attempts to recapture them were not uncommon during rebel incursions into Union held territory. In May 1862, thousands of blacks fled the lower Shenandoah valley in the wake of Stonewall Jackson's legendary campaign. In addition to escaped slaves, free blacks also fled, fearing impressment into Confederate service as laborers, or sale into slavery. In September of that year, during the Maryland Campaign, Jackson captured Harpers Ferry, paroling its white garrison, but prevented the large black refugee population from crossing the Potomac to freedom. Perhaps as many as one thousand blacks were taken south into bondage.³



Left: Presbyterian minister Dr. Thomas Creigh was instrumental in having some of the kidnapped blacks released (*Old Mercersburg*). Right: Chambersburg resident Rachel Cormany wrote: "Oh how it grated on our hearts.... one woman was pleading...for her children." (*The Cormany Diaries*).

THE FIRST RECORDED INSTANCE OF CIVILIAN ABDUCTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA DURING THE WAR took place the following month during Jeb Stuart's Chambersburg raid. Under direct orders from his commander, General Robert E. Lee, Stuart was to take civilians prisoner, both as a security measure—in order to protect the secrecy of his movements—and as retaliation for the arrest of civilians in Virginia by Union forces. Lee specified that those in the latter category were to be government officials.⁴

Perhaps as many as thirty civilians were taken to Virginia and interned in Libby Prison (one of them, Mercersburg attorney Perry Rice, died in captivity). The biographical sketch of Presbyterian minister Dr. Thomas Creigh, contained in the book *Old Mercersburg*, suggests that blacks were among the prisoners: "When Mercersburg was raided by General Stuart... in 1862, several colored men were taken captive and carried to Richmond. Dr. Creigh wrote to Dr. Moore, one of the clergymen of Richmond, and was instrumental in having these free men sent

home.” (Some local historians suspect this account may be in error, and that it refers instead to actions taken by the Confederates in June 1863. However, at least one black man from the area claimed to have been taken hostage by Stuart’s cavalry during the October 1862 Chambersburg Raid.)⁵

Nine months after Stuart’s raid more than 75,000 Confederates crossed into Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg Campaign. Accounts show that as soon as Lee’s army arrived in the state they began rounding up blacks from various communities and taking them back to Virginia. The abductions began in Chambersburg with the arrival on June 15 of rebel cavalry under General Albert G. Jenkins. Rachel Cormany, a resident of the town whose husband was serving as an officer in the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, provided a graphic account of the kidnappings in her diary. She wrote that the Confederates:

were hunting up the contrabands and driving them off by droves. O! How it grated on our hearts to have to sit quietly and look at such brutal deeds—I saw no men among the contrabands—all women and children. Some of the colored people who were raised here were taken along—I sat on the front step as they were driven by just like we would drive cattle. Some laughed and seemed not to care—but nearly all hung their heads. One woman was pleading wonderfully with her driver for her children—but all the sympathy she received from him was a rough “March along”—at which she would quicken her pace again. It is a query what they want with those little babies—whole families were taken. Of course when the mother was taken she would take her children. I suppose the men left thinking the women and children would not be disturbed.⁶

Mrs. Jemima K. Cree wrote to her husband John who was out of town in Pittsburgh at the time of Jenkins’ raid. In her


letter of June 15 she complained of the rebel actions and described her efforts to free an employee. “This morning among the first news I heard was that they had been scouting around, gathering up our Darkies, and that they had Mag down on the court house pavement. I got my ‘fixens’ on, and started down, and there were about 25 women and children, with Mag and Fannie. I interceded for Mag, told them she was free born, etc. The man said he could do nothing, he was acting according to orders. As they were just ready to start, I had to leave; if I could have had time to have seen the General, I might have got her off. Fannie being contraband, we could do nothing about her.” The latter statement suggests that the Confederates were under orders to round up contrabands, but simply seized blacks irrespective of status.

Mrs. Cree then witnessed the hapless victims marched off. “They took up all they could find, even little children, whom they had to carry on horseback before them. All who could get there fled to the woods, and many who were wise are hid in the houses of their employers.” Chambersburg businessman William Heyser noted in his diary that when the rebels left town on June 18 they took with them “about 250 colored people...into bondage.”⁷

In some cases, however, the intercession of local white citizens brought freedom to the victims. When Chambersburg businessman Jacob Hoke noticed that “well and favorably known colored man, Esque Hall” was being abducted he immediately appealed to prominent Reform Church theologian Rev. Dr. Benjamin S. Schneck. Schneck went to Jenkins’ headquarters and “after assuring Jenkins that Hall was long a resident of [Chambersburg], and not a fugitive slave, he was released.” Schneck also intervened successfully on behalf of Henry Deitrick and Samuel Claudy, two black repair hands on the Cumberland Valley Railroad.⁸


Abductions were not limited to Chambersburg. Farmer Amos Stouffer’s diary reveals that Jenkins’ men were “scouring the country in every direction about Waynesboro, Greencastle, Mercersburg [and] Finkstown for horses and cattle and Negroes.”⁹

Mercersburg resident Philip Schaff’s detailed diary entries for June 16-18, 1863, tell of the “flight of the poor contraband negroes to the mountains from fear of being captured by the rebels and dragged to the South.” These fears were realized on



Left: Albert G. Jenkins (National Archives). Below: Confederate cavalry charging through the streets of Chambersburg (from a wartime sketch by George Law. Library of Congress).

The abductions began with the arrival of Albert Jenkins’ cavalry in Chambersburg on June 15.




June 19 when Schaff reported that a detachment of Jenkins' cavalry under Colonel Milton Ferguson returned from a foraging expedition to McConnelsburg with about two hundred head of cattle and "two or three negro boys."

The *Mercersburg Journal* reported that "several of our colored men were observed to be in their custody two of these were John Filkill and Findlay Cuff. They were taken along with a number of others, having before them the cheerless prospect of being sold as slaves in the far South. Some of these unfortunates were brought back, or found their way home again after six months or a year. Others were never returned or heard of afterward."


Two guerilla bands, Mosby's and McNeill's rangers, operated on the fringes of Lee's army during this time. Schaff's diary mentions that McNeill's group threatened to "burn down every house which harbored a fugitive slave, and did not deliver him up within twenty minutes." The rebels then proceeded to search every house in which they suspected blacks were hiding. Schaff wrote that, "They succeeded in capturing several contrabands, among them a woman with two little children."

Philip Schaff (right) reported the capture of several Negro boys by a detachment of cavalry under the command of Colonel Milton Ferguson, 16th Virginia Cavalry.

(*Old Mercersburg*).



Main Street, Mercersburg, circa 1900 (courtesy John Thompson).



Tom Pawling's Antrim House, close by the spot where a band of citizens freed black captives. (*Historical Sketch of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, 1887*).

The following day Schaff recorded that the raiders rode through town with much plunder, including hundreds of head of livestock and "twenty one negroes." Although the Confederates claimed that all of the captured African-Americans were escaped slaves from Virginia, Schaff was certain that a number of them were born and raised in the Mercersburg area.¹⁰

The kidnappings continued. In Greencastle, Charles Hartman, a member of the town council and prominent businessman, kept a detailed diary of events. In his entry for June 22, 1863, he recorded, "One of the exciting features of the day was the scouring of the fields about town and searching of houses for negroes. These poor creatures, those of them who had not fled upon the approach of the foe, concealed in wheat fields about the town. Cavalrymen rode in search of them and many of them were caught after a desperate chase and being fired at."¹¹


It was in Greencastle where one of the most dramatic episodes occurred. This farming community of thirteen hundred people straddled the Valley Pike just four miles from the Mason-Dixon Line and ten miles south of Chambersburg, and lay directly in the path of Lee's invasion. On the afternoon of June 16 from thirty to forty African-American women and children, taken at Chambersburg, were brought to Greencastle in wagons headed for Virginia. In charge of them was a Confederate chaplain and four soldiers. As they came through town the rebels were disarmed by a band of citizens, apparently led by Tom Pawling, the owner of a popular eatery, the Antrim House, and a militant abolitionist.

The Confederates were taken to Waynesboro as prisoners and the women and children freed. On reflection the citizens decided to let the rebels go free, lest the town face retribution. This was fine with the soldiers, but on his release the chaplain demanded reparations of \$50,000.00 for the loss of what he claimed were his slaves. When this was not forthcoming he dropped his demand to \$25,000.00, and threatened to burn the town if the amount were not paid. Of course the citizens had no means to pay this ransom and stood fast in the face of the rebel chaplain's threats. When the ultimatum's deadline came and went the town remained standing and the angry Southern clergyman departed without his "slaves."¹²

A postscript to this incident appeared in the July 17, 1863, issue of the *Mercersburg Journal*. The editor's review of the invasion included a story about the group of blacks who had been freed at Greencastle. "Several miles on this side of Greencastle, toward evening, we passed 13 of these rescued contraband of

whom 3 were adults and the balance children... on their way down to give themselves up, having heard that the town was threatened with burning. Long before they [got] there, however, their hard masters had left." If this account is true it stands as an incredible example of self-sacrifice.¹³

Besides the rescue in Greencastle, the *Chambersburg Repository* reported that "Many escaped in various ways.... One negro effected his escape by shooting and seriously wounding his rebel guard. He forced the gun from the rebel and fired, wounding him in the head and then skedaddled."¹⁴



Guerilla bands under Mosby and McNeill operated on the fringes of Lee's army.

Left: John Singleton Mosby (*L.C. Handy Studios*).
Right: John Hanson McNeill (*Bill Turner collection*).

Confederate forces continued to round up African-Americans as late as July 1, 1863. Around noon on that date a group of more than fifty partisans, led by none other than Major John S. Mosby, arrived in Mercersburg. While the main body of this command rode on to forage in the countryside, a small detachment remained in the town. This group, described by witnesses as "drunken," robbed individual citizens and looted stores. The local newspaper reported that the band, "denying connection with the regular army..., felt licensed to do and dare whatever Satan suggested." One "Satanic suggestion" prompted the raiders to force "along with them several free colored citizens, some of whom were highly esteemed in the community." When Judge James Carson asked one of the guerrillas whether they took "free negroes," the rebel replied "yes and we will take you too if you do not shut up!"¹⁵

Mosby soon led his small force back across the nearby Potomac. But not until, according to one of them, Private James J. Williamson, "he had gathered up 218 head of cattle, 15 horses and 12 negroes."¹⁶

HOW MANY AFRICAN-AMERICANS WERE TAKEN BACK TO VIRGINIA DURING LEE'S INVASION? We cannot be sure. The July 8, 1863, issue of Chambersburg's *Franklin Repository* stated that, "Quite a number of negroes, free and slave—men, women and children—were captured by Jenkins and started South to be sold into bondage...perhaps full fifty were got off to slavery...."¹⁷ As previously noted, Chambersburg businessman William Heyser estimated the total at 250.

All armies contain men of good will and men of ill, and war has a way of bringing out the best in the one and the worst in the other. The contrast below is a case in point.

William Steptoe Christian:

William Steptoe Christian was born in 1830, and practiced medicine until he joined the Confederate army in 1861 as a captain. In May 1863 he became colonel of his regiment. His letter quoted on page 88 was found on the battlefield at Gettysburg: it continues, "They were so scared that I turned them all loose."

Colonel Christian was captured at Falling Waters on July 15. Sent first to Old Capitol Prison in Washington, and then to Johnson's Island, he reportedly assumed the duties of camp doctor and was praised by former prisoners for his humanity and efficiency. Exchanged in March 1864, he took part in the battles in Virginia until March of the following year, when he was wounded in the thigh and resigned his commission. After the war he resumed his medical practice. He died in 1910. *Photograph courtesy Virginia Historical Society.*



Letter from 1st Lieutenant Chester K. Leach, Company H, 2nd Vermont Infantry:

Near Boonsboro, Md.,
July 15th, 1863

Dear Wife,

I seat myself to pen you a line, not knowing when I shall have another opportunity. We marched to this place today from Williamsport & a very hot day it has been too. Yesterday morning it was found that the rebels had left our front, & we marched to the river at Williamsport. Our Cavalry came on some of them on this side of the river & captured a few hundred of them & two pieces of Artillery. They kept their doings a secret or I recon they would have not got over as well as they did. I suppose some will blame Gen. Meade for letting them cross the river, but it is impossible to tell the doings of the enemy unless you attack in force or have means of getting around them for a thousand will make as good a show as 100 thousand. I don't know what our movement will be now, but make a guess that in a week we will be in the vicinity of Centerville & Fairfax....

I saw a sight yesterday that beats all I ever saw. A Negro boy that the Rebels left in a barn, entirely naked. His breast cut & bowels were scratched or cut & the Dr. said that turpentine had been put on him & also his privates had been cut off. I went in the barn to see him but it was rather dark. He lay on his back, his legs bent, knees up, & grinding his teeth & foaming at the mouth & seemed to take no notice of anything & breast & bowels looked as if they had been cut & then burned all over. I understand the reason of the act to be because he would not go over the river with them....

Yours,
C.K. Leach



NOTE: the full text of Christian's letter can be seen on our updated website at www.northandsouthmagazine.com.

Most of the kidnapped blacks were probably from Franklin or neighboring Fulton County. But the panic engendered was more widespread. A massive exodus of blacks occurred in neighboring communities when word spread about what the Southern invaders were up to.



Longstreet ordered Pickett to move his division toward Gettysburg, and concluded: "the captured contrabands had better be brought along with you for further disposition."

Left: General James Longstreet (*Lee-Fendall House, Alexandria, Va.*).
Right: General George Pickett (*William A. Turner collection*).

At the time of the campaign, York, Pennsylvania, east of Gettysburg, had a population of around 450 African-Americans, most of whom fled the town to avoid the fate of their Chambersburg brethren. One of them, William Goodridge, was a prominent merchant (he owned a variety store) and a "conductor" on the Underground Railroad. His sons operated a successful photo studio, "The Premium Skylight Gallery." Goodridge left town and never returned, opting instead to move to the midwest and go into business there. In Gettysburg the pre-invasion black population was 186; records show that by the fall of 1863 fewer than seventy remained. Farther west, thousands of blacks—both free and contraband—reportedly fled the Cumberland Valley for Harrisburg.¹⁸

There is evidence to show that some of those kidnapped ended up in Confederate prisons. After the battle of Gettysburg a group of local white men were taken prisoner when they strayed too near rebel lines at Hagerstown. These Franklin Countians were interned in several prisons in Richmond, including the infamous "Castle Thunder." One of the prisoners, D.M. Eiker of Chambersburg, recalled his prison experience for author Jacob Hoke in his book *Historical Reminiscences of The War In and About Chambersburg*. Eiker wrote that, "A little colored boy from York, Pa., captured during the invasion, was in Castle Thunder, but was allowed to go and come at his pleasure." Eiker also encountered a black man from Chambersburg. "While in the Castle I met Alexander Lewis, a colored man, from this place, known to many of our citizens." Lewis had been captured during the invasion, and placed in the prison's culinary department. Lewis apparently made it back to Chambersburg, for at the time of the publication of Hoke's book in 1884 he was said to have been working at a hotel in the town.¹⁹

The existing evidence of Confederate abductions of African-Americans in southern Pennsylvania raises more questions than it answers. Were these isolated acts perpetrated by unruly

soldiers? Did they stem from official policy? Or did the Confederate high command simply condone the kidnappings after the fact? One damning piece of evidence can be found in the *Official Records*. A dispatch dated July 1, 1863, from General James Longstreet, Lee's First Corps commander, directs General George Pickett to move his division toward Gettysburg, and concludes with the statement, "The captured contrabands had better be brought along with you for further disposition."²⁰

Not all the invaders were comfortable with the kidnappings. The aptly named Colonel William Christian of the 55th Virginia Infantry wrote to his wife on June 28, 1863, that:

there is a good deal of plundering going on, confined principally to the taking of provisions. No houses were searched and robbed like our houses were done by the Yankees. Pigs, chickens, geeses etc are finding their way into our camp; it can't be prevented and I can't think it ought to be. We must show them something of war. I have sent out today to get a good horse; I have no scruples about that as they have taken mine. We took a lot of negroes yesterday. I was offered my choice but as I could not get them back home I would not take them. In fact, my humanity revolted at taking the poor devils away from their homes....²¹ □

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG

The final Confederate outrage visited upon the people, black and white, of Franklin County occurred on July 30, 1864. On that date Jenkins' cavalry returned, now under the command of Brigadier General John McCausland. Their mission was to levy a tribute on Chambersburg or burn it to the ground in retaliation for the destruction by General Hunter of the homes of three prominent West Virginia secessionists. The townfolk were unable to meet the ransom demand of \$500,000 in greenbacks or \$100,000 in gold, and the place was torched. More than 500 structures were burned and the core of the town was destroyed. Discipline broke down, as many Confederates got drunk, robbed and looted. One citizen, a black man, was killed when Confederates repeatedly pushed him back into his burning dwelling; overcome with smoke, he suffered a heart attack and died. As the rebels left town they stopped at the home of the county school superintendent. They had one question for him: had he ever taught "niggers?" He answered yes, and they burned his house.

TED ALEXANDER is senior staff historian at Antietam National Battlefield and a leading authority on the Civil War in Maryland and Pennsylvania. He is a resident of Greencastle, Pennsylvania.

NOTES

1. Philip Schaff Diary, in *Old Mercersburg* (Williamsport, PA: 1949), p. 169.
2. *Ibid.*, 205; William Still, *The Underground Railroad* (Philadelphia: 1872) pp. 220, 233, 332; Hiram E. Wertz, "The Underground Railroad," *The Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers, Volume VII* (Chambersburg: 1912), pp. 100-05, hereinafter cited as "*Kittochtinny Papers*"; Virginia Ott Stake, *John Brown in Chambersburg* (Chambersburg: 1977), passim; W.P. Conrad and Ted Alexander, *When War Passed This Way* (Shippensburg: 1982, pp. 1, 24-27; *U.S. Census, Franklin County, Pennsylvania, 1860*.
3. Edward H. Phillips, *The Lower Shenandoah Valley in the Civil War: The Impact of the War Upon the Civilian Population and Upon Civil Institutions* (Lynchburg, 1993), p. 114; Robert J. Trout, *With Pen and Saber: The Letters and Diaries of J.E.B. Stuart's Staff Officers*

- (Mechanicsburg, PA: 1995) p. 101. In a letter to his mother dated September 18, 1862, Lieutenant R. Channing Price, aide-de-camp to General J.E.B. Stuart, wrote a lengthy account of the Maryland Campaign. In the section on Jackson's capture of Harpers Ferry, Price claimed that nearly 2,000 contrabands were captured.
4. U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 volumes (Washington, D.C.: 1890–1901), Series 1 (hereinafter cited OR), vol. 19, Pt. 2, p. 55.
 5. John Thompson IV, *General J.E.B. Stuart's Raid Through Mercersburg: A Presentation of Collected Publications with Select Discussions on Details of the Raid* (Mercersburg: 1999), p. 38; *Old Mercersburg*, 90. The information on the black man who claimed he was taken hostage by Stuart was provided by local historian John Mohr of Mercersburg. Mohr has conducted extensive research on African-Americans in Mercersburg during the Civil War era.
 6. James C. Mohr (ed.), *The Cormany Diaries: A Northern Family in the Civil War* (Pittsburgh: 1982), pp. 329–30.
 7. Jemima K. Cree letter, *Kittochtinny Papers, 1905-1908* (Chambersburg: 1908), p. 94; "The William Heyser Diary," *Kittochtinny Papers*, volume XVI, p. 74.
 8. Jacob Hoke, *Historical Reminiscences of The War; In and About Chambersburg During the War of the Rebellion* (Chambersburg: 1884), p. 38.
 9. William Garrett Piston (ed.), "The Rebs Are Yet Thick About Us": The Civil War Diary of Amos Stouffer of Chambersburg," 215; *Civil War History*, September, 1992; Schaff, 168–69.
 10. *Mercersburg Journal*, July 17, 1863
 11. Charles Hartman Diary, Philip Schaff Library, Lancaster Theological Seminary.
 12. Conrad and Alexander, 135–37.
 13. *Mercersburg Journal*, July 17, 1863.
 14. Frank Moore (ed.), *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, volume 7 (New York: 1864), p. 197.
 15. *Mercersburg Journal*, July 17, 1863.
 16. James J. Williamson, *Mosby's Rangers* (New York: 1909), p. —
 17. Franklin Repository, July 8, 1863, "Heyser Diary," 74.
 18. Gerald Austin Robison, Jr., *Confederate Operations in York County, 1863*, Masters Thesis, Millersville State College, 107–08. The data on Gettysburg's blacks is from Peter C. Vermilyea, "The Effect of the Confederate Invasion of Pennsylvania on Gettysburg's African-American Community," *Gettysburg Magazine*, Issue Number 24, pp. 112–28. This is a well written and thoroughly researched article on the subject. The author points out that while some black residents of the Gettysburg area were abducted by the Rebels, many escaped by feigning infirmity or by being sheltered by sympathetic whites.
 19. Hoke, 144; very little official references to the abduction of African-Americans are found in the published OR. Special Orders, No. 275, dated November 19, 1864, from the Adjutant and Inspector Generals office in Richmond discusses the establishment of a new "Camp of prisoners of war" and makes vague references to "negroes confined at Salisbury" prison. A footnote states that they were "Brought from Pennsylvania by C.S. Army." OR, Series II, vol. 7, p. 1145. About one year prior to this on December 14, 1863, an order came from the Confederate secretary of war's office directing Brigadier General John H. Winder, provost marshal of Richmond, to free one "Amos Bares, a free negro from Pennsylvania" from one of the Richmond prisons. The Reverend T.V. Moore of Richmond applied for his release. OR, Series II, volume 6, p. 705. This seems to have been done upon a request to Moore from fellow Presbyterian minister Thomas Creigh of Mercersburg. *Old Mercersburg*, 92.
 20. OR, Series I, vol. 51, Pt. 2, pp. 732–33.
 21. Moore, *Rebellion Record*, volume 7, p. 325.

Campbell Brown's Civil War

With Ewell and the Army of Northern Virginia

Edited, with an Introduction, by TERRY L. JONES

"A unique view of Ewell through the eyes of his staff officer and stepson. Occasionally poignant, often humorous, and always entertaining."—Donald C. Pfanz, author of *Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier's Life*

Illustrated, \$39.95

Railroads in the Civil War

The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat

JOHN E. CLARK JR.

This provocative comparison between Union and Confederate logistics management is certain to spark debate among Civil War enthusiasts.



CONFLICTING WORLDS: NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
T. MICHAEL PARRISH, EDITOR


LOUISIANA STATE
UNIVERSITY PRESS



Baton Rouge 70803
(800) 861-3477 www.lsu.edu/lupress

GRATIOT STREET PRISON

During the Civil War Gratiot Street Military Prison was operated in St. Louis, Missouri by the Union army. Gratiot was unusual in that it was used not only to hold Confederate prison-



ers of war, but spies, guerillas, civilians suspected of disloyalty, and even Federal soldiers accused of crimes or misbehavior. The prison also was centered in a city of divided loyalties. Escapees could find refuge in homes not even half a block away. Many of the most dangerous people operating in the Trans-Mississippi passed through its doors. Some escaped in dramatically risky ways; others didn't and lost their lives at the end of a Union rope, or before a firing squad.

Gratiot Street Prison, an upcoming book by D.H. Rule, will tell the tales of many of the people who spent time in Gratiot Street Prison. For more information about the prison, and to read excerpts from this book, visit

www.civilwarstlouis.com



BRIEFINGS Reviews

Polignac played a minor role in the frequently overlooked Battle of Richmond and Kinard writes a detailed account of that crucial engagement.


THE LAFAYETTE OF THE SOUTH Prince Camille de Polignac and the American Civil War

By Jeff Kinard (Texas A&M University Press, 2001. Pp. 234 \$34.95, ISBN 1-58544-103-1).

The Trans-Mississippi theatre of the Civil War suffers neglect both in the popular imagination and in terms of serious scholarship. Jeff Kinard has attempted to provide a window into this oft-ignored region with his biography of French military adventurer Camille de Polignac. Polignac, a child of the fading French aristocracy and a veteran of the Crimean War, used a personal relationship to both P.G.T. Beauregard and Judah P. Benjamin to become a staff officer and, largely due to attrition rather than personal ability, managed to become a major general by 1865. Polignac apparently served later in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and became a minor figure in mathematical theorizing, although the author spends only a few pages on his subject's life after Appomattox.

Readers will find Polignac both an intriguing and ultimately an unsympathetic figure. Opportunistic and vain, Polignac spent much of the Civil War seeking preferment and comparing himself, in journals and private conversation, to Julius Caesar. When he finally receives command of a Texas regiment, he shows himself more interested in the social whirl of the Louisiana planter-class than drilling his rough-hewn and rowdy troops, troops who derisively refer to the Frenchman as "polecat." Often a comedic figure, Polignac once mistook a newspaperwoman for Confederate first lady Varina Davis. Much more serious than this embarrassing social *faux pas*, the man who considered himself a military genius showed a limited understanding of the tactical innovations of the American Civil War, calling the all-important cavalry raids employed by both sides "silly."

Kinard's discussion of the Red River campaign in the spring of 1864, in which Polignac played an active role, is perhaps the most significant part of the work. Polignac's brigade fought bitterly at the Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Grove, key struggles in the effort to turn back Nathaniel P. Bank's attempt to sunder Texas from the Confederacy. Kinard's skills as a military historian (he is also an author of a fine study of the "Battle of the Crater") becomes even more apparent in his excellent discussion of Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg's failed 1862 invasion of Kentucky.



The career of Camille De Polignac likely does not deserve the attention Kinard gives it. Reading the author's perceptive descriptions of both Confederate strategy and tactical engagements on the margins of the American Civil War made me wish that Kinard had used his considerable talents as a writer and a historian to give us a good general history of the Trans-Mississippi rather than a description of the rather shallow and mercenary Prince Polignac's struggles for preferment. Our understanding of the war would benefit greatly should Kinard ever give his attention to such a study.

—Dr. Scott Poole

University of South Carolina-Aiken

THE POLITICAL WORK OF NORTHERN WOMEN WRITERS AND THE CIVIL WAR, 1850-1872

By Lyde Cullen Sizer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000. Pp. 332. \$45.00. ISBN 0-8078-2554-9.)

In this insightful and important study, Lyde Cullen Sizer examines northern women writers and their influence on politics and cultural attitudes before, during and after the Civil War. She focuses on nine authors including Harriet Beecher Stowe, Louisa May Alcott, and Lydia Maria Child, to explore how their novels, poems, short stories, and other published texts, helped mold attitudes and "change the way the nation saw the task it was undertaking" (p. 8).

Sizer's book is part of a continuing discussion that has dominated much of the recent literature on women and the Civil War. Women historians, cultural scholars and others have wondered whether America's sectional conflict marked a "watershed" moment in United States women's history. Did the war help fuel women's suffrage and challenge traditional gender roles by forcing females to assume new, more public, and thus, more "masculine" positions in society? Did it lead to a new conception of womanhood and pave the way for modern debates about gender equality? The women writers included in this book believed that the Civil War had changed them permanently, but many historians have questioned this assumption, noting that after the war, gender roles, North and South, resumed their prewar semblance, returning women to their separate, domestic sphere.

Sizer concludes that the writings of these nine women, and their many female readers, show that the consequences of civil war had lasting effects on gender roles. Recognizing that most of these authors were white, middle-class and thus, unable and/or unwilling to look beyond their biases, Sizer admits that their vision of universal womanhood had its limitations. Yet, by revealing their active and influential interest in debating national issues such as slavery, emancipation, union and capitalism, Sizer affirms that the Civil War was a "transformative moment, a revolution in the understanding of woman herself" (p. 11).

—Lesley J. Gordon
University of Akron

MARYE'S HEIGHTS, FREDERICKSBURG

By Victor D. Brooks (Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Publishing, 2001. Pp. 140, \$16.95, ISBN 0-85052-752-X).

Surely the repeated Federal assaults toward the stone wall and Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg are among the most poignant scenes of the Civil War. The sheer senselessness of the carnage is both moving and puzzling. Victor Brooks' brief new book provides a straightforward, clear, and readable account of the fighting that should be useful for general readers, and especially those planning a trip to the battlefield.

Unlike many shorter and even some longer works, Brooks provides ample background on the campaign—including helpful considerations of everything from foreign relations to logistics. The treatment of Burnside's strategy is clear and judicious. There is occasional confusion about geography and the units engaged at various points; Brooks also inaccurately claims that there was much snow and ice on the battlefield. He more briefly deals with the fighting on the Union left and the problems with Burnside's orders, but surpris-

ingly, Brooks gives uneven coverage to the Union attacks against the Confederate left. He recounts the movements of some divisions in detail, gives short shrift to others, and ignores some altogether. The reader therefore receives an incomplete sense of both the valor and futility involved. Brooks too often relies on post-war accounts for quotations and therefore fails to recapture the soldiers' perceptions and expectations at the time of the battle.

The work ends abruptly without even noting the problems with burying the dead or treating the wounded, not to mention why this bloodbath at the time loomed so important to both sides. The work concludes with helpful description of stops on the battlefield tour. For a reader wishing for a quick and usually accurate overview of one phase of the battle, this account is adequate despite the errors and omissions.

—George C. Rable
University of Alabama

A BILLY YANK GOVERNOR **The Life and Times of New Jersey's** **Franklin Murphy**

By Bernard A. Olsen (West Kennebunk, Maine: Phoenix Publishing, 2000. Pp. 221, \$35.00, ISBN 0-914659-90-1).

The life of Franklin Murphy offers a unique opportunity to explore important elements of this country's past, including the Civil War, the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, and New Jersey political history. Bernard Olsen has done a commendable job tying these various strands of history together into one enthralling life.

Olsen does not disappoint those interested specifically in Murphy's role in the Civil War. He joined the 13th New Jersey Volunteer Infantry in 1862 and during the war rose from private to lieutenant. Murphy saw action in such famous battles as Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Chattanooga, and in Sherman's Atlanta campaign. Attention to the war encompasses a large percentage of pages in this book, though some might argue that it was Murphy's postwar roles in business and New Jersey politics that are of paramount importance.

Murphy made an easy transition from soldier to entrepreneur in the unprecedented economic expansion of the latter part of the nineteenth century. He ran a successful varnish manufacturing business in Newark, New Jersey, which sold product all over the world. As an employer he took a "progressive" stance toward his employees by creating a profit sharing and a pension system. This led him straight into local politics and culminated in his being elected governor of New Jersey (1902–1905). He fit neatly into the Progressive wing of the Republican Party and championed environmental policies, clamped down on violations

of New Jersey's child labor laws, enforced tenement-housing codes, and backed public health measures.

Olsen relies heavily on Murphy's own correspondence, including his personal diary, and on occasion includes entire letters and postwar speeches.

—Kevin M. Levin
St. Anne's–Belfield School, Charlottesville, Va

STAND FIRM YE BOYS FROM MAINE **The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign**

By Thomas A. Desjardin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xv, 239. Illustrations, maps, tables, notes, bibliography, index. Paperback, \$13.95. ISBN 0-19-514082-6)

Of books about Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, there is no end. Every year at least one ostensible biography of the hero of Little Round Top is published. Over the last decade, there has been a veritable flood tide of books, articles, and pamphlets about him. Books about his family, his relationship with his wife, and his rise to fame have all appeared in the short space of the past three years. Among the most dubious of projects, included as an appendix to a recent biography, is the strange attempt by a professor of psychology to put the dead Chamberlain on

Now over 50 styles of T-Shirts Available!



AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN


U.S. Surplus Sales

Call for a free flyer or visit our website

www.ussurplussales.com

1-800-545-7072

NOW AVAILABLE ON VIDEO!



REBEL BENEATH THE WAVES, THE CSS HUNLEY

Produced by an Emmy award-winning producer, this video tells the dramatic story of the CSS Hunley, her design by a small group of Confederates, her successful attack and mysterious disappearance, and her discovery at the bottom of Charleston Harbor by underwater archeologists. 52 minutes of exciting history, dramatic re-enactments and underwater digital photography.

ONLY \$19.95 plus \$4.95 shipping and handling.
All major credit cards accepted

TO ORDER CALL 1-866-262-4769
between 9:30 am and 5:00 pm EST.

LIMITED OFFER - RESERVE YOUR VIDEO TODAY!

S T U A R T



UNABRIDGED AUDIOBOOKS



for a free catalogue, write or call:
Dept. NAS • P.O. Box 969 • Ashland, Oregon 97520

1-800-729-2665

<http://www.blackstoneaudio.com>



BLACKSTONE AUDIOBOOKS

an analyst's couch, using scientific techniques intended for live patients. I am surprised that no one has thought to write a psychobiography of Chamberlain's favorite horse, Charlemagne.

But this fine book by Thomas A. Desjardin, a former historian at Gettysburg National Military Park, is not to be lumped with the usual hooey that gets published about Chamberlain. First issued in 1995 by a niche publisher in Gettysburg, and originating in a doctoral dissertation done at the University of Maine, Orono, this is by far one of the best books ever written about Chamberlain, his famous regiment, and their day in the sun at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. If you want to know what really happened that afternoon on the slopes of Little Round Top, this is the book to read.

Desjardin uses a wealth of primary sources—some never consulted before, not even by Alice Trulock, the patron saint of Chamberlain's many hagiographers—to paint a realistic, solid, and credible portrait of Chamberlain, the man and the soldier. Don't be fooled by the title; this book offers a great deal more about Chamberlain than a simple recitation of the fight for Little Round Top. Although Gettysburg is the centerpiece, Desjardin artfully—and succinctly—describes Chamberlain's experiences before, during, and after the Civil War in a multilayered and nuanced narrative.

He even presents a balanced treatment of Chamberlain's Gettysburg adversary, William C. Oates, and successfully tells the Little Round Top story from both perspectives, Union and Confederate. Want a measure of Desjardin's thoroughness? He supplies an appendix listing the Gettysburg casualties of the 20th Maine (name by name), a chronological itemization of every primary source he relies on, and a remarkably accurate roster and count of the 15th Alabama's casualties (again, name by name).

I don't think anyone can write a better book about Chamberlain. And I certainly wish the Chamberlain lunatic fringe would stop trying.





—Glenn W. LaFantasie
Delaplane, Virginia



Legendary Arms, Inc.

P.O. Box 479, Three Bridges, NJ 08887-0479
(800) 528-2767, Fax: (908) 788-8522

Special Sale Items -- This Month Only

	B004 -- Springfield Bayonet & Scabbard \$37		K002-- Arkansas Toothpick \$20.00		C026 -- Officer's Embroidered White Gauntlets (Specify Branch) \$80.00		C019 -- Officer's Silk Sash \$45.00
	L010 -- C.W. Leather Holster \$18.00		L006 -- C.W. Cartridge Box w/Tins & Strap \$50.00 + \$5.00 S/H		C015 -- C.W. White Muslin 4-button Shirt (S, M, L) \$20.00		L007 -- Cap Pouch \$12.00

Include \$4.00 shipping and handling for one item, and \$3.00 for each additional item. AZ, NY, NJ, OH, WI residents, please include applicable state sales tax. MC/VISA/Amex/Discover Cards accepted. Check and Money Orders accepted. Send \$5.00 for 24-page color catalog of reproduction swords, knives, bayonets, period clothing & miscellaneous accessories.

WORD-WIZ THE STUDY OF LATIN AND GREEK ROOTS—IDEAL FOR S.A.T. PREPARATION


Roots are the building blocks upon which all words are formed, and a thorough knowledge of "root words" will greatly enhance one's vocabulary and improve one's understanding of otherwise unfamiliar words. Word-Wiz is designed to help students expand their spelling, vocabulary and comprehension skills. For more information on this self-directed workbook and study guide contact:

CB EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS • (970) 835-3072

2069 M 25 Road-NS, Eckert, CO 81418 • Fax (970) 921-6578

Email: jgusner@aol.com (subject line: Word-Wiz)

Special Discounts for School/Group Orders, and Civil War Society Members



\$19.95 +
\$3.00 s/h

ISBN 0-9663148-1-6



SHADOWS IN BLUE AND GRAY Original Civil War Poems

By Jeanne Losey (Lincoln Nebraska: Writer's Showcase by Writer's Digest, iUniverse.com, Inc., 2000. Pp. 361, paper \$18.95, ISBN 0-595-13504-8).

Mrs. Losey has compiled a collections of 172 of her poems expressing the feelings of ordinary people affected by the great conflict of the 1860s. These poems are written from the viewpoint of ordinary soldiers, Union and Confederate, and of their family members on

the home front. A few touch on the lives of slaves—some looking to the freedom promised by a Union victory, others, always well treated, fiercely loyal to their owners and fearful of the consequences of emancipation. Many speak of a soldier in battle—often wounded, many times of the final hours of life. Some touch on the loyalty of a cavalryman's horse to his master, or of a soldier's pet dog that accompanied him to the war. There is a humorous poem about a mule captured by a Union patrol, then returned to his Rebel owner because no one in the platoon could ride the beast. "Meeting Daddy's Train" is the poignant tale of a small girl's conversation with a stranger at the railroad station about her father's return from the war, not with a happy greeting, but in his casket. Others speak of disabled men returned to a lifetime of helplessness. A few speak of nurses in behind the lines hospitals.

Most of the poems have the overtones of an intensely patriotic Unionist—a great-grand uncle died at Spotsylvania in 1864—but those written about Confederate soldiers or civilians are sensitive to that point of view.

Mrs. Losey has adapted her poetic style to the period of which she writes—four line stanzas, smoothly rhythmic, always in rhyme. The language is characteristic of the ordinary people of that day, often in the dialect of the uneducated rural soldier who left his farm to serve the cause of his region. Sometimes the language is ungrammatical, sometimes not "politically correct" by today's standards, but never unfeeling as to the emotions of the characters in the poems. This is an excellent book—a masterwork by a former Poet Laureate of Indiana (1993-1998) who is a direct descendant of a distinguished officer (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton) in Washington's army in the War of Independence.

—Albert Ray Horrell
St. Charles, Missouri


THE LINCOLN ENIGMA The Changing Faces of an American Icon

Edited by Gabor Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 324, notes, bibliographic essays, index, 81 halftone illustrations. \$30-00, ISBN 0-19-514456-9).

Based on a conference held at Gettysburg College, this collection of high quality essays is worth reading by anyone wanting to reach a better understanding of Abraham Lincoln. A tremendous bonus is the eighty-one Lincoln images, including prints, paintings, caricatures, photos of sculptures, and photographs. Harold Holzer and Gabor Boritt give each image or set of images a cogent assessment. While it may seem unusual to dwell on the illustrations, they are themselves remarkably

informative about how the sixteenth U.S. president is portrayed to Americans and to the world.

Boritt has assembled a notable group of historians, two of whose contributions will prompt special reflection. The prize piece is Robert Bruce writing on Lincoln and "The Riddle of Death." It is well known that Lincoln fixated on death, and Bruce postulates that this fixation may be traced to the death of Lincoln's mother while he was a youth. In a marvelous example of the essayist's art, Bruce takes a subject that may seem to have been overwritten and makes his essay one of the first things anyone should read on the topic. Likewise, Jean Baker delineates "Mary and Abraham: A Marriage," introducing readers to the historical viewpoints of a wedded union that writers have dwelled upon for 160 years. Baker emphasizes how that marriage was a key to Lincoln's political as well as his personal life.



Two other chapters merit attention. Critics of Lincoln from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first have pointed out apparent contradictions in his speeches or writings about the matter of race in America. Boritt's essay "Did He Dream of a Lily-White America?" puts such contradictions and attitudes in perspective. Allen Guelzo addresses the ways that Lincoln drew upon both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to reach his conclusions about America's society, politics, and economy. For readers who have not read Guelzo's books, this essay is a fine way to approach his work.

Other essays include Gerald Prokopowicz on Lincoln's "Military Fantasies," Douglas Wilson on "Young Man Lincoln," William O. Harris on the Confederacy and unconditional surrender, and David H. Donald on "Lincoln and Davis as Commanders In Chief."

How can Lincoln be both one of America's most well known and still enigmatic leaders? This book provides some answers.

—Joseph G. Dawson III
Texas A&M University



THE WAR HITS HOME THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTHEASTERN VIRGINIA

Brian Steel Wills

In *The War Hits Home*, Wills tells the story of real people in the crucible of war. Reconstructing life for soldiers from southeastern Virginia on the battlefield and for civilians at home, Wills provides a full depiction of what life was like for the ordinary person—black, white, soldier, citizen, Unionist, or secessionist—contending with domestic, economic, social, and military hardship in the contest of sectionalism and war. Wills employs their individual experiences to illustrate the impact of the war on a human scale, on soldiers and their relatives, North and South. We witness battlefield horror and family despair, African Americans' embrace of freedom, and the persistence of Confederate nationalism among most whites in the region.

*A Nation Divided: New Studies in
Civil War History*
\$34.95 cloth


UNIVERSITY PRESS OF
VIRGINIA

800-831-3406
www.upress.virginia.edu

DIXIE 2001 catalog

Loaded with the best blackpowder "stuff!"

The Dixie Gun Works catalog is positively the most comprehensive source of blackpowder firearms and period accessories available.



Since 1954, Dixie has loaded its catalog with the best in blackpowder, Civil War, and cowboy action shooting supplies, antique gun parts, and accouterments.

More than 10,000 items PLUS professional service and expertise.

DIXIE
GUN WORKS, INC.

ORDERS ONLY
1-800-238-6785

CATALOG \$5 SHIPPED C.O.D. \$8.50

INFO: 901-885-0700 FAX: 901-885-0440

DEPT. NS P.O. BOX 130, UNION CITY, TN 38281
www.dixiegun.com



CSA
GALLERIES, INC.

CONFEDERATE

Prints Catalogue FREE on Request SAS Envelope	Gifts Catalogue \$5.00 Refundable on First Order
--	---

Authorized Dealer for:

Kunstler • Troiani • Strain
Stivers • Gallon • Et Al

Northwoods Mall
2150 Northwoods Blvd. - K812
N. Charleston, SC 29406
1-800-256-1861 • (843) 818-2009
www.csagalleries.com

THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 1847-1883

By Kurt Henry Hackemer (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Pp. 208, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index, \$45.00, ISBN 1-5575-0333-8).

In this book Kurt Hackemer, professor of nineteenth-century American history at the University of South Dakota, examines the origins of the military-industrial complex and the U.S. Navy. Making extensive use of National Archives records and official correspondence, he demonstrates that a nexus between the navy and private industrial firms existed well before the creation of the modern steel navy in the 1880s. More than a technological and business study, Hackemer discusses changes in ship design and characteristics and the performance of individual vessels. He also treats changes in the government policies that led to the demand for technologically advanced ships.

Until the 1850s there was no major threat in this hemisphere to the United States. As a consequence the U.S. Navy remained small and, for the most part, technologically backward. The navy's own facilities were not developed to the point where they could provide state-of-the art technology. The change to steam engines in the 1850s, to iron-hulled ships in the 1860s, and to steel ships in the 1880s, however, all required new technologies beyond that of the navy's own physical plant to supply. As a consequence the navy turned to private contractors.

This process began before the Civil War, but that conflict greatly accelerated it, thanks to the great demand for fast steam warships capable of maintaining the blockade of the Confederate coasts and for ironclad monitor vessels. As Hackemer notes and contrary to popular belief, the Civil War did not usher in a revolution in naval warfare; rather it was a testing ground for technology already developed. As a consequence of the navy's experience, however, when it came time for the new steel navy of the 1880s the navy knew the contractors with which it wanted to deal and how the agreements should be drawn up. Groundwork laid over the preceding thirty years made this possible.

While this is an interesting book on an important topic, it will likely not have wide appeal for the general reader of the Civil War. Only 51 of 136 pages of text treats Civil War naval construction. The *Monitor* and the most successful of Union ironclads, the *New Ironsides*, are barely mentioned. The longest treatment goes to the failed *Galena*, the subject of Hackemer's doctoral dissertation.

—Spencer C. Tucker
The Virginia Military Institute

CIVIL WAR NAVIES, 1855-1883

By Paul H. Silverstone (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Pp. 240, 140 photographs, appendix, bibliography, index. \$49.95, ISBN 1-55750-894-1).

Some Civil War enthusiasts may be familiar with the exploits of the Confederate ironclad *Virginia*, commerce raider *Alabama*, or the Union ironclads *Monitor* and *Tecumseh*. Yet very few are aware of the design dimensions or service history of these important ships, much less the details of numerous other vessels that also made notable contributions to the conflict. Paul H. Silverstone's *Civil War Navies*—the second in a five volume series on U.S. warships—corrects that deficiency by bringing the ships of the Civil War to our fingertips in a single comprehensive volume.

Silverstone divides this important book into two parts—United States Navy warships and vessels of the Confederate States Navy. He also separates Union craft into the following categories: armored vessels; unarmored steam vessels; acquired combat vessels; service vessels; sailing ships; the Mississippi River Fleet; the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service; and the U.S. Coast Survey. He divides Confederate ships into similar categories: armored vessels; unarmored steam vessels; area defense forces; privateers; blockade runners; and tenders. Beginning with a brief historical statement that explains developments occurring within that particular category, Silverstone offers a breakdown by ship classification and then provides an incredible alphabetical listing of vessels, including their size and dimensions, time and place of construction, and service record (i.e. actions fought, damage sustained, prizes taken, ships sunk, dates of commission, as well as when the ship left the navy, names used in other service, and the ultimate fate of each vessel). He concludes with an appendix that offers an alphabetical listing of shipbuilders and their location.

Those who anticipate a narrative about the Civil War navies may be greatly disappointed. Even so, this abundantly illustrated volume is a wonderful reference tool and will be a pleasant surprise for those who desire to learn more about the Civil War at sea.

—Gene A. Smith
Texas Christian University

LONG GRAY LINES The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839-1915

By Rod Andrew, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Pp. 184, \$29.95, ISBN 0-9078-2610-3).

Military and cultural historians have marveled at the martial ardor demonstrated by southern soldiers during and after the Civil

War. Rod Andrew examines possible sources to southern military élan by studying military tradition that developed in southern schools, beginning with the Virginia Military Institute in 1839, and revived after 1865 in military academies and land-grant colleges.

Andrew challenges many widely held notions about these schools. Low tuition rates and scholarships made them affordable to a broad class of southern men; they were not bastions of aristocratic prestige. The military curriculum emphasized science and engineering; hence, these schools were not anachronisms in a modernizing world. Finally, the training of students was to promote superior citizens, not merely provide soldiers; hence, the military school tradition was as much about the definition of republican citizens as it was about protection and defense.

Contrary to perceptions held in 1861, and repeated by historians since then, the military schools were not intended to promote sectionalism. Events, not design, made the institutions into bastions of southern nationalism. Cadets from VMI guarded John Brown in 1859 and Citadel cadets fired cannon at the *Star of the West* in January 1861. VMI cadets made a gallant charge at the Battle of New Market in 1864.

It was the post-bellum phenomenon of the "Lost Cause" that completed the link between the military school tradition and support for the Confederacy. Many southern military schools and land-grant colleges selected ex-Confederate generals to be their presidents. The cadets performed Memorial Day rituals and other ceremonies commemorating the Confederacy; many that involved Civil War veterans. These ties helped make the cadets "symbols of the Lost Cause," a living testament to what Southerners believed was best about themselves. Simultaneously, cadets juxtaposed militarism and liberalism in a peculiarly southern way, suggesting a regional mindset on the evolving definition of American citizen.

—Edward R. Crowther
Alamosa, Colorado

ON CAMPAIGN WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC The Civil War Journal of Theodore Ayrault Dodge

Stephen W. Sears, ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001. Pp. 304, \$28.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8154-1030-1).

"From noon until three o'clock," wrote the French novelist Stendhal after observing the Battle of Bautzen in 1813, "we had an excellent view of all that can be seen of a battle—that is, nothing at all." Stendhal's remark offers a powerful corrective to the false image of nineteenth-century warfare as an orderly business, with soldiers in brightly colored uni-

forms charging in neat columns, sabers drawn, bayonets flashing, and cannon booming in the background. Yet an astute eyewitness can discern much that remains elusive to the painstaking research of the historian and even to the penetrating vision of the novelist. Theodore Ayrault Dodge was such a man.

In his wartime journal, faithfully kept between June 7, 1862, and July 5, 1863, Lieutenant Dodge, adjutant in two New York regiments (the 101st and the 119th, the latter part of the infamous Eleventh Corps), recorded the condition, temper, maneuvers, and engagements of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula Campaign to the Battle of Gettysburg. No detail of camp life, whether pleasant, exasperating, or melancholy, was too small to escape Dodge's notice. His austere descriptions and precise analyses of the fighting, however, constitute the most memorable aspect of the book, early displaying the gifts that, after the war, established him among the finest military historians of his generation.

—Mark G. Malvasi
Macon College

MY BRAVE BOYS To War with Colonel Cross & the Fighting Fifth

By Mike Pride and Mark Travis (New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2001. Pp. 310, \$27.95 cloth, ISBN 1-58465-075-3).

Colonel Edward Cross' "Fighting Fifth" New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry is among the most storied regiments of the Army of the Potomac. However, Cross and his men are today surrounded by myth and legend, coupled with a healthy lack of readily available detail. Mike Pride and Mark Travis' new book helps modern aficionados of the Fifth New Hampshire and the Second Corps obtain a deeper understanding of this remarkable regiment.

Travis and Pride, both of whom are veteran New Hampshire journalists, have created a remarkably well written and well researched account of the Fifth New Hampshire. *My Brave Boys* makes skillful use of first person accounts, in effect letting the men of the regiment—particularly Cross—tell their own story. Sources include a myriad of New Hampshire newspaper accounts, personal letters, diaries, soldier memoirs, and a previous regimental history, together with the *Official Records* and secondary sources. The book is easily digestible and reads almost like a novel. In particular, the authors' style and use of first-person quotations generates sympathy for the soldiers as the reader gets to "know" them. The book's concluding chapter includes a "what happened to them" section to wrap up each storyteller's tale.

In the book's first chapter, Pride and Travis provide excellent detailed background infor-



Abraham Lincoln Book Shop, Inc.

Since 1938, Buying and Selling...
Books, Autographs, Manuscripts, Documents,
Original Photographs, Prints,
Paintings, and Sculpture

Pertaining To...
The Civil War, Lincolniana, U.S. Presidency,
U.S. Military History, and Political History

Reach Us At...
357 West Chicago Ave. Chicago, IL 60610
312/944-3085 ♦ Fax 312/944-5549
<www.ALincolnBookShop.com>



1861-65

**BAND
MUSIC**

The 37th GEORGIA BAND
announces a new series of CD albums!

Each CD runs 1 hr. or longer, with Confederate and/or Union music played on period instruments. \$15 plus \$3.00 S&H, with vendor discounts for quantity orders. Georgians please add \$1.05 tax. Allow 3-4 weeks for delivery. (Non-US checks must be drawn on American banks, with S&H-\$3.50; no foreign money orders.)

CD 1: The Bandmaster's Favorites
CD 2: Rebel Rousers and Concert Classics
CD 3: Serenade in Blue
Contact Bandmaster, 766 Riverhill Drive, Athens, GA 30606. Ph: (706) 543-4559 or <http://www.netnik.com/37gaband>



A Fugawee Replica

Front: an original built in 1864
Rear: The Fugawee Artillery Boot
now in production.
It has antique molded vamp, full
cowhide lining.

www.fugawee.com

**Fugawee Corp (800) 749
0387 business hours only**

mation on Cross, who was something of an enigma then and now. Cross was a journalist who truly led an adventurer's life in the pre-war years. The authors do not varnish his shortcomings: he had a hair trigger temper, mood swings, was profane and harsh, and possessed virulent Know-Nothing sentiment. On the other hand, Cross possessed unquestionable courage, leadership ability, and eagerness, created an excellent regiment in his own hard-boiled image, and was wounded in three battles.

One of the chief distractions of the otherwise well done *My Brave Boys* is that the book does not appear to have a defined purpose, as it is neither a full biography of Cross nor a true regimental history of the Fifth New Hampshire. It is at times both, and other times it is neither of these things.

The book ends shortly after the battle of Gettysburg, in which Cross was mortally wounded and the regiment reduced to less than 150 men. Despite the fact that the Fifth fought in the Overland, Petersburg, and Appomattox campaigns, Pride and Travis omitted these portions of the regiment's service, presumably based on a remark in the concluding chapter that, after Gettysburg, the regiment was never the same again. This could also be said for many other units, and to neglect a regiment's history for the entire second half of the war seems somehow tragic. One hopes that Travis and Pride eventually write a companion volume to *My Brave Boys* that takes the Fifth through its final muster-out.

The book is curiously annotated and does not use traditional footnotes or endnotes, which increases the difficulty of consulting the references. The book ends with the Fifth's return home to New Hampshire to recruit in the summer of 1863, but never states why, of all the battle-scarred Gettysburg regiments, the Fifth was allowed to return home while so many other units had to remain at the front.

My Brave Boys constantly compares the Fifth to the Irish Brigade, which was in the same division, and include as alleged fact a lot of Cross' personal prejudice against the Irish Brigade's controversial commander, Thomas Francis Meagher. The constant comparisons—the Irish Brigade is mentioned more than any other unit except the Fifth itself—grow somewhat tiresome about midway through the book.

The book's dust jacket perpetuates one of the Fifth's common myths, claiming that no Federal regiment in the Civil War, "not one, suffered more deaths in battle than the Fifth New Hampshire," to cite verbatim. According to William Fox's *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War*, while the Fifth lost more men (295 killed and mortally wounded over a period of three years) than any *infantry* regiment, its oft-quoted grisly "first ranking" ne-


glects two Federal heavy artillery regiments. The First Maine Heavy Artillery lost 423 killed and mortally wounded, and the Eighth New York Heavy Artillery lost 361 killed and mortally wounded, both over a period of only ten months.

Despite these criticisms, *My Brave Boys* casts some much needed modern light on a storied but curiously little known regiment and its contentious commander. It is a very good book and possesses the best qualities of a good historical account—it is well written, well researched, and an excellent read.

—Kevin O'Beirne
Hamburg, New York

Crossfire

(continued from page 7) no war. On the other hand, it was not the *only* issue. Others included a clash of cultures, the resistance of a conservative society to modernization, and concepts of honor and self-determination. As for being "anti-American," clearly the attempt to consign any group to permanent second class status is contrary to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. But both the North's antebellum resistance to the expansion of slavery and the South's resistance to the abolitionist threat were classically American: an insistence that no group should dictate to another its way of life. (And yes, this is incompatible with the defense of slavery—but no one ever said human beings had to be consistent.)



Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis

Portrait of Dred Scott (c.1881)
Painting by Louis Schultze, commissioned by "a group of Negro citizens" and presented to the Missouri Historical Society in 1882.

* * * *

Excellent magazine, by the way!

I read with great interest the article, "What Caused the Civil War?" and have since followed the "Crossfire" tit-for-tat between the author, Dr. James M. McPherson, and your "devoted reader," Mr. Ron Jones. I was incredulous to learn from Mr. Jones that even the title of the

article, i.e., "Civil War," was wrong because the Confederate States of America was, unbeknownst to most of us, a separate country, and therefore, by definition, could not have been party to a civil war. (Webster's unabridged dictionary defines civil war as: "a war between different sections or parties of the same country or nation.")

Oh well, we still have plenty of good names for that war: the War for the Union, the War for Southern Independence, the War of American Unity, the War Between the States, the Uncivil War, and more, including my favorites, That Recent Unpleasantness, and the War of the Rebellion.

Abraham Lincoln was trying to prevent just such an argument when he adroitly refused to recognize the Confederacy, called the insurrection "combinations" in rebellion, advised the secretary of state not to receive official delegations of seceded states, and did not ask Congress for a declaration of war. One got by congress however, when they incorrectly used the term "blockade," which is what one does to a foreign enemy, when technically they should have said the southern ports and borders of the United States were "closed."

I would be interested in reading an article making some credible arguments for the thesis that the Confederate States of America actually attained the status of a sovereign nation. I would find convincing such facts as recognition by a few major world powers, exchange of diplomats, treaties, or military assistance, as occurred with the United States during the revolutionary war; years of a country not even trying to control part of its claimed territory, as happened when Texas obtained its independence from Mexico; division imposed by external power as was the case with East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam; or separation by mutual consent as took place a decade ago with the Soviet Union. One imaginative approach to such an article might be to follow the old saw that the United States was merely a voluntary association of independent sovereign countries, making the war in question not a civil war at all, but one between a confederation of 11 countries on one side and an alliance of 23 countries on the other. After all, when WW II was drawing to a close and plans were being made for a U.N., Stalin suggested the U.S.S.R. get 12 delegates since it was actually a union of 12 republics. Roosevelt immediately concurred, pointing out that the U.S. was actually a union of 48 states. The absurdity of it all was instantly obvious and Stalin instantly withdrew his suggestion. Mention of the C.S.A. in parole documents simply does not rise to the level of credible proof in my opinion. Methinks such arguments are frivolous and put far too fine a point on near irrelevancies.

—Clark Larsen,
Holladay, Utah

ART

AFFORDABLE CIVIL WAR PRINTS
of Forrest, Lee & Jackson
www.civilwarart.com

BATTLEFIELD MAPS

FULL COLOR TOPOGRAPHIC MAPS of CW Battlefield Parks. All monuments, markers and visitor information. For information contact: Trailhead Graphics, Inc., PO Box 472991A, Aurora, CO 80047. 800-390-5117 or www.trailheadgraphics.com

BOOKS/PUBLICATIONS

"THE TRUE STORY OF JESSE JAMES"
by Brad Dalton. The Civil War in Missouri as it's never been told before. Order from Barnes & Noble or "iuniverse.com", toll free 1-877-823-9235. 475pgs

NOVEL REVEALS THE TRUTH about the Lost Gold of the Confederacy. **DAWN** available at bn.com for \$12.95. Go to Bookstore. Under keyword, type in author's name Byron Edwards.

FREE CATALOG politically incorrect books & music. Send \$1.00 for postage. Bohica Concepts, POB 546, Dept. NS, Randle, Washington 98377

THE BEST ORIGINAL CIVIL WAR BOOKS. Free catalog. Online articles, forthcoming book news, and interviews, see www.savaspublishing.com. Savas Publishing, 202 1st Street SE, Suite 103A, Mason City, IA 50401. 515-421-7135.

GHOST GUNS OF VIRGINIA. In-depth traveler's journal. \$35 per year/20 issues. CVS, 2355 Fairview Ave., Roseville, MN 55113. www.geocities.com/GastropodGraphics/CivilWar/GGHampton.html

COLLECTIBLES

CIVIL WAR AUTOGRAPHS, LETTERS, DIARIES, STAMPS, CURRENCY



Price list upon request.
Top prices paid for
quality material.

BRIAN & MARIA GREEN
P.O. Box 1816 NS
Kernersville, NC 27285-1816

336-993-5100

fax: 336-993-1801


Website: <http://www.collectorsnet.com/bmg/>

COMMUNITY

RESIDENTS WANTED TO LIVE AND WORK in an 1800s style military outpost/b&b/farm, with or without experience. Need singles, couples and/or families for the following positions: cooks, admin, farmers, general store personnel, saloon personnel (no alcohol), maint & grounds, wood workers and more. For information and numbered application send \$3.00 to: William Costello, POB 15102, Fremont, CA 94539

MILITARY MINIATURES

PAINTED A.C.W 54MM METAL SOLDIERS BY SHENANDOAH AUSTRALIA IN EITHER MATT OR GLOSS. Contact Heritage Toy Soldiers, P.O. Box 1440, Booragoon, Western Australia 6954. Tel/Fax 061-08-9337-8149 or e-mail heritage@ic-net.com.au



scales), naval vessels, siege guns, etc.! Total of over 50 brands!

FREE Civil War Miniatures Catalog

We stock over 1500
unpainted kits/
models & diorama
aid products, inc.
figures (many

To obtain a **FREE** copy of Homegrown's Late War Vignettes 4 page catalog (contains photos):

write: **Military Miniatures Warehouse**
159 Pine Tree Lane, Tappan, NY 10983, E-mail:
milminwh@aol.com; call/fax: 845-680-2503

REPRODUCTIONS

CIVIL WAR SUPPLIES

Uniforms • Muskets • Tinware • Leather Goods
Edged Weapons • Patters • Books and
Much Much More

FINEST QUALITY REPRODUCTIONS

Illustrated Catalog \$3.00

Upper Mississippi Valley Mercantile Co.
1607 Washington St., Davenport, Iowa 52804

PH: (563) 322-0896 • FX: (563) 383-5548

<http://www.umvmco.com>

RESTORATION

Old Photos Restored

Prices Start at \$8.50

800-777-0221

Digi-Tech Restorations

REENACTORS

CANADIANS WANTED—to join Ontario based, family-oriented Civil War Reenactment Association. See Website: <http://www.geocities.com/acwhrs/> Phone: Wayne Elliot 416-691-2395 Email: wdelliott@sympatico.ca

ROUNDTABLES

RECRUITS WANTED! NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE. Holds Bi-Monthly Meetings Near Burlington. New Members Welcome. Upcoming Speakers Include Ed Bearss, Richard McMurry, and Lee Kennett. For More Info, Call 919-933-5200, Or Visit Our Website At <http://www.mindspring.com/~nccwrt/home.htm>

7th ANNUAL WEST COAST CIVIL WAR ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE. November 9-11, 2001. Radisson Resorts Knott's Berry Farm, Buena Park, Ca. "Confederate Tide Rising: The 1862 Maryland Campaign - South Mountain and Antietam." Brian Pohanka, Joseph Harsh, Richard Rollins. For conference registration information contact: Maryann Koenig (714) 539-0550 or email: yankeeangel5@cs.com

TOURS/VACATION

★ WHITE STAR ★ BATTLEFIELD TOURS

Private Guided Tours Through the
Chickamauga - Chattanooga
National Military Park

Group Tours Available

1746 West Cove Street
Chickamauga, GA 30707

888-828-1864

www.battlefieldguide.com

"Dedicated to the Boys"

WANTED

WANTED BACK ISSUES OF CIVIL WAR,
No. 53, 55, 59, 61, 64, 66, 69. Email:
LZAWORSKI@AOL.COM

GETTYSBURG WRITINGS FROM SOLDIERS - JUNE 25, 1863 - JULY 4, 1863. Material to be used in upcoming book based on personal experiences during the Gettysburg Campaign. Please include source info, your name and address. Send to: Jeff, PMB #141, 3111 Rt. 38 #11 Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054-9754 or email to Gettysburgstories@hotmail.com.

Huge Collection of Important Civil War Collectibles!



MAIL BID AUCTION • OCTOBER 13, 2001

MAIL BID AUCTIONS EVERY TWO MONTHS ♦ APPROXIMATELY 2,100 LOTS IN THIS AUCTION





See our Entire Catalog on the Internet • Images Enlarged and in Full Color

www.EarlyAmerican.com

COINS ♦ CURRENCY ♦ MILITARIA ♦ SLAVERY ♦ LINCOLN
AUTOGRAPHS ♦ STAMPS ♦ CIVIL WAR ♦ AMERICANA ♦ MAPS



ALWAYS BUYING COLLECTIONS & ACCEPTING IMPORTANT CONSIGNMENTS



Send \$36 for a Full Year's Subscription of Six Catalogs

EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY AUCTIONS, INC.

P.O. Box 3341 ♦ LA JOLLA, CA 92038 ♦ (858) 459-4159 ♦ 1-800-473-5686 ♦ FAX (858) 459-4373